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A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS 
AND SELF-REGULATED LEARNING AMONG ADVANCED PLACEMENT 
CALCULUS STUDENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
by
James Clinton Stockton 
Secondary mathematics educators advocating constructivist-oriented instruction face the 
dilemma of developing students’ problem-solving skills. Students’ epistemological 
beliefs and self-regulated learning (SRL) processing capacity influence mathematical 
problem-solving prowess. This multiple-case study explored the relationships between 
epistemological beliefs and SRL processing while advanced mathematics students 
engaged in problem-solving tasks and investigated students’ SRL strategy use, heuristic 
strategy use, and problem-solving performance. Data sources included think-aloud and 
interview transcriptions, student work, and classroom observation protocols. Validity and 
reliability were enhanced via member-checking interviews, triangulation, peer review, 
and completion of a case study database. Five major findings emerged from the data: (1) 
participants’ unique/arbitrary beliefs regarding problem solutions, procedural/conceptual 
beliefs in problem solving, and empirical/rational beliefs in problem solving were related 
to various facets of SRL processing; (2) differences in SRL strategy use were noted 
dependent upon cognitive load of problem-solving tasks; (3) heuristic strategy use was
vii
related to participants’ mathematical problem-solving beliefs; (4) problem-solving 
performance was related to participants’ mathematical problem-solving beliefs; (5) 
discrepancies were noted between espoused beliefs and manifested beliefs among
participants with non-availing beliefs. Recommendations for practicing mathematics 
educators include the assessment and development of students’ mathematical 
epistemological beliefs and SRL processing capacity, differentiation of cognitive load for 
tasks based on assessments of students’ cognitive capacity, and professional development 
training for teachers. Further research is needed which involves students of various 
achievement levels and extends methodologies to grounded theory or structural equation 
modeling. Additionally, a request is made for more research from classroom teachers.
Keywords: epistemological beliefs; gifted students; mathematics education; mathematical 
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study investigated the relationships between epistemological beliefs and self-
regulated learning (SRL) processing while students engaged in mathematical problem-
solving tasks. Data collected from six students selected from an Advanced Placement 
(AP)* Calculus BC course provided detailed narratives and cross-case analysis explaining 
the phenomenon. Hopefully the results of this study will inform pedagogical practice for 
the purpose of fostering improved problem solving skills in secondary mathematics 
students. 
 This chapter initially addresses the background and context of the study. Then a 
statement of the problem and purpose of the study leads to the research questions that 
drove the inquiry. The chapter also includes a brief overview of the research design, 
assumptions inherent in the study, the rationale for conducting the study, and significance 
of the study. This chapter concludes with definitions of key terms and limitations and 
delimitations inherent in the study.
Background and Context 
 For the purposes of this study, problem solving was viewed as an activity that 
facilitates student learning of mathematics. The implication of this stance is that a study
relating self-regulation, epistemology, and problem solving may inform pedagogical 
practice for the purpose of fostering increased student learning of mathematics. Early
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mathematical problem-solving theorists and researchers suggested that issues of control 
and mathematical beliefs are connected to the successful completion of mathematical 
problems (e.g., Polya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989). More recently, 
theorists and researchers have infused contemporary self-regulated learning (SRL) theory 
and epistemological beliefs into the study of mathematical problem solving (Hofer, 1999;
Muis, 2004, 2008). This study extended the exploration of these constructs using a 
multiple-case study design in an advanced high school mathematics course. 
SRL was viewed as students’ autonomous control of learning experiences via the 
following phases: definition of the task, forethought, performance control, and self-
reflection (Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). Based on a review of literature, 
mathematical problem-solving-based epistemological beliefs were assumed to exist on a 
continuum and were identified as follows: rational/empirical approaches, nature of 
problem solutions, duration of problem-solving, procedural/conceptual approaches,
importance/usefulness of mathematics, and effort/inherent mathematical ability 
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Muis, 2004; Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 
1992). To appropriately define the background and context of issues germane to the 
study, this section will present a summary of student learning issues relative to SRL,
epistemology, and problem solving. 
Philosophical Viewpoint of Student Learning 
Much debate has revolved around how students do and should learn mathematics. 
The camps range from back-to-basics rote learning to radical constructivism (Steffe & 
Kieren, 1994). The researcher’s philosophical perspective closely resembles von 
Glasersfeld’s trivial constructivism (as cited in Steffe & Kieren, 1994), which implies 
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that students can and do construct their own mathematical meanings, and carries the 
assumption that researchers and practitioners can identify, study, and enhance students’ 
mathematical ways of knowing. Based on its alignment with this philosophical 
perspective, the definition of student learning defined by the National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) was used throughout this paper: “Students must learn 
mathematics with understanding, actively building new knowledge from experience and
prior knowledge” (NCTM, 2000, p. 20). 
This study utilized the definition of mathematical problem solving provided by 
Schoenfeld (1985), who stated, “By definition, problem situations are those in which the 
individual does not have ready access to a (more or less) prepackaged means of solution” 
(p. 54). Due to the novel student experiences inherent in a constructivist perspective, 
Schoenfeld’s definition implied that mathematical problem solving is at the heart of 
students’ learning of mathematics. Student learning will now be situated within the 
interrelated constructs of problem solving, epistemology, and SRL. 
Mathematical Problem Solving and SRL
“For mathematics education and for the world of problem solving [Polya’s works] 
marked a line of demarcation between two eras, problem solving before and after Polya” 
(Schoenfeld, 1987, p. 283). Polya (1957) developed a problem solving system, 
understand, plan, execute, and check, which remarkably foreshadowed every phase of the 
SRL model described above. The theoretical basis of Polya’s problem-solving system 
was an extensive list of heuristics, or problem-solving strategies. The main focuses of his 
problem-solving works were the application and adaptation of these heuristic strategies, 
teacher-student dialogues, and internal dialogues of students solving problems.  
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Drawing upon the works of Polya, Schoenfeld studied the problem solving 
practices of undergraduate and high school students. Schoenfeld’s (1985) mathematical 
problem solving framework included the aspect of control, which he further subdivided 
into reading, analyzing, exploring, planning, implementing, and verifying. Schoenfeld’s 
(1982, 1985) findings suggested that many students do not enter college with the 
appropriate control skills for problem solving, but usage and adaptation of heuristic skills 
can be taught to students. Specifically, many students who engaged in wild goose chases
involving empirical meanderings without curtail were unable to solve his problems 
(Schoenfeld, 1982, 1985). Schoenfeld’s (1988, 1989) suggested that the extensive focus 
on structure and standardized testing that pervades many high school classrooms is the 
cause of such ill preparation. It should be noted that these studies were conducted at a 
New York high school with an excellent track record for high student achievement on the 
standardized Regents exam. Thus, Schoenfeld’s findings suggested a significant 
disconnect between the learning implied by standardized exam results and the learning 
suggested by a constructivist perspective. In fact, Schoenfeld (1988) stated, “It is pretty 
clear what mathematical thinking is not: the rote memorization of facts and procedures as 
often practiced in our classrooms, and as reified by current texts and examinations” (p. 
164).  
In 2000, the NCTM published Principles and Standards for School Mathematics,
a culmination of over a decade of reform efforts. (It should be noted that Schoenfeld was 
a contributing author to the grades 9-12 chapters of the volume.) The suggestions in 
Principles and Standards reflected a constructivist, conceptually-oriented view of 
teaching and learning mathematics. For the problem solving standard, NCTM (2000) 
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suggested that “instructional programs from prekindergarten through grade 12 should 
enable all students to apply and adapt a variety of appropriate strategies to solve 
problems” and “monitor and reflect on the process of mathematical problem solving” (p. 
334). Adapting, monitoring, and reflecting are key cognitive actions inherent in the 
model of SRL used in this study. From a constructivist viewpoint, then, student learning 
that is fostered through mathematical problem solving may be partially dependent upon 
the attainment of self regulatory skills.
With respect to general educational psychology, the origins of SRL can be traced
to Vygotsky’s (1978) notions of self-talk and Bandura’s (1986, 1997) social cognitive 
theory. Briefly, “self regulation refers to self-generated thoughts, feelings, and actions 
that are planned and cyclically adapted to the attainment of personal goals” (Zimmerman, 
2000, p. 14). For the purposes of this study, SRL was viewed as a cyclic, recursive 
process that involves the following phases: definition of the task, forethought, 
performance control, and self-reflection (Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). 
Definition of the task and forethought are pre-action phases and include such activities as 
defining the problem-solving space, setting goals, and developing plans. Performance 
control is the action phase and includes application and monitoring of appropriate 
strategies, while applying self-control throughout the learning experience. Self-reflection
is the post-action phase and involves evaluation of performance and determination of 
causal attributions for both successful and unsuccessful aspects of the completed task. 
Typically, judgments are made assessing the effectiveness of the learning strategies used, 
which provides internal feedback affecting further action for the current learning task (if 
needed) and all other future learning tasks. Students’ actions may indicate structured 
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adherence to the model, recursive, cyclic patterns of behavior within the phases of the 
model, or very little adherence to the model. 
De Corte, Verschaffel, and Op ’T Eynde (2000) suggested a model for “self-
regulated mathematical learning and problem solving” to encompass more contemporary 
views of SRL (p. 693). A major component of the model was students’ mathematical 
dispositions, which included the application of heuristic strategies and self-regulatory 
skills. For the purposes of this study, heuristic strategies were viewed as domain-specific 
strategies that may be enacted during the performance control phase of SRL. Students’ 
mathematical beliefs are another major component of the dispositional perspective, which 
segues into the next section.  
Mathematical Problem Solving and Epistemology
 In addition to issues of control, students’ epistemological beliefs are important 
factors in the successful navigation of a problem space (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; 
Muis, 2004, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1992). Polya’s (1957) contributions to 
problem solving dealt very little with issues of personal epistemology, instead focusing 
on teacher-student dialogue and heuristic strategy application and adaptation. This is 
consistent with historical reviews of mathematics education, which cite the early to mid-
twentieth century as an era of the philosophy of knowledge transfer (D’Ambrosio, 2003).  
Schoenfeld (1983, 1985, 1992) is generally credited with formally introducing 
personal epistemology to the mathematical problem-solving dialogue. He suggested that 
students’ “mathematical worldviews” are key components to the successful completion of 
problem-based tasks (Schoenfeld, 1985, p. 186). Schoenfeld dichotomously defined 
students’ mathematical problem solving beliefs as rational (logical and analytical 
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approach) or empirical (observational and perceptual approach). In general, Schoenfeld’s 
studies suggested that rational problem solvers exert more control and are more 
successful than their empirical counterparts. Typical empirical students’ beliefs included 
the assumptions that formal mathematics is not needed during problem solving, 
mathematics problems are solved quickly or not at all, mathematical discovery is only 
possible for geniuses, a unique solution exists for all mathematics problems, and a 
algorithmic, procedural method is available for all mathematics problems (Schoenfeld, 
1985, 1992). These non-availing mathematical beliefs would surface later as both general
and domain-specific epistemological beliefs literature expanded to a multi-dimensional 
perspective (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2004; Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 
2006; Schommer, 1990). 
Schommer (1990) was the first to suggest that epistemological beliefs may exist 
as a system of independent dimensions. Much theoretical and empirical work led to the 
development of a contemporary system of epistemological beliefs: certainty of 
knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, sources of knowledge, and justification for knowing 
(Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Additionally, domain-specificity has been 
suggested as a major factor in the study of students’ epistemological beliefs (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2004; Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 2006). The main justification for 
examining beliefs from a domain-specific perspective is based on the assumption that 
students’ beliefs vary with respect to the domain of study. In the field of mathematics 
education, there is relatively consistent agreement that students’ adherence to non-
availing mathematical beliefs are generally detrimental to learning and performance 
(Muis, 2004; NCTM, 2000; Schoenfeld, 1988, 1989). Muis (2004) suggested that a 
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system of mathematical beliefs may include the “nature of mathematics knowledge, 
justifications of mathematics knowledge, sources of mathematics knowledge, and 
acquisition of mathematics knowledge” (p. 326). Within this synthesis, Muis (2004) also 
suggested that students’ epistemological beliefs impact cognition and motivation, which 
foreshadowed her future work relating personal epistemology and SRL. 
SRL and Epistemology 
Recently, SRL processing and epistemological beliefs have begun to appear as 
interrelated constructs in the literature (Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009; 
Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Schommer-Aikins (2004) hypothesized that a reciprocal 
relationship may exist between epistemological beliefs and SRL. Students’ initial beliefs 
may affect the degree of self-regulatory actions taken in the classroom and subsequently, 
the potential feedback loop inherent to SRL processing may affect, or possibly alter, the 
initial beliefs. Muis (2007) presented a model introducing epistemological beliefs into 
Winne and Hadwin’s (1998) SRL model. She suggested that students’ epistemological 
beliefs are enacted during the task definition and goal-setting phases. These beliefs may 
subsequently affect other aspects of self-regulatory processing (i.e., self-monitoring, self-
reflection). Consistent with Schommer-Aikins’ theoretical assertion, Muis also suggested 
that a reciprocal relationship may exist between students’ epistemological beliefs and 
SRL. Muis and colleagues have begun the work of studying the relationships that exist 
between SRL and epistemology (Muis, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009). Their mixed-
methods findings were promising but suggested that further research is needed utilizing 
think-aloud and interview methods, specifically with respect to the definition of the task 
phase of SRL. 
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Problem Solving, SRL, and Epistemology  
 To my knowledge the only study investigating the relationships among 
mathematical problem solving, SRL, and epistemology is Muis’ (2008) study of 
Canadian college students. Muis conducted a mixed-methods study involving 
questionnaires, think-aloud protocols, and interview protocols. Her findings confirmed 
Schoenfeld’s assertion that rational problem solvers are more successful and engage in 
higher levels of SRL processing than empirical problem solvers. Her findings also 
suggested that epistemological beliefs are enacted during the definition of the task phase 
of SRL and may influence learning standards and strategies. Limitations to the study 
were the domain-generality of the epistemological questionnaire used and the lack of 
attention to more contemporary views of multi-dimensional aspects of epistemological 
beliefs. The current study attempted to extend the scholarly dialogue concerning 
connections between mathematical problem solving, epistemology, and SRL. The current 
study extended Muis’ (2008) work by infusing more contemporary, domain-specific 
epistemological beliefs into the theoretical framework. Additionally, the current study 
investigated high school students, an often underrepresented group in mathematics 
education research, in their authentic learning environment. 
Problem Statement
Research has demonstrated that a relationship exists between SRL and 
epistemological beliefs in multiple contexts (Bråten & Strømsø, 2005; Hofer, 1999; Muis, 
2008) . Research has also demonstrated that successful problem-solvers typically exert 
control over the problem space and have availing epistemological beliefs (Muis, 2008; 
Perels, Gürtler, & Schmitz, 2005; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989). Unfortunately, 
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students continue to enter university mathematics courses without adequate problem-
solving skills. Despite this fact, a significant gap exists in the relevant literature for 
secondary mathematics education. Therefore, this study utilized domain-specific beliefs, 
contemporary views of SRL and epistemology, and authentic problem-solving tasks in an 
effort to provide further insights into relationships between secondary mathematics 
students’ beliefs and self-regulatory problem-solving practices. 
Statement of Purpose and Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the SRL practices of six advanced 
mathematics students in relation to mathematical epistemological beliefs while engaged 
in problem-solving tasks. From a constructivist standpoint, it was assumed that 
engagement in mathematical problem solving could potentially lead to learning. So, 
furtherance of our understanding of the factors involved in both successful and 
unsuccessful students’ problem-solving engagement should lead to pedagogical 
initiatives aimed at improving student learning. This study explored these issues by 
answering the following research questions: 
1. How are students’ epistemological beliefs related to self-regulatory processing 
practices during engagement in mathematical problem-solving  tasks? 
2. What self-regulation strategies do students employ while preparing for the AP 
Calculus exam and engaging in problem-solving episodes?
3. What epistemological beliefs influence students’ choice and use of heuristic 
strategies to solve mathematical problems?
4. How are self-regulated learning strategies and epistemological beliefs related 
to student performance on problem-solving tasks? 
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Research Design Overview 
Prior to data collection, IRB approval was obtained from the local school district 
and university to study six students’ experiences with respect to the proposed problem. A 
multiple-case study design was selected to provide a deep, fine-grained exploration of 
students’ SRL processing practices relative to their mathematical epistemological beliefs 
(Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2008). Six students were selected to serve as case participants. The 
term case referred to a student who participated in the learning activities in this study and 
whose data were collected by the researcher. Due in large part to his mathematical 
background, the researcher applied the postpositivist qualitative paradigm to the study. 
Thus, research practices included accepting multiple realities to explain phenomena, 
applying rigorous data collection and analysis procedures, and reporting findings using a 
scientific structure (Creswell, 2007).  
Multiple types of data were collected from the six participants selected for this 
study. Data collection occurred in four different phases, with the first involving the 
administration of three quantitative surveys measuring students’ self-reported
epistemological beliefs and SRL aptitude. Second, students prepared for the AP Calculus 
exam during class by working select problems based on knowledge taught the prior 
semester. Field observation transcriptions and AP exam practice journals served as data 
sources. The third phase of data collection involved the six participants engaging in two 
think-aloud problem-solving sessions (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Immediately following 
each session, participants completed retrospective interviews to discuss various aspects of 
their navigation through the problem space. Finally, soon after completion of data 
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collection, participants engaged in member-checking interviews to review narrative draft 
reports and discuss initial findings.
Data analysis occurred concurrently with data collection to ensure that accurate 
recollections of events were documented, allow opportunities for addressing 
discrepancies or misconceptions, and inform the researcher as to whether alterations in 
the research design were needed. Descriptive statistics from the quantitative surveys 
aided in participant selection and provided initial, albeit self-reported, evidence of 
students’ self-regulatory prowess and epistemological beliefs. For the qualitative data, an 
extensive codebook was developed from a thorough review of the literature and was used 
to code each piece of data. Various matrices provided multiple perspectives for both 
individual and cross-case analyses and led to rich, thick narrative descriptions. Reliability 
was ensured by creating a case study database, establishing a chain of evidence, and 
conducting a peer review of the coding scheme. The validity of the findings was 
supported by triangulating data sources, conducting member-checking interviews, and 
developing rich, thick descriptions (Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2008). 
Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations of this study existed that were beyond the researcher’s control. First, 
the results of this small-scale case study may not be generalized to all secondary
mathematics students. Rather, the results provided a deeper, fine-grained description of 
advanced secondary mathematics students’ experiences that is much needed in the 
literature. Another limitation was my role as both teacher and researcher. Participants
may have reacted differently in certain situations than if an outside researcher had 
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conducted the study. Although this dual role provided particularly poignant insights into 
students’ actions, the researcher was careful not to introduce bias into the analysis of the 
findings, but reported actual students’ actions and intentions. Finally, research methods 
may have affected the results of this study. Specifically, issues of group dynamics may 
have affected results during the in-class portion of the study and think-aloud protocols, 
although a widely used method for assessing cognitive activities, may not have produced 
a complete report of each participant’s thinking (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
 The desire to gain a deep, fine-grained description of students’ actions led to 
certain necessary delimitations for the study. First, the study included six students to 
enable deep analysis of all data and provide rich descriptions. Second, only high school 
students were selected as this group seems most neglected in the literature. Third, all six 
students were selected from one intact class to introduce rich contextual descriptions and 
social interactions that are important to both epistemological and SRL constructs.
Assumptions 
 Four major assumptions were made with respect to this study based on the review 
of literature and the researcher’s nine-year experience as a high school mathematics 
teacher. The first assumption was that most AP Calculus students have an innate desire to 
learn mathematics. Those who are not learning-driven are typically grade-driven, so all 
students have some motivation to perform at a high level. Second, mathematical learning 
can be achieved, and possibly enhanced, by the act of problem solving. This assumption 
was derived from suggestions made by NCTM’s (2000) Principles and Standards. Third, 
heuristic strategies, when applied properly, enhance problem-solving prowess. Polya 
(1957) introduced heuristics as a viable pedagogical tool and then Schoenfeld’s (1985) 
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findings suggested that heuristics can be taught to students and have the potential to 
positively affect problem-solving performance. Fourth, SRL processing enhances 
students’ overall educational experiences, particularly in the mathematics classroom. This 
assumption, which is crucial to the rationale for conducting the study, has been in place 
among social cognitive theorists since the conception of SRL (Bandura, 1986; 
Zimmerman, 1989). 
Rationale and Significance
 The rationale for conducting this study stemmed from my desire to see students
learn mathematical concepts by engaging in mathematical problem solving tasks. As 
discussed above, students’ mathematical epistemological beliefs and self-regulatory 
strategy use may be related to their problem-solving performance (Muis, 2008; 
Schoenfeld, 1985). Additionally, the active construction of mathematical knowledge is 
dependent upon students’ problem-solving prowess (NCTM, 2000). Then, from a 
practitioner’s point of view, justification for the study is established based on potential 
student learning and achievement benefits. 
This study has the potential to significantly contribute to theory and practice. 
Work has recently been undertaken to establishing relational ties between 
epistemological beliefs and SRL (Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009). This study 
sought to extend these works. Specifically, this case study was designed to provide 
evidence of the relationships between epistemological beliefs and SRL at a finer grain 
size by closely examining students’ authentic experiences. For the practicing educator, 
the study should provide formative groundwork for the development of pedagogical 
interventions for developing students’ availing mathematical beliefs and self-regulatory 
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practices. My desire is that the study will contribute to general educational psychology 
theory, mathematics education theory, and mathematics teachers’ arsenals of best 
practices. 
Definitions of Terms
The terms below represent the major constructs that are important to this study. 
Operational definitions are provided to clarify how each term was used throughout the 
study. A more detailed and extensive description and analysis of each construct and its 
component parts may be found in Chapter II: Review of Relevant Literature.
Epistemological Beliefs
 Hofer and Pintrich (1997) described “personal epistemological development and 
epistemological beliefs” as “how individuals come to know, the theories and beliefs they 
hold about knowing, and the manner in which such epistemological premises are a part of 
and an influence on the cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning” (p. 88). This study 
examined both students’ general and mathematics-specific epistemological beliefs from a 
contemporary, multi-dimensional viewpoint. The general epistemological beliefs 
dimensions included: certainty of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, sources of 
knowledge, and justification for knowing (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The 
mathematical problem-solving epistemological beliefs dimensions included:
rational/empirical problem-solving, unique/arbitrary problem solutions, duration of 
problem-solving, procedural/conceptual approach, importance/usefulness of mathematics, 
and effort/inherent mathematical ability (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Muis, 2004; Royce 
& Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985). From a multi-dimensional epistemological 
16
beliefs perspective, students may hold various, even contradictory, beliefs depending on 
both contextual and domain-related issues.
Heuristic Strategies
 Generally considered the father of the modern study of heuristics, Polya (1957) 
defined heuristic strategies as “the process of solving problems, especially the mental 
operations typically useful in the process” (p. 129–130). Polya provided an extensive list 
of heuristic strategies and suggested that both teachers and students of mathematics could 
benefit from serious consideration of the use of heuristics when solving problems.  
Mathematical Problem 
For the proposed study, the definition of a mathematical problem is a scenario or 
situation proposed such that a prescribed solution path is not readily available to the 
solver (Schoenfeld, 1985). This definition differentiates between a mathematical problem 
and a mathematical exercise, which simply involves applying prescribed procedures. This 
distinction is important in that problems requiring application of pre-scripted knowledge 
(exercises) imply a rote-memorization approach to learning, which is in direct contrast to 
the constructivist philosophy of learning that is the basis of the study. 
Self-Regulated Learning (SRL)
Zimmerman (2002) defined SRL in the following manner: 
Self-regulation is not a mental ability or an academic performance skill; rather it 
is the self-directive process by which learners transform their mental abilities into 
academic skills. Learning is viewed as an activity that students do for themselves 
in a proactive way rather than as a covert event that happens to them in reaction to 
teaching. (p. 65) 
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For this study, the SRL process referenced by Zimmerman will include the following 
phases: definition of the task, forethought, performance control, and self-reflection 
(Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). Self-regulating students tend to navigate a 
problem space by recursively and cyclically applying the SRL phases as needed.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
This study examined how advanced mathematics students’ epistemological beliefs 
are related to self-regulated learning (SRL) processing while engaging in problem-
solving tasks. To complete a case study investigating such complex phenomena, a 
thorough review and critique of relevant literature was required (Yin, 2008). Thus, this 
chapter develops a literature-based analysis and synthesis of issues relevant to
epistemological beliefs, SRL, and mathematical problem-solving. 
Initially, the focus was on the broad spectrum of SRL literature and found highly-
developed theoretical constructs (e.g., Butler & Winne, 1995; Garcia & Pintrich, 1994; 
Pintrich, 2000; Winne & Hadwin, 1998, 2008; Zimmerman, 1989, 2000) and empirical 
studies relating SRL to various facets of education (e.g., Greene & Azevedo, 2009; 
Hadwin, Boutara, Knoetzke, & Thompson, 2004; Muis, 2008; Usher, 2009). As my 
review began to narrow, I discovered that current researchers were requesting studies 
investigating closely the specific mechanisms of students’ application of SRL processes 
and strategies (Hadwin, Boutara, Knoetzke, & Thompson, 2004; Winne & Jamieson-
Noel, 2003; Winne & Perry, 2000; Zimmerman, 2008). Thus, this study evolved into a 
qualitative case study to gain a rich description of individual students’ use of SRL 
processes, as opposed to a broad paint stroke of general SRL usage by a large sample of 
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students (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2008). This study is expected to augment current models 
of SRL and uncover new perspectives for modeling SRL.  
Further narrowing of the literature review revealed a topic of SRL study related 
directly to mathematics education–problem solving (De Corte, Verschaffel & Op ’T 
Eynde, 2000; Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1992). Then, the research topic was narrowed to 
the study of the relationships between epistemological beliefs and SRL processing of 
advanced high school mathematics students engaged in problem-solving episodes. 
Additional probing revealed that critical thinking and problem solving are influenced by 
students’ epistemological beliefs (Hofer, 1999, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 
Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Muis, 2004, 2007, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1989). 
Particularly influential to the overall design and content of the proposed study was a
mixed methods study by Muis (2008), which examined the complex weave of 
mathematics students’ epistemic profiles, SRL processing, and problem solving capacity. 
This study attempted to extend Muis’ work by examining SRL, epistemology, and 
problem solving at a finer grain size and by examining students’ epistemological beliefs 
from a more contemporary, domain-specific perspective. 
 The ensuing review of relevant literature is topically segmented and incrementally 
builds a theoretical framework for the study. The main topics relevant to this study 
include SRL, epistemology, and problem solving. Each topic will be analyzed and 
synthesized with regard to the field of mathematics education. The presentation of 
relevant literature is divided into the following sections: (1) theoretical analysis of SRL, 
(2) theoretical analysis of epistemology, and (3) theoretical analysis of problem solving. 
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The review culminates in a description of the theoretical framework developed from the 
literature reviewed.
Topical Review of Relevant Literature
Theoretical Analysis of SRL
The purpose of this section of the literature review is to provide an analysis of 
general theory of SRL relevant to the study. As a branch of educational psychology, SRL 
has been widely researched and theoretically developed. SRL originated from Vygotsky’s 
(1978) notions of inner speech and Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory. Ormrod 
(2008) described the connection between Vygotsky’s theories on inner speech and SRL 
as follows:
In Vygotsky’s view, such self-talk (also known as private speech) plays an 
important role in cognitive development. By talking to themselves, children learn 
to guide and direct their own behaviors through difficult tasks and complex 
maneuvers in much the same way that adults have previously guided them. Self-
talk eventually evolves into inner speech [italics added], in which children “talk” 
to themselves mentally rather than aloud . . . We are essentially talking about self-
regulation here. (p. 331) 
Students who practice inner speech are essentially applying the self-monitoring process 
of SRL, which involves evaluating the effectiveness of learning goals and cycling back 
through SRL processes if needed. Several cognitive and affective processes are common 
to most SRL models (Butler & Winne, 1995; Garcia & Pintrich, 1994; Pintrich, 2000; 
Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). The ensuing theoretical analysis of SRL 
contains a description and analysis of the processes involved in the model used in this 
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study, qualitative studies of SRL processing, and relationships between SRL, external 
feedback, and motivation.  
Self-Regulated Learning (SRL) Processing Model
SRL is a highly-developed theory within educational psychology that describes 
students’ control of learning. Students may control, or regulate, virtually any aspect of 
their learning, including, but not limited to: cognition, metacognition, motivation and 
affect, emotion, and behavior (Boekaerts & Niemivirta, 2000; Pintrich, 2000). This study 
focused on SRL processing of cognitive and metacognitive navigation through problem-
solving tasks.  
Multiple models to describe SRL processing have been developed. For this study, 
Zimmerman’s (2000) cyclic model served as the main framework for describing SRL 
processing. However, particularly salient constructs from other models were integrated 
into Zimmerman’s model (Butler & Winne, 1995; Garcia & Pintrich, 1994; Pintrich, 
2000; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). Steeped in the tenets of social cognitive theory, 
Zimmerman’s (2000) cyclic model involves the following three phases: (1) forethought, 
(2) performance control, and (3) self-reflection. For the model used in this study, Winne 
and Hadwin’s (1998) definition of the task phase precedes these three phases. These four 
phases of SRL will serve to organizationally subdivide this section of the literature 
review.  
Definition of the task. Winne and Hadwin (1998) posited that self-regulating 
students develop a definition of the task prior to a specific goal-setting and planning 
phase. The definition of the task is “a perception about features of the task” and involves
students’ development of inferences and preliminary goals relative to the task (p. 283). 
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Portions of the task definition will remain intact throughout the task, while others will be 
eliminated as additional information is gleaned from future SRL processes. 
Forethought. The forethought phase involves developing goals and planning 
activities for the purpose of completing the learning task. Particularly well-attuned self-
regulators will set distal learning goals and then evaluate their progress via proximal 
process goals (Zimmerman, 1989, 2000). Process goals serve as standards for measuring 
task progression and provide the learner with parameters to assess levels of success. More 
specifically, goals may be classified as mastery- (focused on learning and understanding) 
or performance- (focused on doing better than others) oriented (Pintrich, 2000). Further 
delineation of performance goals yields an approach focus (motivated to demonstrate 
superiority over peers) and an avoidance focus (motivated to avoid failure). Pintrich 
(2000) pointed out that mastery- and performance-approach goal orientations tend to 
produce increased SRL processing in students, whereas students with a performance-
avoidance goal orientation tend to demonstrate inferior cognitive processing skills. 
Although mastery goals may also be subdivided into the categories approach (focused on 
comprehension and learning) and avoidance (focused on avoidance of misunderstanding), 
researchers typically do not address this distinction. Pintrich (2000) speculated that 
students with a mastery-avoidance approach may use less adaptive monitoring processes 
due to a focus on not making mistakes rather than on deep learning. Furthermore, SRL 
processing is not linear. Thus, students may set goals prior to a learning task or during 
latter stages of the task based on future SRL processing (Boekaerts & Niemivirta, 2000; 
Pintrich, 2000). 
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The planning stage involves the selection of strategies best suited to the learning 
task based on goal-driven standards for learning. Additionally, self-regulatory strategies 
vary with respect to both individuals and learning contexts. Since adjustments are 
necessary for most learning tasks, self-regulating students must develop a plan to monitor 
their progress as they navigate through the learning task (Boekaerts & Niemivirta, 2000; 
Zimmerman, 1989, 2000). 
Schunk (1996) reported the results of two empirical studies analyzing the effects 
of goal-setting and self-evaluation on fourth-grade students’ self-efficacy and 
achievement. Schunk adopted Dweck and Leggett’s differentiations of goal profiles (as 
cited in Schunk, 1996, p. 361) for the study: “A learning goal refers to what knowledge 
and skills students are to acquire; a performance goal denotes what task students are to 
complete.” These goal types are respectively synonymous with the mastery and 
performance goal orientations discussed above. In both studies, students were learning 
fraction skills and were divided into four groups. The groups consisted of students who 
were taught to set learning goals, students who were taught to set learning goals and 
practice self-evaluation, students who were taught to set performance goals, and students 
who were taught to set performance goals and practice self-evaluation. The reason for 
developing such groups was to better examine the effects of the differing types of goals 
and the presence or absence of self-evaluation practices. Schunk used a pretest-posttest 
model with assessments measuring students’ goal orientation, self-efficacy, skill, and 
motivation. The findings from both studies suggested that setting learning goals enhances 
students’ task (or mastery) goal orientation, skill, self-efficacy and motivation. The 
achievement results were mixed in that only the second study showed a significant 
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increase in achievement for students who set learning goals and participated in self-
evaluation, in comparison to students who set performance goals and participated in self-
evaluation.  
Ablard and Lipschultz (1998) investigated high-achieving students’ SRL 
processing with respect to goal orientation. One rationale for conducting the study was 
the suggestion from prior research that performance levels of some gifted students 
indicate underachievement (Risemberg & Zimmerman, 1992). Ablard and Lipschultz 
suggested that a lack of SRL processing capacity may be a factor in gifted students’ 
underachievement. To investigate their claim, the authors conducted a study of 222 
seventh-grade students who scored in the top 3% on grade-level assessments. 
Quantitative data were generated from a variety of SRL and goal orientation 
questionnaires and protocols.  
The results of the study indicated that, although all students were high-
performers, significant variation existed with respect to goal orientation and SRL strategy 
use. Students with high mastery goals demonstrated significantly higher use of SRL 
strategies than their low mastery-goal setting peers. In fact, of all the variables analyzed, 
mastery goal orientation accounted for the most variation in SRL strategy use. Ablard and 
Lipschultz (1998) suggested that some high-achieving students succeed without the use 
of SRL strategies and thus, relationships between SRL and achievement are complex. 
The authors tempered their findings by pointing out that data was obtained via self-report 
instrumentation. Thus, students may have indicated learning strategies that they were 
aware of, but did not actually use. The authors suggested that future research should 
investigate SRL strategies students actually apply compared to strategies they report.
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Performance control. During performance control, the learner utilizes self-control 
and self-observation to enact the plan developed in the forethought phase. Zimmerman 
(2000) identified the following self-control processes: “self-instruction, imagery, 
attention focusing, and task strategies” (p. 18). Self-instruction is the act of describing the 
process for completing a learning task while engaged in the task. Self-instruction may be 
a physical (e.g., self-talk, writing mathematical formulas before applying them) or mental 
(e.g., mental rehearsal of algebraic simplification steps, recalling typical pitfalls 
encountered during previous work) phenomenon. 
Students who utilize imagery self-control develop mental images to aid in the 
completion of a task. An example would be a student who separates a composite function 
into its component parts and uses mental images of the graphs of each function to solve a 
particularly difficult limit in calculus. Attention focusing involves ignoring external (e.g., 
a noisy classroom during group work) or internal (e.g., the nervous excitement of playing 
in tonight’s football opener) stimuli and consciously focusing on the learning task. Task 
strategies involve reducing a learning task to its component parts and developing a 
personalized systematic representation that makes sense to the learner. 
Self-observation, another component of the performance control phase, involves 
the student monitoring the learning task and assessing focused aspects of performance. 
Proximal goal-setting during the forethought phase facilitates purposefully selective self-
observation. Zimmerman (2000) suggested the following features of effective self-
observation: (a) self-feedback should be provided concurrently with the task, (b) 
feedback should inform the level of performance, (c) self-observations should be accurate 
portrayals, and (d) self-observations should focus on performance accomplishments 
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instead of deficits. Butler and Winne (1995) suggested that self-monitoring (or self-
observation) naturally elicits internal feedback, which provides a bridge between goal-
based expectations and actual performance. Operationally, Butler and Winne define 
internal (or self-) feedback as “conditional knowledge that bridges past performance to 
the next phase of engaging with a task” (p. 260). So, internal feedback is a product of 
self-observation and when compared to a goal-based standard, yields action on the part of 
the learner. This action is the subject of Zimmerman’s (2000) final phase in the SRL 
cycle, as described below. External feedback, or feedback provided by others, may also 
affect SRL processing and is discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter. 
In a recent empirical study, Greene and Azevedo (2009) used think-aloud 
protocols to study middle and high school students’ use of macro-level SRL processing 
of complex systems of information. Throughout the study, the authors used a model of 
SRL developed in part by Azevedo, which expands Winne and Hadwin’s (1998) and 
Pintrich’s (2000) theories of SRL into 35 specific micro-level processes that fall under 
five main processes similar to the model used in this study. The study involved 219 
middle and high school students investigating the circulatory system via a hypermedia 
learning environment (HLE) while thinking aloud and taking a pre- and post-test in the 
form of a mental model essay. The mental model pre-and posttests were scored based on 
a 0 to 12 point scale. The think-aloud transcriptions, which totaled 8760 minutes in 
duration, were encoded using the 35-component model of SRL, then categorized based 
upon the five macro-levels of the same model. Inter-rater agreement was high for both 
the essay scoring and the coding. 
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Using cumulative logit ordinal logistical regression modeling, Greene and 
Azevedo (2009) found significant differences in learning performance between middle 
and high school students, with high school students tending to have a more sophisticated 
mental model. Additionally, prior domain knowledge was significantly associated with 
the production of more sophisticated mental models. Finally, self- monitoring was the 
only SRL process that was significantly associated with the production of a more 
sophisticated mental model. These results suggest that monitoring is a key component of 
all aspects of SRL and is important in promoting student learning. The authors identified 
limitations of their study: lack of clarity as to the influence of think-aloud protocol on 
metacognitive activity in students, limited scope of the topic of study to one domain, and 
lack of instructional aids embedded into the HLE. The authors also suggested that future 
research should investigate SRL at multiple grain sizes and provide objective data 
regarding student SRL processing. 
Self-reflection. Finally, during the self-reflection phase, students make self-
evaluations and consider causal attributions in terms of their performance during the 
learning task (Zimmerman, 2000). Self-evaluations may use mastery criteria, which 
imply that the learner sets incremental performance markers ultimately leading to 
becoming expert in the task. Self-regulated learners who set process goals during the 
forethought phase naturally become mastery-focused self-evaluators. Alternatively, 
students may base their self-evaluation of current functioning on prior performance of 
similar tasks. Finally, students may utilize normative criteria during self-evaluation, 
which involves comparing their performance to that of others. Self-regulated learners 
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who set outcome goals tend to apply normative criteria to their evaluations and may find 
themselves focusing more on negative aspects of their performance.
Self-regulating students identify causal attributions based upon their self-
evaluations, perceived self-efficacy, and/or the learning environment (Bandura, 1997; 
Zimmerman, 2000). Attributions that focus on deficits in the learner’s ability tend to 
discourage future self-regulation; whereas attributions that focus on insufficient strategy 
use tend to promote motivation to alter future behavior to achieve self-set learning 
standards. As the cyclic SRL processing draws to an end, the student either makes an 
adaptive or defensive inference based upon progression through the learning task. 
Adaptive inferences lead students to improved understanding of the interplay between 
SRL phases with respect to the current task and improved application of SRL processing 
for future learning tasks (Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). Other students 
may choose a defensive inference, which protects the learner from adverse evaluations, 
but simultaneously stifles SRL processing. Thus, the cyclic nature of Zimmerman’s 
(2000) model is longitudinal in that students develop SRL skills over time based on their 
commitment to attaining personal learning and achievement standards.  
Qualitative Studies of SRL Processing 
SRL processing may be described along a developmental continuum. Hadwin, 
Boutara, Knoetzke, and Thompson (2004) studied Canadian college students’ SRL 
processing from a developmental perspective. The authors utilized self-report 
questionnaires, self-evaluations, and trace data obtained from a hypermedia program to 
develop case studies describing students’ actual SRL processing over a series of events.
Participants were 8 students chosen as cases out of 50 undergraduates enrolled in an 
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instructional psychology course. The participants were chosen based upon performance 
on three exams. Each participant was categorized  with respect to performance on the 
three exams as either a low, average, high, or improved performer. The unit of analysis 
became cross-case comparisons of each group, as opposed to individual case studies. 
Trace data were collected from hypermedia software called CoNoteS2, which was 
experimental software specifically designed to gather fine-grained data of student control 
of learning during a specified task. The remaining data were collected through three 
exams, weekly self-reflections, and a final self-reflection and analysis.  
During the four-week study, students studied content in each of three chapters 
presented by CoNoteS2 for one hour, completed a self-reflection, and took an exam over 
the content. Each learning event occurred once during the first three weeks and students 
were required to complete a one-page final self-reflection and analysis to be submitted 
for grading. Findings indicated significant variability in SRL processing within each 
performance group. For example, within the high-performing pair, one student displayed 
a learning-oriented approach while the other student tended more toward a performance-
oriented approach. Although the first student demonstrated much higher-order cognitive 
processing, both students performed well on the exams.  
Both the high and improved performance groups demonstrated deeper approaches 
to studying. However, the high performers demonstrated these skills throughout the three 
units; whereas, the improved performers developed their skills over time. Finally, the 
authors developed a continuum of SRL ratings: low, emerging, and high. Participants 
were given a overall rating based on their predominant rating classification in terms of 
skill, will, and self-regulation. Although one high achiever had the highest rating and one 
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low achiever had the lowest rating, results were inconsistent in between. Hadwin et al. 
suggested that this inconsistency indicates that students’ performance may not be a good 
indicator of SRL processing prowess. 
Despite the loss of generality inherent in qualitative designs, Hadwin et al. (2004) 
suggested that students in early developmental stages of SRL (low overall rating) appear 
to have difficulty accurately assessing their learning processes and products. 
Additionally, findings support the growing literature base that SRL study designs need to 
incorporate multiple sources of data. The authors pointed out that by collecting and 
analyzing data over a series of events, patterns of SRL processing and development 
emerged over time. Such patterns may not have been uncovered by a study using 
performance data that emerges from a single event. The authors provided calls for future 
research as follows: similar qualitative studies involving longer duration, more learning 
events, and/or more participants, studies investigating the relationship between goal 
orientations and SRL development, and studies involving more grade-bearing learning 
tasks while controlling for confounding instructional variables.  
Issues of self-efficacy often arise when considering students’ capacity to self-
regulate. Usher (2009) studied middle school students’ sources of self-efficacy and 
relations to issues of race, gender, and SRL processing. Eight students participated in the 
study and were representative of every combination of four subgroups: African American 
females, African American males, White females, and White males, and two self-efficacy 
profiles, high and low. Teachers and parents were also included as participants to gain 
additional perspectives on students’ functioning. Data collection instruments consisted of 
semi-structured interview protocols for students, parents, and teachers. Internal validity 
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was addressed via triangulation from multiple sources, member checking, maintaining an 
audit trail, and peer review (intercoder reliability). External validity was addressed via 
rich descriptions of participants’ experiences. 
The findings of Usher’s (2009) study indicated that middle school mathematics 
students’ self-efficacy profiles are derived from performance interpretations, peer and 
adult influences, physiological influences, and self-regulatory activity. Additionally, 
Usher’s findings suggested that self-efficacy and SRL are reciprocally linked, which is in 
line with Bandura’s (1997) assertions. In other words, students’ degree of self-efficacy 
tends to predict their self-regulatory prowess. Inversely, the level of SRL processing 
practiced by a student tends to appropriately affect their self efficacy beliefs. Due to the 
in-depth nature of qualitative data collection and analysis, Usher was able to identify one 
student who did not participate in self-regulatory study habits, yet had high self-efficacy 
and performed well in mathematics. Additionally, this student’s family members all had 
poor mathematics skills, yet he used this as motivation to excel and thus, improved his 
mathematical self-efficacy. This finding contradicted Usher’s assertions and the 
theoretical framework that she developed. Usher used these surprising findings to justify 
her choice of qualitative methods for the study. Of additional importance to the current 
study is the fact that the aforementioned student was on an advanced mathematics track, 
thus implying that advanced mathematics students may not adhere strictly to theoretical 
SRL propositions.  
External Feedback and SRL
Feedback can be divided into two major categories: internal and external. Internal 
feedback is controlled by the learner and occurs naturally as the learner participates in the 
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self-monitoring process of SRL. External feedback is provided to the learner by teachers, 
peers, and other sources in the event that the established learning goals are not being 
successfully executed (Butler & Winne, 1995). Butler and Winne (1995) developed a 
research-based model for SRL that incorporates external feedback. For the purposes of 
this study, the model provides clear connectivity between both internal and external 
feedback and the processes of SRL. Butler and Winne suggested that external feedback 
initiates internal, cognitive processing conducive to self regulation.  
External feedback is supplied as a result of the provider’s evaluation of learner 
performance. “If external feedback is provided, that additional information may confirm, 
add to, or conflict with the learner's interpretations of the task and the path of learning” 
(Butler & Winne, 1995, p. 248). Students are then able to evaluate both internal and 
external feedback to determine necessary adjustments for the next learning task. So, 
external feedback should be provided while the student is engaged in the learning task so 
that the learner can process the feedback during the self-monitoring and self-evaluation 
phases. 
External feedback can be further subdivided into cognitive and outcome 
categories. Cognitive feedback has been suggested as preferable to outcome feedback 
(Butler & Winne, 1995). Outcome feedback simply  involves informing the learner if 
their performance is accurate; cognitive feedback refers to information provided to the 
learner that suggests learning cues that “may help students identify cues and monitor task 
engagement” (p. 253). Therefore, teacher and peer feedback should be constructed to 
encourage critical thinking and metacognitive activity. Finally, Butler and Winne found 
gaps in the literature and included a call for more research “that integrates instruction, 
33
self-regulation, feedback, and knowledge construction” (p. 275). The authors further 
requested that research should be “fine-grained analyses” of “single students . . . that lead 
to successfully updated, improved performance” (p. 276). 
In a synthesis of feedback and SRL literature, Nicol and Macfarlane-Dick (2006) 
expanded Butler and Winne’s (1995) model. Most salient to the Nicol and Macfarlane-
Dick model is the development of “seven principles of good feedback,” as follows: 
 Good feedback practice:
1. helps clarify what good performance is (goals, criteria, expected standards); 
2. facilitates the development of self-assessment (reflection) in learning;
3. delivers high quality information to students about their learning; 
4. encourages teacher and peer dialogue around learning;
5. encourages positive motivational beliefs and self-esteem;
6. provides opportunities to close the gap between current and desired 
performance;
7. provides information to teachers that can be used to help shape teaching. (p. 
 205) 
The seven principles provide educators and researchers a standard by which to guide 
feedback practices. Reflecting on their assertions, Nicol and Macfarlane-Dick noted that 
research on the quality of external feedback is lacking, which may cause problems with 
the implementation of principle number three. The authors suggested that “good quality 
external feedback is information that helps students troubleshoot their own performance 
and self-correct: that is, it helps students take action to reduce the discrepancy between 
their intentions and the resulting effects” (p. 208). This definition is learner-focused and 
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steeped in SRL theory, providing practitioners with further guidance for feedback 
practices, despite the lack of a research-based description. Nicol and Macfarlane-Dick 
identified gaps in the research base that yielded calls for further research. Recognizing 
that their synthesis and resulting analysis was not exhaustive, a request for research to 
“refine these principles, identify gaps and to gather further evidence about the potential of 
formative assessment and feedback to support self-regulation” was suggested (p. 215). 
In a case study analysis, Cleary and Zimmerman (2004) assessed the 
implementation of the Self-Regulated Empowerment Program (SREP), which is a 
program designed to help educators foster positive, self-motivating learning experiences 
for students. The SREP provides students a self-regulated learning coach (SRC) to 
identify academic deficiencies, provide instruction fostering SRL cyclic processing, and 
generate continuous and immediate feedback. The ultimate goal of the SRC was to 
empower students to be responsible for their own learning.  
A single case study was presented that detailed a female student struggling in a 
science course who had been introduced previously to other interventions, resulting in 
very little success. The SREP provided her with guidance that initiated a cyclic SRL 
processing system to aid in learning tasks (Zimmerman, 1989, 2000). The results of the
case study analysis showed that the SREP fostered autonomy and self-directed learning 
practices. The student also showed increased achievement due in part to the program. The 
researchers did quantify their results by stating that the SREP is not an all-inclusive 
program and would be more successful if introduced in conjunction with other 
interventions. Cleary and Zimmerman’s (2004) comments on teacher feedback provided 
insight into the interrelationships inherent in SRL and external feedback, as follows: 
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The type of feedback that students receive from teachers also will influence their 
ability to reflect on performance outcomes. For example, teachers who do not 
provide students with strategic feedback or with a clear explanation of their 
specific errors will make it more difficult for students to understand why they are 
performing poorly and what they need to do to improve. (p. 548) 
So, according to Cleary and Zimmerman, educators can impact students’ self-regulatory 
actions and feedback provides a means for fostering such behavior.  
In a study involving an online university course in the Netherlands, van den 
Boom, Paas, and van Merriënboer (2007) investigated the effects of student reflections 
with external feedback on SRL and performance. The SRL framework used in the study 
consisted of a decomposition of SRL processing using theory similar to that found in 
Zimmerman’s (2000) cyclic model. The decomposition provided micro-level processes 
for each of the constructs from the model used in the study. Participants were 49 students 
studying psychology via a distance teaching university, who were assigned to the 
following random groups: control, reflection with peer feedback, and reflection with tutor 
feedback. Reflective protocols were developed using the decomposition of SRL 
processing described above and consisted of prompts intended to elicit student reflection 
of their learning process. Peer feedback was to be generated via electronic newsgroups 
concerning students’ discussion posts generated from the reflective protocols. Tutor 
feedback was provided via direct email from the students to their assigned tutor. 
Students’ SRL functioning, achievement, and appraisal of the learning experience were 
measured by the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, 
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Garcia, Smith, & McKeachie, 1991), the final exam for the course, and an evaluation 
questionnaire. 
 Upon the completion of the study, van den Boom et al. (2007) chose to rename 
the peer-feedback group as the reflection-without-feedback group since very little peer 
feedback dialogue was generated by the group. This led to the observation that more 
research is needed to determine how to better elicit feedback dialogue amongst peer 
groups. Findings indicated a significant difference between the reflection-without-
feedback and tutor-feedback groups’ frequencies of reflective activities. In fact, the peer-
feedback group demonstrated very little attention to developing reflective dialogue. In 
terms of SRL functioning, the analysis conducted on the MSLQ data revealed significant 
differences in only two of the six scales: Value and Test Anxiety. The Value scale of the 
MSLQ contains three subscales: Intrinsic Goal Orientation, Extrinsic Goal Orientation, 
and Task Value. In both cases, the reflective groups scored higher than the control group. 
Only with respect to the test anxiety scale did the tutor-feedback group score significantly 
higher than the peer-feedback group. Although in partial agreement with their hypothesis 
that feedback would foster SRL processing, the authors suggested that inflexibility of the 
course and/or possible incongruities between the aspects of SRL being assessed and the 
MSLQ may explain why the findings indicated significant differences for only two of the 
scales of the MSLQ. In terms of achievement, the tutor-feedback group scored 
significantly higher on the exam than the peer-feedback group, but no significant 
difference was found between the control group and the combined reflective groups. The 
evaluation questionnaire revealed that both reflective groups valued the learning 
experience, but no significant differences were found amongst their responses. 
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 Finally, van den Boom et al. (2007) suggested that researchers investigate peer-
feedback in conjunction with collaborative learning and that similar studies be developed 
using mixed methods designs. The authors also suggested that educators implement 
reflective dialogue into online courses and utilize scaffolding to gradually shift the 
feedback responsibilities to students. The authors provided three limitations for their 
study, as follows: unaccountable factors in the design of the study, questionable 
credibility of the MSLQ (or any self-report questionnaire) as the main source of data, and 
conclusions being limited to higher education online learning environments. 
Motivation and SRL
In addition to cognitive aspects of SRL, Garcia and Pintrich (1994) suggested that 
motivation is an integral part of any SRL model. Garcia and Pintrich also suggested that 
motivation depends on students’ goals, orientation for learning, and beliefs about task 
difficulty. Further, they claimed that motivation is related to students’ knowledge of self, 
which includes self-schemas (i.e., students’ beliefs about themselves). They also 
introduced motivational strategies within the framework of SRL, which included self-
handicapping, defensive pessimism, self-affirmation, and attributional style.
According to Garcia and Pintrich (1994), self-handicapping is an anticipatory 
coping mechanism for students with fragile self-schemas, which involves students 
purposely failing to exert effort to maintain their self-worth. An example would be a 
student who exerts low effort on a learning task knowing that obtaining a high grade will 
be positive, but obtaining a low grade can be excused for lack of time spent on the task. 
Defensive pessimism is also anticipatory but involves the exertion of high effort to 
compensate for negative self-schemas. Students who practice defensive pessimism
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typically demonstrate high motivation and self-regulatory skills but set extremely low 
expectations to avoid anxiety and compensate for poor self-efficacy. The authors noted 
that the presence of SRL processing and low self-efficacy goes against research and 
literature suggesting that students need high self-efficacy to engage in SRL (Bandura, 
1997; Usher, 2009; Zimmerman, 1989, 2000). Self-affirmation is a reactive strategy that 
involves the learner activating positive self-conceptions to counteract a negative 
evaluation. For example, a student may receive a low grade on a mathematics quiz but 
remind himself that he is in a prestigious program of study. Finally, attributional style is a 
reactive strategy that involves the student with a well-defined self-schema responding to 
events based upon multiple habitual experiences. Each of these strategies may be 
employed by self-regulating students when faced with a particular academic task that 
demands motivational regulation. 
Wolters (1998) conducted a mixed-methods study examining the degree to which 
college students regulate motivation while participating in tasks deemed irrelevant, 
boring, or difficult. Overall, it was found that students did use a variety of techniques to 
regulate motivation. In fact, Wolters identified 14 different descriptors for coping 
strategies utilized by students to regulate motivation. Of the 14 codes developed by 
Wolters, the most often used coping strategies fell under the code of cognition and most 
of these instances occurred when the task condition was highly difficult. This finding 
indicates that students tend to exhibit self-regulatory practices when the task is more 
difficult.
Wolters (1998) also examined student self-regulation of motivation with respect 
to goal profiles. Recall that the focus of learning goals is on knowledge and skill 
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attainment, whereas the focus of performance goals is on task completion. Findings 
indicated that intrinsic motivation strategies were positively related to learning goal 
orientation and that extrinsic motivation strategies were positively related to performance 
goal orientations. Intrinsic motivation strategies were also positively related to cognitive 
strategy use, whereas extrinsic motivation strategies were not related to cognitive strategy 
use. Overall, Wolters suggested that the students demonstrated a systematic means of 
regulating motivation and that their regulation was similar to cognitive models of SRL.  
Wolters (1999) conducted another study on the regulation of motivation in high 
school students. This quantitative study utilized a questionnaire developed by the author 
based upon the MSLQ (Pintrich et al., 1991). Factor analysis revealed the following 
statistically valid factors developed by Wolters (1999) from the SRL and motivation 
literature:
! Self-consequating questions were related to students’ “self-provided 
extrinsic rewards for reinforcing their desire to finish academic tasks.” 
! Environmental control questions were related to students’ “avoiding or 
reducing distractions as a means of ensuring their completion of academic 
tasks.” 
! Interest enhancement questions were related to students’ “tendency to 
make the task into a game, or more generally to make it more immediately 
relevant, enjoyable, or fun to complete.” 
! Performance self-talk questions were related to students’ use of “subvocal 
statements or thoughts designed to increase their desire to complete the 
task by intensifying their focus on performance goals.”
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! Mastery self-talk questions were related to students’ “tendency to focus or 
make salient their desire to learn or master task materials in order to 
increase their level of motivation.” (p. 287). 
The strong relationships among factors imply that overall students who apply one 
motivational strategy tend to apply others. Results indicated that students differentiate the
frequency of motivational regulation strategy use, as indicated by the following highest-
to-lowest ordinal list: performance self-talk, environmental control, self-consequating, 
mastery self-talk, and interest enhancement. All five of the strategies exhibited moderate 
to strong positive correlations with cognitive and metacognitive SRL practices and effort, 
but only performance self-talk was significantly related to GPA. Also, mastery self-talk 
was significantly related to more elaborate forms of self-regulation; whereas performance 
self-talk was significantly related to lower-level cognitive aspects of SRL. This seems to 
go against theoretical suppositions that higher-order cognition is related to higher student 
achievement. These findings must be tempered with the fact that self-report was the only 
instrument used in the study.  
Recent SRL literature has brought to the forefront the theoretical underpinnings of 
motivation with respect to SRL (Schunk & Zimmerman, 2008). Zimmerman and Schunk 
(2008) provided a clear description of the need for motivational-based studies of SRL:
Although SRL interventions produced successful outcomes in classroom settings, 
they often failed to sustain students’ use of these processes in less-structured 
environments. This limitation has led researchers to focus on students’ sources of 
motivation to self-regulate . . . (p. 2) 
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A more specific rationale for investigating motivation within a study of SRL is that 
students who are able to effectively self-monitor learning tasks but lack the motivation to 
alter practices do not receive full benefits of SRL. 
Research has suggested that motivation is a key component in eliciting student 
transitions through phases within the SRL processing sequence (Wolters, 1998, 1999). 
Winne and Hadwin (2008) identified such changes and their relation to SRL, stating, 
“We refer to making such changes as regulating a motivational state [italics added]. We 
posit that regulating a motivational state follows a similar process to regulating other 
aspects of learning” (p. 306). Findings that suggest a link between SRL and motivation 
have significant implications for practicing educators. If what Winne and Hadwin posited 
above is true (i.e., if motivational state can be self-regulated) then practitioners could 
potentially develop methodologies for fostering autonomous, self-motivating students.  
Specifically, Winne and Hadwin (2008) requested studies tying motivational state 
to SRL:
Research needs to examine more thoroughly (a) the types of goals and standards 
students adopt with respect to motivational state, (b) strategies they actually 
employ to regulate motivational state, and (c) the degree to which they are 
metacognitively aware of the goals, standards and strategies used to monitor and 
change motivational states during learning activities. (p. 308).  
In addition to pointing out key gaps in the current body of literature, the authors also 
stated that such studies must examine thoroughly the actions students actually engage in 
with respect to SRL processing. Many of the current studies in the field merely report the 
42
intentionality of students to participate in SRL but never follow up on the goals and plans 
established by participating students. 
Theoretical Analysis of Epistemology
“Epistemology [italics added] is an area of philosophy concerned with the nature 
and justification of knowledge” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 88). Educational 
psychologists are interested in the effects that students’ epistemologies have on cognition, 
affect, and ultimately student achievement and learning. Educational epistemological 
research and theory can be divided into two main categories: the development of 
epistemological beliefs over time and the exploration and theory of a multidimensional 
interpretation of epistemological beliefs (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Perry (1970) is 
generally given credit for beginning the developmental epistemology movement (and the 
study of personal epistemology, in general) and Schommer (1990) is generally credited 
with initiating the study of epistemology through the lens of independent, multi-
dimensional beliefs. These seminal works would eventually filter down to two specific 
issues relevant to this study: the domain specificity of epistemological beliefs (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 2006) and the ramifications of students’ 
personal epistemological beliefs on mathematical problem solving (Kloosterman & 
Stage, 1992; Muis, 2004, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1992). In her 
contemporary synthesis of mathematics-based personal epistemology research, Muis 
(2004) divided students’ mathematical beliefs into two categories with respect to 
learning: availing and non-availing. “An availing belief is one that is positively related to 
quality learning and achievement, and a nonavailing belief is one that does not affect 
learning or achievement in a positive way” (p. 324). These categories will be used 
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throughout the ensuing discussions of epistemology and mathematical problem solving. 
This section will present a literature-based, theoretical analysis of personal epistemology. 
The section will be subdivided as follows for organizational purposes: (1) multi-
dimensional beliefs view of epistemology, (2) issues of domain with respect to 
epistemology, and (3) mathematical problem solving and epistemology. 
Multi-Dimensional Beliefs View of Epistemology
Schommer (1990) suggested a framework for investigating epistemology based 
on multiple, independent dimensions of epistemological beliefs. Her study involving 
university and junior college students utilized a questionnaire to investigate her 
hypothesis that “epistemological beliefs are a system of more or less independent beliefs” 
(p. 499). Her findings suggested that epistemological beliefs can be divided into four 
independent dimensions: (1) innate ability (“the ability to learn is innate rather than 
acquired”), (2) simple knowledge (“knowledge is simple rather than complex”), (3) quick 
learning (“learning is quick or not at all”), and (4) certain knowledge (“knowledge is 
certain rather than tentative”) (p. 499). Additionally, Schommer found that quick learning 
predicted oversimplified conclusions, underperformance on mastery assessments, and 
overestimation of understanding. Certain knowledge predicted distortion of the reality 
that knowledge is relative and contextual to compensate for the rigid aspect of this belief.  
Since Schommer’s (1990) findings, researchers have sought to integrate a multi-
dimensional model of epistemological beliefs with other cognitive and affective models 
of learning (Hofer, 2004a; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2007; Schommer-Aikins, 
2004). In fact, Schommer-Aikins (2004) stated, “The need for an embedded systemic 
model of epistemological beliefs, that is, a model that includes many other aspects of 
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cognition and affect, comes from the assumption that epistemological beliefs do not 
function in a vacuum” (p. 23). Of particular interest to this study are epistemological 
beliefs models that incorporate metacognitive, affective, and self-regulatory aspects.
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) acknowledged the theoretical strides of Schommer’s 
(1990) work, but questioned the innate ability belief dimension. They argued that innate, 
or “fixed, ability beliefs concern the nature of intelligence as a personal, psychological 
trait of an individual” and should, therefore, be considered a separate construct from 
epistemological beliefs (p. 109). They also acknowledged Schommer’s contribution of 
devising a questionnaire for measuring personal epistemology but pointed out the 
construct validity issues that have plagued the questionnaire’s use in her studies. In fact, 
Hofer and Pintrich questioned whether or not epistemological beliefs can be measured via 
questionnaire.  
Upon examining models ranging from Perry’s (1970) developmental model to 
Schommer’s (1990) multi-dimensional model, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) suggested the 
following general framework for epistemological beliefs: (1) nature of knowledge, which 
includes certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge, and (2) process of 
knowing, which includes sources of knowledge and justification for knowing. Hofer and 
Pintrich provided comprehensive definitions for the four subdivisions of the general 
framework: 
! Certainty of knowledge. The degree to which one sees knowledge as fixed 
or fluid. 
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! Simplicity of knowledge. As conceptualized by Schommer, knowledge is 
viewed on a continuum as an accumulation of facts or as highly 
interrelated concepts.
! Source of knowledge. At the lower levels of most of the models, 
knowledge originates outside the self and resides in external authority, 
from whom it may be transmitted. The evolving conception of knower, 
with the ability to construct knowledge in interaction with others, is a 
developmental turning point of most models reviewed. 
! Justification for knowing. This dimension includes how individuals 
evaluate knowledge claims, including the use of evidence, the use they 
make of authority and expertise, and their evaluation of experts. (pp. 119–
120) 
These general epistemological beliefs dimensions provide a framework for analyzing 
student beliefs during any learning episode and may be applied to domain-specific 
inquiries.  
Additionally, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) suggested that epistemological beliefs 
may be related to cognition and motivation. In particular, they suggested that 
epistemological beliefs may be tied to the goal-setting phase of self-regulated learning 
models (e.g., Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). Their suggestions prompted 
epistemology researchers and theorists to develop and investigate integrated models of 
epistemological beliefs. These innovations include, but are not limited to, models relating 
epistemological beliefs to metacognition, metacognitive monitoring, and self-regulated 
learning (Hofer, 2004a; Muis, 2007; Schommer-Aikins, 2004).  
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Issues of Domain with Respect to Epistemology
One core issue facing the research of epistemology is determining whether 
epistemological beliefs are domain-general, domain-specific, or a combination of the 
two. In other words, are students’ beliefs of knowledge and knowing similar regardless of 
context (domain-general), or are there differences in students’ epistemological beliefs 
dependent upon context (domain-specific)? With respect to problem solving, Schraw 
(2001) suggested that the importance of answering this question is “that individuals may 
develop different epistemological commitments across domains depending upon the 
extent to which they possess expert knowledge” (p. 453).   
In a synthesis of epistemological studies related to academic domain issues, Muis, 
Bendixen, and Haerle (2006) found support for both domain-general and domain-specific 
views of epistemological beliefs. Based upon the extensive review, Muis et al. developed 
the theory of integrated domains in epistemology (TIDE) framework for academic studies 
and interventions relating to student epistemology. The TIDE model “provide[s] a 
theoretical framework from which to discuss broader relations among epistemic beliefs 
and various facets of cognition, motivation, and achievement” (p. 30). Throughout the 
model, general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs work in tandem and are 
reciprocally related. Additionally, development of epistemological beliefs is assumed to 
occur through the four dimensions suggested by Hofer and Pintrich (1997). The authors 
suggested that domain-specific beliefs socially develop and evolve through school 
experiences, but general ways of knowing developed before entering school remain and 
continue to influence subsequent learning experiences. As students progress through 
school, domain-specific beliefs tend to become more influential. Muis et al. suggested 
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that “as individuals become more specialized in a particular domain, which typically 
begins in upper-level high school, their academic epistemic beliefs are more 
representative of their focal domain” (p. 35). Muis et al. concluded that researchers 
should consider domain when developing contextually dependent studies involving 
personal epistemology, including the choice and use of questionnaires. 
Royce and colleagues’ findings are particularly salient for viewing students’ 
beliefs about mathematics knowledge as variant with respect to domains (Diamond & 
Royce, 1980; Royce & Mos, 1980; Wardell & Royce, 1978). Royce and colleagues 
examined three epistemological constructs: (1) rationalism (logical and analytical 
cognition), (2) empiricism (observational and perceptual cognition), and (3) 
metamorphism (insightful and symbolic cognition). Royce and Mos (1980) developed the 
Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP) to determine an individual’s epistemological 
persuasion. The PEP provides a score for each of the three epistemological constructs 
described above. The highest of the three scores indicates the individuals’ epistemic 
persuasion, or profile. Additionally, Royce and Mos (1980) found that mathematics 
professors tended to demonstrate rational epistemic qualities, which distinguishes 
mathematics from other disciplines such as science whose professors depended mainly 
upon empiricism. It should be noted that not all participants of domain-specific activities 
model the more generally dominant patterns of epistemic beliefs for that domain (Muis, 
et al., 2006; Muis, 2008). Students tend to exhibit this disconnect between actual beliefs 
and domain-dominant beliefs, which provides a window of opportunity to observe 
relationships between students’ actual epistemic profile, SRL prowess, and performance 
during mathematical problem-solving tasks. 
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Hofer (2000) investigated the dimensionality of epistemological beliefs with 
respect to academic discipline, or domain, in a study involving first-year college students 
in psychology and science. A portion of the study involved the testing of the Discipline-
Focused Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (DFEBQ) designed by the author. Her 
intention was that the DFEBQ would measure students’ levels of epistemological beliefs 
as described by Hofer and Pintrich (1997): certainty of knowledge, simplicity of 
knowledge, source of knowledge, and justification for knowing. After conducting a factor 
analysis, the following dimensions emerged from the questionnaire: certain/simple 
knowledge, justification for knowing: personal, source of knowledge: authority, and 
attainability of truth. Both certainty and simplicity of knowledge loaded onto the same 
dimension and thus, the two dimensions were collapsed to one. Thus, the certain/simple 
knowledge dimension may be assigned the combined definition of certainty and 
simplicity of knowledge provided by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) above. The justification 
for knowing and sources of knowledge items only loaded with respect to non-availing 
beliefs. Specifically, the justification dimension only factored with regard to personal 
opinion and experience, as opposed to the more availing belief that knowledge should be 
justified based on the evaluation of evidence and expertise. Similarly, the sources of 
knowledge dimension only factored with respect to external authority, as opposed to the 
more availing belief that knowledge may be attained via the interactive construction of 
knowledge. Finally, attainability of truth was an unexpected dimension whose items were 
expected to load onto certainty of knowledge. The results of the study revealed that 
significant differences existed between the science and psychology students for each 
belief scale. For example, students held significantly higher beliefs that science 
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knowledge was more certain than psychological knowledge. Hofer (2000) suggested that, 
while students hold domain-general epistemological beliefs, first-year college students
are able to discriminate among beliefs based on domain. Finally, Hofer suggested factor 
loadings indicated that additional work is needed to improve epistemological self-report 
questionnaires, implying that interviews and other qualitative methods may be more 
suitable for studying epistemology. 
Hofer continued to investigate the dimensionality and domain-specificity of 
epistemological beliefs using think-aloud protocols (Hofer, 2004a) and case study 
methods (Hofer, 2004b). Applying a framework encompassing metacognition and 
epistemology, Hofer (2004a) conducted a series of studies with high school and college 
students, which involved thinking aloud while conducting computer searches for a 
science unit. The framework situated certainty and simplicity of knowledge within a 
metacognitive knowledge construct, source of knowledge and justification of knowing 
within a metacognitive judgments and monitoring construct, and identified self-regulation 
as the regulation of cognition during knowledge construction. Her prior work revealed 
problems assessing students’ epistemological beliefs via self-report questionnaires, 
particularly the justification of knowing and source of knowledge dimensions (Hofer, 
2000). Think-aloud protocol analysis yielded evidence of all four beliefs dimensions and 
provided evidence that beliefs operate interactively and tie to student motivation. Despite 
methodological concerns, Hofer (2004a) suggested “thinking aloud, however imperfect, 
may be the best means of learning about the actual, situated nature of epistemic thinking” 
(p. 51).  
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Hofer (2004b) conducted a case study of 25 first-year university students enrolled 
in two different chemistry courses. Thirteen of the students were enrolled in an advanced 
organic chemistry course focusing on student construction of knowledge via group 
activities. The remaining twelve students were in a general chemistry course focusing on 
mathematical procedures and measurement. In the latter course, the professor placed 
heavy emphasis on the text and review sessions as means for preparing students for 
eventually curved open-ended exams. Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) four dimensions of 
epistemological beliefs were analyzed within the classroom context using semi-structured 
interviews, classroom observations, and pedagogical artifacts. With respect to simplicity 
of knowledge, a common theme amongst many students was the preference for multiple-
choice exams, which typically assessed more simplistic, concrete topics instead of the 
open-ended questions that were prevalent on both chemistry courses’ exams. Although 
not to be generalized, findings indicated that students in the more constructivist-oriented 
course tended to adapt more readily to the critical thinking and synthesis required of the 
exams. The students in the more procedurally-based general chemistry course tended to 
struggle throughout the course.  
In terms of the continuum of certainty of knowledge, the results of the study 
suggested most students had moved past the extreme dualistic nature of knowledge but 
were not sophisticated enough to critically evaluate knowledge to develop improved 
interpretations. Such students tended to accept all knowledge as opinion and assigned 
equal validity to any claim. Students in the study held fairly unsophisticated views of 
source of knowledge and justification for knowing. Textbooks were generally cited as 
authoritative sources of knowledge despite college professors’ credentials and 
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preparation. Additionally, despite the opportunity in the organic chemistry course to 
attend study groups and construct their own knowledge, few of the students in the study 
participated. Finally, few students comprehended the mechanics of scientific inquiry, 
which is the main source for justifying knowledge in chemistry. 
Epistemological Beliefs and SRL 
Building on prior work suggesting connections between epistemological beliefs 
and SRL (e.g., Hofer, 2004a; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer-Aikins, 2004), Muis 
(2007) proposed a model integrating epistemological beliefs into Winne and Hadwin’s 
(1998) model of SRL. Specifically, she theorized that epistemological beliefs are enacted 
at the definition of task phase and “may influence the standards set for a task,” which 
directly impacts the goals that students set (Muis, 2007, p. 180). In turn, standards affect 
students’ enactment and evaluation of strategies used to complete the task. Thus, Muis’ 
(2007) proposition implied that epistemological beliefs may be related to all phases of 
SRL, as defined by Winne and Hadwin (1998). Additionally, Muis suggested that a 
reciprocal relationship may exist between epistemological beliefs and SRL. Internal 
feedback generated at the monitoring phase of SRL is compared to standards set and 
ultimately informs cognitive and affective schemas, which may include epistemological 
beliefs. Finally, Muis suggested that studies examining the relationships between 
epistemology and SRL combine quantitative and qualitative techniques, including think-
aloud protocols and interviews.  
In a study directly applying Muis’ (2007) model of SRL and epistemological 
beliefs, Muis and Franco (2009) studied 201 undergraduate educational psychology 
students. Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) four-dimension framework for epistemological 
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beliefs was used to analyze students’ beliefs. Data were collected with regard to students’ 
SRL processing, goal-orientation, and epistemological beliefs. Qualitative data consisted 
of students’ reflections on three course assessments. As part of the coursework, students 
were required to reflect on what they had learned and how they could apply the 
knowledge to teaching or learning situations. Quantitative data included the MSLQ 
(Pintrich et al., 1991), DFEBQ (Hofer, 2000), and a goal-orientation questionnaire. 
Qualitative data were coded based on a coding scheme developed from Hofer and 
Pintrich’s (1997) epistemological beliefs. Structural equation modeling was applied to the 
quantitative data to obtain a system of weighted, causal paths between the myriad of 
variables. The resultant model demonstrated a moderate to good fit and suggested that 
epistemological beliefs influence goal-orientation, then goal-orientation influences SRL 
strategy use, and finally, SRL strategy use influences student achievement. 
A surprising result was that the source of knowledge belief was not a factor in the 
model. Muis and Franco (2009) suggested that the applied nature of educational 
psychology may explain the lack of a significant causal path. Of particular interest are the 
findings relating epistemological beliefs to goal orientation (see Table 1). Muis and 
Franco’s findings suggested that a relationship exists between goal-orientation and three 
of Hofer’s (2000) epistemological beliefs categories from the DFEBQ. In addition to the 
lack of source of knowledge dimension, the relationship between attainability of truth 
and performance- and mastery-approach goal orientations was also surprising. This 
relationship contradicted Muis’ hypothesis that a constructivist orientation to learning 
would be more conducive to students’ adoption of mastery-approach goals since the 
belief that truth is attainable is generally considered to be non-availing and less 
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constructivist-based (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Muis and Franco suggested that the type 
and difficulty-level of tasks may affect the depth of SRL processing, including goal-
setting and orientation. Additionally, these findings suggested that domain-specificity 
may play a role in determining the relationship between epistemological beliefs and SRL. 
Finally, Muis and Franco called for research examining task-definition and domain-
specificity using think-aloud protocols and interviews. 
Table 1 
Interrelated Qualities of Goal-Setting and Epistemological Beliefs     
Belief Dimension Student profile Goal preference
Certainty/simplicity Certain/simple P-AP, P-AV
Certainty/simplicity Tentative/complex M-AP
Justification Expert justification P-AP, M-AV
Attainability of truth Truth is attainable P-AP, M-AP
Note. Belief dimensions represent Hofer’s (2000) belief scales from the
DFEBQ. Certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge loaded onto a 
single factor and are thus, shown as a single dimension. P-AP = performance- 
approach; P-AV = performance-avoidance; M-AP = mastery-approach; 
M-AV = mastery-avoidance
Neber and Schommer-Aikins’s (2002) study focused on SRL and epistemological 
beliefs for gifted students. The study involved both elementary and secondary students 
and investigated, among other things, the causal relationships between epistemological 
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beliefs and SRL. The quantitative study utilized the MSLQ (Pintrich et al., 1991) and 
Schommer’s epistemological beliefs measure for high school students as the main 
instruments for data collection and subsequent MANOVA analyses. Three surprising 
results were found suggesting that high school students’ epistemological beliefs are no 
more advanced than elementary students, high school students demonstrate poor SRL 
processing in physics, and goal-orientation is a very weak predictor for SRL processing. 
Additionally, success does not require work was the only epistemological belief 
significantly related to SRL and subsequently included in the causal path model.  
Neber and Schommer-Aikins (2002) suggested that the constraining environment 
of high-school physics, in contrast to the more constructive elementary science courses, 
was the main cause of the differences in SRL practices. The authors also suggested that 
SRL in science could be promoted by increasing students’ opportunities to actively 
engage in investigative studies. Finally, the weak effects of epistemological beliefs on 
SRL strategy use may be attributed to the use of a domain-general questionnaire in a 
domain-specific study.  
Bråten and Strømsø (2005) investigated relationships between epistemological 
beliefs and SRL amongst Norwegian college students, 178 majoring in management and 
108 in education. The quantitative study utilized self-report questionnaires. In contrast to 
Neber and Schommer-Aikins’ (2002) findings, the results suggested that epistemological 
beliefs were significant predictors of SRL strategy use and “should be included in models 
of self-regulated learning” (Bråten and Strømsø, 2005, p. 559). These results were 
obtained despite using a domain-general questionnaire. However, the authors were unable 
to establish domain related differences amongst the students, which may be attributable 
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to the domain-generality of the instrument. Additionally, naïve epistemological beliefs
negatively related to self-efficacy and mastery goal orientation. The authors presented 
multiple calls for research, including a call for more research utilizing classroom 
observations, think-aloud protocols, and interviews to “provide dynamic, in-depth views 
of epistemological beliefs and their relations to other constructs” (p. 561).   
Research suggests that epistemological beliefs are related to academic 
achievement. In a quantitative study involving approximately 1600 students from Spain, 
Cano (2005) reported that quick and simple knowledge directly, negatively impacted 
student achievement. Additionally, surface approaches to learning negatively impacted 
student achievement; whereas deeper approaches to learning positively affected student 
achievement. Cano also found that high school students tend to show a significant 
decrease in deep-level approaches to learning. One possible rationale for this disturbing 
result is that secondary students may have become institutionalized and learned “to 
navigate the choppy waters of the curriculum” (Cano, 2005, p. 215). Schoenfeld (1988, 
1989) echoed this opinion in his work on problem solving, discussed in detail below. 
Theoretical Analysis of Problem Solving
According to the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM), “solving 
problems that have been strategically chosen and carefully sequenced is a fundamental 
vehicle for learning mathematical content [italics added]” (NCTM, 2000, p. 335). The 
constructivist viewpoint taken by NCTM assumes that problem solving can be a form of 
learning, given that students are engaged in the development of their own knowledge. 
Unfortunately, Schoenfeld’s (1988, 1989) studies of high school geometry students 
indicated that students tend to rely heavily on rote memory and empirical musings, fail to 
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assess the validity of mathematical reasoning while problem solving, and lack the control 
to curtail wild goose chases. More contemporary studies have suggested that such 
behaviors are still prevalent (Lerch, 2004; Muis, 2008), but provide hope that 
pedagogical interventions are feasible and conducive to increasing students’ problem 
solving prowess and self-regulatory practices (de Corte, Verschaffel, & Op ’T Eynde, 
2000; Perels, Gürtler, & Schmitz, 2005).  
For this study, Schoenfeld’s (1985) problem-solving framework was appropriate 
for analyzing students’ problem-solving endeavors. Schoenfeld’s interest in problem 
solving can be credited to George Polya, the father of the modern problem-solving 
movement. Although problem solving has always been inherent in mathematics, George 
Polya is generally given credit for ushering in the modern era of the study of 
mathematical problem solving (Schoenfeld, 1987). Even with publication dates for most 
of his problem-solving works surpassing four decades, Polya’s general methods for 
teaching and learning mathematical problem solving, including an extensive list of 
heuristic (problem-solving) strategies, are still in use in classrooms today. Schoenfeld 
(1985), extending the work of Polya, presented a problem-solving framework that 
brought student control and beliefs issues to the forefront, suggesting that self-regulatory 
processing and epistemology may be an important aspect of problem solving. More 
recently, Muis’ (2008) findings have extended Schoenfeld’s work to encompass more 
contemporary SRL theory and have suggested that student beliefs, self-regulatory 
processing, and problem-solving capacity are interrelated constructs.
The design of this study necessitated the need for an analysis of task definition 
and group dynamics. Mathematical problem solving tasks may be defined according to 
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cognitive demand (Stein, Smith, Henningsen, & Silver, 2000) and structure (Lodewyk, 
2007; Lodewyk, Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2009). A framework for evaluating small 
group problem-solving episodes presented by Artzt and Armour-Thomas (1992) proved 
useful for evaluating self-regulatory aspects of students engaged in group work. This 
section of the literature review is divided as follows: (1) issues of task definition in 
mathematical problem solving, (2) Schoenfeld’s (1985) mathematical problem-solving 
model, (3) issues of group dynamics in mathematical problem solving, and (4) Muis’s 
(2008) study of mathematical problem solving, epistemology, and SRL.   
Issues of Task Definition in Mathematical Problem Solving
When developing learning tasks, teachers and researchers should consider the 
cognitive demand required of students for completing the task. Stein, Smith, Henningsen, 
and Silver (2000) suggested the following categorical scheme for assessing a task’s 
cognitive demand: lower-level demands–memorization tasks and procedures without 
connections tasks; higher-level demands–procedures with connections tasks and doing 
mathematics tasks. Procedures without connections tasks require students to apply 
algorithmic procedures, which are devoid of deeper connections to concepts underlying 
the task. Procedures with connections tasks make connections to underlying concepts and 
require significant cognition as students adapt procedures to task conditions. A 
constructivist, SRL-infused, problem-solving approach to mathematics teaching and 
learning implies the need to develop tasks with a high cognitive demand (Lodewyk, 
2007). The doing mathematics tasks most closely resemble the types of problem-solving 
activities appropriate to the constructivist view of mathematical learning. In fact, one 
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rationale suggested by Stein et al. for classifying a task as doing mathematics is “there is 
no predictable pathway suggested by the task and it requires complex thinking” (p. 21).  
In practice, tasks used by mathematics teachers will necessarily shift from one 
end of the cognitive continuum to the other (Stein et al., 2000). Teachers need to keep 
track of the frequency of use for each level and keep learning goals in mind as tasks are 
developed. Finally, teachers should also consider the most appropriate task level to use 
based on student abilities and needs (Stein et al., 2000).  
Lodewyk and colleagues investigated task structure with respect to epistemology 
and SRL (Lodewyk, 2007; Lodewyk, Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2009). In terms of 
structure, tasks are generally defined as either well-structured tasks (WST) or ill-
structured tasks (IST). Lodewyk (2007) suggested that a WST “is usually more clearly 
formulated and presented, and requires straightforward operations, providing the 
necessary information, algorithms, and precise criteria to indicate how the completed 
learning task will be assessed to aid the learner in searching for a suitable answer;” 
whereas an IST “makes less obvious the operations to be used, is more ambiguous (does 
not have a clearly identifiable answer), and does not provide the necessary information 
(clear instructions), algorithms (cues and resources), or evaluative criteria for students to 
determine if they are solving the problem correctly” (p. 311). 
Both studies discussed here drew from the same sample of tenth grade science 
students in western Canada (Lodewyk, 2007; Lodewyk et al., 2009). Each student 
completed a WST and an IST in partial completion of a science unit on cancer. To 
complete the WST, students typed an essay on cancer and were provided with specific 
subgoals, organized resources, and grading criteria. In contrast, the IST required students 
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to develop a stance as to whether government should focus on the treatment or prevention 
of cancer. The task was more ambiguous, cognitively-demanding, and reflective than the 
WST. Both studies were quantitative and involved factor analyses, ANOVA, MANOVA, 
and structural equation modeling to provide robust results. 
Lodewyk’s (2007) focus was on the relationships between task structure and 
epistemological beliefs. Results suggested that students who view knowledge as simple 
and fixed tended to have more difficulty with the IST. Additionally, findings suggested 
that non-availing beliefs, especially quick, fixed and simple views of knowing, predict 
lower student achievement. Lodewyk suggested that teachers should provide students 
with both types of problem structures, as too many well-structured tasks tend to promote 
a simple-knowledge belief system in students and too many ill-structured tasks tend to 
promote anxiety and withdrawal. Finally, Lodewyk suggested that studies of 
epistemological beliefs should focus more on domain-specific beliefs and be more fine-
grained in nature. 
Lodewyk, Winne, and Jamieson-Noel (2009) suggested that teachers should 
consider student achievement when assigning tasks. Their study investigated aspects of 
self-regulation exhibited by students while working on the WST and the IST discussed 
above. They found that lower-level achievers regulated their efforts and performed better
on the WST but had difficulty scaffolding their knowledge to regulate and perform well 
on the IST due in large part to a lack of setting appropriate subgoals. In contrast, higher-
level achievement students tended to be more motivated, demonstrated higher levels of 
self-regulation, and performed better on the IST due to the high cognitive demand 
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inherent in such problems. Thus, teachers should vary the cognitive load of tasks 
assigned to students to simultaneously promote self-efficacy and critical thinking.  
Schoenfeld’s Mathematical Problem-Solving Model
Schoenfeld (1985) stated, “By definition, problem situations are those in which 
the individual does not have ready access to a (more or less) prepackaged means of 
solution” (p. 54). This definition differentiates problem solving from routine 
mathematical exercises and was the operational definition for problem solving throughout 
this study. Schoenfeld’s definition is also congruent with the doing mathematics 
cognitive demand category described above (Stein et al., 2000). The majority of 
Schoenfeld’s empirical studies involved undergraduate university students (1982, 1983, 
1985) and high school students (1988, 1989). His work produced a framework for 
examining mathematical problem solving. The components of his framework will serve 
as the categorical subheadings for the ensuing discussion: (1) resources, (2) heuristics, (3) 
control, and (4) belief systems (Schoenfeld, 1985). 
Resources. To undertake any endeavor, one must have the necessary resources to 
complete the task. Mathematical problem solving is no different and educators must take 
resource accessibility into account when infusing problem solving into any mathematics 
agenda. The most basic resource available to the prospective problem solver is “domain-
specific knowledge” (Schoenfeld, 1983, p. 332). For instance, a student attempting to 
determine two functions whose intersections form an enclosed region with area 
equivalent to some real number must either recall from elementary calculus that the area 
between curves is obtained via an integral expression or utilize an approximation 
technique from calculus or geometry. However, simply knowing a mathematical fact will 
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not be sufficient unless a student accesses the appropriate knowledge from long-term 
memory (LTM) while working a problem (Schoenfeld, 1983). For example, even though 
it is intuitively obvious to a calculus student that a non-horizontal, linear function cannot 
be positive on its entire domain, will the student access this knowledge when attempting
to prove, or disprove, whether a general cubic function can be concave up on its entire 
domain? 
According to Schoenfeld (1985), expert mathematicians access and apply relevant 
knowledge routinely in problem situations. Expert mathematicians develop a system of 
chunks of mathematical scenarios, have a schema prepared for each familiar chunk, and 
are able to perform even in complex, unfamiliar problem-solving situations. 
Unfortunately, novice problem solvers may fail to recognize a problem type, apply 
flawed resources to a recognized scenario, or simply fold under the pressure of a difficult, 
unfamiliar problem despite having the vision and resources necessary to adequately solve 
the problem. Since a student may fail to solve a problem for various reasons, Schoenfeld 
(1985) suggested that researchers keep “an inventory of resources,” which “should 
include not only the pieces of knowledge accessible to the individual, but the kinds of 
access that the individual has to them” (p. 57). The inventory may aid the researcher in 
determining the cause for the incomplete solution and provide an impetus for follow-up 
interview discussions.  
More specifically, resources are domain-specific within the overall mathematical 
discipline (Schoenfeld, 1985). For instance, students who have only studied first-year 
high school algebra may find difficulty in determining an equation of the line tangent to a 
circle in the plane without significant support. Although they have learned about average 
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rates of change and may have a vague notion of the meaning of tangent, they have not 
learned about the geometric properties of tangents, nor have they discussed instantaneous 
rates of change. Schoenfeld points out that a broad range of resources exists for each 
mathematical domain and range from “informal and intuitive knowledge” to 
“algorithmic” and “routine procedures” (pp. 54–55). Students will demonstrate varying 
mastery of these resources, which will heavily impact the degree of success that may be 
attained in problem solving within the domain. Finally, researchers need to build a 
repertoire of common student mistakes and be prepared to identify them based solely on 
the nature of students’ solution attempts. The fact that this can be done implies that 
teachers need to become more adept at identifying common student errors and develop 
pedagogical means for remedying them that are more robust than simply reiterating the 
same procedure taught in class. 
 Schoenfeld (1992) provided further insights into the importance of researchers’ 
understanding and identification of students’ resource capacity: 
 Did they fail to pursue particular options because they overlooked them, or 
 because they didn’t know of their existence? In the former case, the difficulty 
 might be metacognitive or not seeing the right “connections;” in the latter  case, it 
 is a matter of not having the right tools. From the point of view of the observer or 
 experimenter trying to understand problem-solving behavior, then, a major task is 
 the delineation of the knowledge base of individuals who confront  the given 
 problem solving tasks. It is important to note that in this context, the knowledge 
 base may contain things that are not true. Individuals bring  misconceptions and 
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misunderstood facts to problem situations; it is essential to understand that those
 are the tools they work with. (p. 349) 
Heuristics. Schoenfeld (1985) distinguished heuristics from routine problem 
solving strategies, as follows: “The use of a general problem-solving strategy is heuristic 
[italics added] if the problem solver is having difficulty, and there is reason to suspect 
that taking this particular approach might help” (p. 60). Expert problem solvers share a 
fairly common set of heuristic strategies and employ them during problem solving 
episodes (Schoenfeld, 1985). Thus, at the time of Schoenfeld’s (1985) work, mathematics 
educators had devoted large amounts of energy to teaching heuristic strategies but with 
few positive results. Schoenfeld suggested that the lack of success may be partially 
attributable to the lack of detail inherent in most heuristics-based pedagogy.  
In his seminal problem-solving work How to Solve It, Polya (1957) described a 
large number of heuristics that both teachers and learners may draw upon. Many of 
Polya’s heuristic strategies are referenced by NCTM’s (2000) reform suggestions for 
teaching through problem solving. Polya’s (1957) heuristic list includes, but is not limited 
to, draw a picture, set up an equation, introduce proper notation, introduce auxiliary 
elements, work backwards, special cases, and develop subgoals. Schoenfeld (1982, 1985) 
specifically cited two of Polya’s heuristics strategies: special cases and subgoals. To 
utilize the special cases heuristic, one must recognize that the problem can be simplified 
without loss of generality, determine an appropriate simplified form, utilize resources to 
solve the simpler problem, and then use the result to determine the solution for the 
general-case problem. Applying the subgoals heuristic requires a similar number of steps 
and is generally considered more difficult to employ than the special cases heuristic 
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(Schoenfeld, 1985). The subgoals established for the problem should be in partial 
fulfillment of the given conditions. Once established, the problem-solver would then
work to complete each subgoal until the original problem is solved. Expert problem 
solvers are capable of applying these strategies with ease and precision, but naïve 
problem-solvers demonstrate great difficulty with them (Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985).  
Schoenfeld (1985) suggested two major causes for students’ lack of ability to 
apply heuristics strategies. First, simply teaching, or demonstrating, general heuristics is 
not enough. As shown above, each heuristic method comes with a large quantity of sub-
steps that students must be taught and then allowed the opportunity to explore. 
Otherwise, students will have the general notion of the heuristic but lack the intuition to 
apply it. Second, students’ successful implementation of heuristics is heavily dependent 
on their possession of and access to resources. Mastery of a heuristic strategy will not 
help a student who cannot access appropriate subject matter knowledge in the given 
domain.  
Control. Schoenfeld’s (1985) notions of control are closely related to 
Zimmerman’s (2000) performance control and self-reflection phases. Considering 
resources and heuristics as key factors in planning and goal-setting for solving problems, 
Schoenfeld’s framework may be seen as a self-regulatory problem-solving framework, 
and has been cited as such (De Corte, Verschaffel, & Op ’T Eynde, 2000; Muis, 2008). 
To aid students in his university problem-solving courses taught in the 1970s, Schoenfeld 
(1985) developed a detailed strategy integrating heuristics and control, which was 
developed by him as he worked problems. Schoenfeld (1983, 1985) suggested that there 
was no need for control if a problem was routine to the solver. Thus, he told his students 
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to work problems as they normally would, but refer to the detailed strategy integrating 
heuristics and control when they were at an impasse in a particular problem. His 
problem-solving strategy proceeds as follows: (1) analysis, (2) design/exploration, (3) 
implementation, and (4) verification.  
During analysis, a careful examination of the problem is made and common 
heuristics, such as drawing a diagram or simplifying the problem without loss of 
generality, may be applied (Polya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1985). Once a preliminary decision 
is made, one moves to the design phase, which entails determining an optimal plan of 
attack that may provide a path to success. During this phase, exploration is taking place, 
which is the most active heuristics stage involving such practices as replacing conditions 
with equivalent ones, developing subgoals, and constructing analogous, simpler problems 
(Polya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1985). At any point during exploration, one may wish to go 
back and re-analyze the problem or alter facets of the current design given that navigation 
of the problem space is not going well. Once a schematic solution plan is obtained from 
this stage, one moves to implementation and completes the work required by the chosen 
methods. Finally, during verification, the solution is tested to ensure accuracy. For the 
purposes of protocol analysis, Schoenfeld parsed problem-solving sessions into timed 
episodes, as follows: read, analyze, explore, plan, implement, and verify. 
Overall, Schoenfeld’s (1982, 1983, 1985) results were favorable in that students 
who utilized his strategy were typically able to more readily apply heuristics and 
correctly solve problems as a result of his course. However, Schoenfeld’s (1985) myriad 
observations and videotaped sessions suggested enough variation that he developed a 
continuum of “effects of control decisions on problem-solving success,” as follows:
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Type A. Bad decisions guarantee failure: Wild goose chases waste resources, and 
potentially useful directions are ignored. 
Type B. Executive behavior is neutral: Wild goose chases are curtailed before 
they cause disasters, but resources are not exploited as they might be. 
Type C. Control decisions are a positive force in a solution: Resources are chosen 
carefully and exploited or abandoned appropriately as a result of careful 
monitoring. 
Type D. There is (virtually) no need for control behavior: The appropriate facts 
and procedures for problem solution are accessed in long-term memory (LTM). 
(p. 116) 
Of these four levels, Schoenfeld asserted that Type C control demonstrates “true 
problem-solving skill” (p. 127). The problem has aspects that the potential solver is 
unable to readily access, yet via control and continuous monitoring, the solution is still 
obtained.  
Lerch (2004) challenged Schoenfeld’s (1985) assertions that control was at the 
heart of students’ failures, citing a significant lack of resources amongst most 
undergraduate students. Lerch suggested that Schoenfeld may have disproportionately 
focused on control issues, and failed to give proper credence to the immense supply of 
problem-solving resources available to the expert professors that he compared with his 
student participants. She further suggested that students’ lack of such resources may 
explain their wild goose chases better than issues of control. Lerch’s (2004) small-scale 
qualitative study investigated the differences inherent in undergraduate mathematics 
students’ problem-solving capacity with respect to well-structured (textbook) exercises 
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versus ill-structured problems. Her findings were that the students successfully applied 
and adapted strategies for solving the textbook problems, but were unable to successfully 
complete the ill-structured problems. Lerch suggested that students’ success on textbook 
problems may be attributed to the accessibility of a procedural model; students’ lack of a 
mathematical processing model (due to insufficient resources) for unfamiliar problems 
may explain the failure to solve the ill-structured problems. Although not empirical, 
Lerch’s study supported the assertion that students need to develop a more broad-based, 
conceptual approach to problem solving, which steers away from the algorithmic 
procedures that made the students successful on the textbook problems. From a 
mathematical problem-solving perspective, such success is artificial anyway. It only 
indicates the ability to follow a recipe, not that any mathematical problem-solving 
prowess has been attained (Schoenfeld, 1992). Finally, Lerch suggested that student 
attainment of mathematical problem solving skills is a multi-faceted enigma and the 
compelling evidence presented for using SRL as a framework only tells part of the story.  
Perels, Gürtler, and Schmitz (2005) presented some promising results concerning 
SRL and problem-solving training for students from their study of 249 eighth-grade 
German gymnasium students. Using an SRL problem-solving framework based on 
Zimmerman (2000) and de Corte et al. (2000), Perels et al. found that providing students 
with six weeks of SRL and problem-solving training resulted in improvements in students 
for both constructs. Training sessions focused on self-regulatory components consistent 
with Zimmerman’s model and problem-solving training focused on applying heuristic 
methods. To ensure quality training sessions, the researchers kept group sizes to no more 
than 19 students per training session. The study implemented a pretest-posttest design 
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with each test having an SRL questionnaire component and a mathematical problem-
solving component.  
The results of Perels et al.’s (2005) study revealed that the students trained in both 
SRL processing and problem-solving skills improved from pretest to posttest for both 
constructs. Unfortunately, not every aspect of SRL (including goal-setting and learning 
strategies) was improved to a statistically significant level, which led Perels et al. to 
request further research to determine more appropriate means of teaching these skills. A 
surprising result was that students who only received SRL training (but no problem-
solving training) showed improvements in both SRL processing and problem-solving 
ability. Thus, although Perels et al. suggested difficulties in developing self-regulatory 
capacity, the benefits inherent to improving problem-solving capacity indicate that the 
endeavor should be of paramount importance to constructivist-minded mathematics 
educators.
Belief systems. Researchers have examined the relationships between 
epistemological beliefs and mathematical problem solving (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; 
Muis, 2004, 2008; Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1992). 
Much of Schoenfeld’s research was devoted to investigating students and experts while 
solving mathematical problems. Based on his videotaped problem-solving sessions, 
Schoenfeld (1985) suggested that three nonavailing beliefs typically pervade students’ 
attempts at solving mathematical problems:
1. Formal mathematics has little or nothing to do with real thinking or problem 
solving. 
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2. Mathematics problems are always solved in less than ten minutes, if they are 
solved at all. 
3. Only geniuses are capable of discovering or creating mathematics. (p. 43) 
In a synthesis of problem solving literature, Schoenfeld (1992) provided additional non-
availing student beliefs:
1. Mathematics problems have one and only one right answer. 
2. There is only one correct way to solve any mathematics problem–usually the 
rule the teacher has most recently demonstrated to the class.
3. Ordinary students cannot expect to understand mathematics; they expect 
simply to memorize it and apply what they have learned mechanically and 
without understanding. (p. 359) 
Although obviously couched in a mathematical problem-solving perspective, 
these non-availing beliefs are fairly congruent with low-level, multi-dimensional
epistemological beliefs described above (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 
Schommer, 1990). Specifically, the beliefs listed above are congruent with Schommer’s 
(1990) quick learning belief and the low-level beliefs from Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) 
source of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge dimensions. Along a more 
contemporary vein, Muis (2004) stated, “In the context of mathematics epistemological 
beliefs, beliefs include perspectives on the nature of mathematics knowledge, 
justifications of mathematics knowledge, sources of mathematics knowledge, and 
acquisition of mathematics knowledge” (p. 326).  
Romberg (1992) described mathematical epistemology from a process 
perspective, as opposed to an acquisition perspective: 
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When many nonmathematicians look at mathematics, they see a bounded and 
static set of concepts and skills to be mastered. This is perhaps a reflection of the 
mathematics they studied in school or college rather than insight into the 
discipline itself. For many, to know means to identify the artifacts of the 
discipline–its basic concepts and procedures. For others more familiar with the
discipline, to know mathematics is to do mathematics. A person gathers, 
 discovers, or creates knowledge in the course of some activity having a purpose. 
 Only if the emphasis is put on the process of doing is mathematics likely to make 
sense to students. (pp. 60–61)    
Partially based on the works of Schoenfeld, Kloosterman and Stage (1992) 
developed the Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (IMBS) to measure “secondary school 
and college students’ beliefs about mathematics as a subject and how mathematics is 
learned” (p. 109). Through a series of studies, the five scales were validated and include 
measurements of the following topics of mathematical beliefs: duration of problem-
solving engagement, solutions of problems via procedural means, importance of 
conceptual understanding, importance of word problems, and attributing mathematical 
ability to effort versus innate skill. An additional scale measuring students’ beliefs about
the usefulness of mathematics was also included with the other five scales. A more 
complete assessment of the IMBS may be found in Chapter III: Methodology.
Schommer-Aikins, Duell, and Hutter (2005) “tested the hypothesis that general 
epistemological beliefs are linked to the mathematical problem-solving beliefs” in a study 
of 1269 middle school students from the American Midwest (p. 292). Additionally, 
Schommer-Aikins et al. explored the developmental nature of the structure of middle 
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school students’ beliefs, and examined relationships and possible causality between 
epistemological beliefs, mathematical problem solving beliefs, and performance. Data 
were collected from a middle school version of Schommer’s (1990) epistemological 
belief questionnaire, the IMBS, students’ performance on a standardized exam, and 
students’ overall GPA. To test the hypotheses, data analyses included exploratory factor 
analysis, regression calculations, and path analysis.
Results indicated that the structure of middle school students’ beliefs tend to be 
less developed than secondary and college students’ beliefs. Exploratory factor analysis 
revealed that quick/fixed learning and studying aimlessly were the two strongest general 
epistemological beliefs and effortful math, useful math, math confidence, and understand 
math concepts were the four strongest mathematical problem-solving beliefs. Step-wise 
regression indicated that the less students believe in quick/fixed learning, the more likely 
they will believe that problem solving is effortful and useful, requires understanding of 
concepts, and have confidence in their ability to solve problems. An additional step-wise 
regression analysis revealed that beliefs in quick/fixed learning and that mathematics is 
useful predicted mathematical problem-solving performance. Finally, path analysis 
indicated that beliefs in quick/fixed learning, useful mathematics, math confidence, and 
understand math concepts had a significant effect on overall academic performance. In 
sum, Schommer-Aikins et al. (2005) stated, “The results of our study also suggest that 
both general epistemological beliefs and mathematical beliefs may play a role in 
students’ problem-solving performance” (p. 301).  
Mason (2003) used an Italian interpretation of the IMBS to study 599 Italian high 
school students’ mathematical beliefs. Participants included students from two school, 
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representative of each of the five grades of Italian high schools. The mixed methods 
study included analyses of the Italian version of the IMBS and students’ achievement in 
mathematics, and individual interviews with select students. All but one scale, 
importance of word problems, of the Italian version of the IMBS demonstrated moderate 
to high reliability. It is not surprising that the importance of word problems scale 
demonstrated low reliability since Kloosterman and Stage (1992) reported difficulty in 
generating reliable ratings for this scale due to students’ confusion with the term word 
problem. The results of the study indicated that as students progress through high school, 
their beliefs that all problems may be solved via routine means begin to diminish. 
Unfortunately, findings indicated that non-availing beliefs emerge during the high school 
years as students’ beliefs that they can solve difficult problems and their beliefs in the 
usefulness of mathematics decrease with time. Additionally, the findings indicated that 
four scales predicted student achievement to varying degrees, as follows in order from 
strongest to weakest: duration of problem-solving engagement, solutions of problems via 
procedural means, usefulness of mathematics, and importance of conceptual 
understanding. The findings of this study indicated the importance of considering 
mathematical beliefs as factors in students’ mathematics education. Mason suggested that 
educators develop interventions for fostering availing mathematical beliefs in students 
and also suggested that teachers design instruction, tasks, and assessments in alignment 
with such availing mathematical beliefs.
Royce and Mos’ (1980) and Schoenfeld’s (1983, 1985) findings suggested that 
mathematics professors exhibit rationalist-based approaches to mathematical problem-
solving. Expert mathematicians and professors develop a rational sense of problem 
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solving through graduate school experiences and are able to derive mathematical 
information even if they cannot recall it (Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985). However, 
Schoenfeld’s (1983, 1985) findings suggested that college mathematics students tend to 
solve problems from an empirical perspective. In Schoenfeld’s studies, multiple students, 
with little idea as to how to progress, simply tried every plausible solution by visual 
inspection, rather than utilizing a logical chain of reasoning or proof. Schoenfeld (1985) 
provided the title naïve empiricism to such a belief system. In contrast, when Schoenfeld 
(1983) gave the same problems to mathematicians, they derived necessary results, 
monitored their performance, and verified their solution processes. In other words, 
mathematicians modeled Royce and Mos’ (1980) rationalist epistemic profile and 
demonstrated many of the phases of the SRL processing model used in this study (Winne 
& Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000).  
Schoenfeld (1985) also described how high school classroom experiences 
promote empirical beliefs in students and stymie the use of proof and discovery in 
problem solving: 
Such experience is abstracted as part of the students’ mathematical world view as 
follows: Mathematical argumentation only serves to verify established 
knowledge, and argumentation (proof) has nothing to do with the processes of 
discovery or understanding. As a result, students who are perfectly capable of 
deriving the answers to given problems do not do so, because it does not occur to 
them that this kind of approach would be of value. (p. 186) 
On a positive note, Schoenfeld (1983) suggested that his problem solving courses 
promoted heuristics-based control approaches and a more rational belief system amongst 
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students in his university problem-solving courses. These changes resulted in improved 
problem-solving performance, which shows that success and progress can be made in a 
classroom setting.  
Muis (2004) suggested that, to a certain extent, students’ beliefs concerning 
mathematical knowledge are dependent upon classroom practices. Based on her extensive 
synthesis of mathematics-based epistemology literature, Muis suggested that teacher-
centered classrooms focused on rote-memorization for the purpose of passing 
standardized exams are detrimental to students’ active pursuit of mathematical 
knowledge as constructed schemas for solving problems. She further suggested that 
teacher-centered classrooms foster non-availing epistemological beliefs amongst 
students. She suggested that teachers develop classrooms that foster student construction 
of mathematics and place teachers in the role of facilitators of learning. In line with Muis’ 
views, de Corte et al. (2000) shunned the overuse of standardized assessments and 
suggested that teachers assume a theory of assessment devoted to authentic, complex, 
real-life alternative forms of assessment. Alternative assessments may include 
performance tasks, journals, and portfolios (NCTM, 2000). However, it is not enough to 
develop such assessments and then mark them in a traditional manner with a grade 
ranging from zero to one hundred. From both the SRL and constructivist perspectives, 
teachers must provide constructive, cognitive feedback (Butler & Winne, 1995; Nicol & 
Macfarlane-Dick, 2006) and “stimulate in students the development of attitudes toward 
and skills in assessing their own mathematical learning processes and performances” (de 
Corte et al., 2000).
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Schoenfeld’s (1985, 1988, 1989) findings were among the evidence that led to 
Muis’ (2004) and de Corte et al.’s (2000) assertions. Schoenfeld studied high school 
geometry students’ epistemological beliefs via a year-long observational period 
(Schoenfeld, 1988) and a questionnaire containing both Likert-scale and open-ended 
items (Schoenfeld, 1989). Students reported that learning mathematics requires 
memorization of formulas and proofs, homework problems should be solved in a matter 
of minutes or not at all, and that quality teaching involves showing students how to use 
rules. Problem solving was discussed in classrooms, but rarely did teachers engage 
students in mathematical tasks beyond the scope of rote-memorized material. Thus, 
although performance on standardized exams was high, the observed instruction and 
student engagement was sub-par from a conceptual perspective. Schoenfeld (1988) 
continually referenced instances in which instruction focused on mechanics and form 
(e.g., two-column proofs and procedural constructions) at the expense of understanding. 
Additionally, concepts were segmented to the point that students could not make 
connections or apply prior knowledge to newly discussed material. In total, Schoenfeld’s 
findings painted a bleak picture of non-availing student belief profiles for learning 
mathematics. I choose to close this section with a quote from Schoenfeld (1989) that still 
resonates in my mind as I reflect on my own mathematics teaching practice:
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the present study is the suggestion that these 
students have come to separate school mathematics–the mathematics they know 
and experience in their classrooms–from abstract mathematics, the discipline of 
creativity, problem solving, and discovery, about which they are told but which 
they have not experienced. (p. 349) 
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Issues of Group Dynamics in Mathematical Problem Solving  
 Theoretical and empirical work from educational psychology has provided 
mounting evidence that problem-solving endeavors in small group settings can be 
successful (Johnson & Johnson, 2009). Additionally, the social constructivist viewpoint 
used in most reform mathematics literature (e.g., NCTM, 2000) has suggested that 
students should be critically thinking about and communicating mathematical ideas with 
their peers. However, simply placing students in heterogeneous groups of two to three 
members will not guarantee successful problem solving experiences (Johnson & Johnson, 
2009). A multitude of factors must be considered by researchers investigating and 
educators implementing group problem solving. This section will review two frameworks 
for analyzing group problem-solving (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Goos, Galbraith, 
& Renshaw, 2002). 
Expanding Schoenfeld’s (1985) episodic framework for analyzing problem-
solving protocols, Artzt and Armour-Thomas (1992) developed a framework for 
analyzing cognitive and metacognitive behaviors exhibited by individual students 
engaged in group problem solving. In addition to Schoenfeld’s read, analyze, explore,
plan, implement, and verify episodes, Artzt and Armour-Thomas considered 
understanding the problem and watching and listening important instances in group 
problem-solving progression. Within these episodes, an individual member of the group 
may exhibit overt evidence of either cognitive or metacognitive actions. The authors 
distinguished these behaviors as follows: 
Metacognitive behaviors can be exhibited by statements made about the problem 
or statements made about the problem-solving process. Cognitive behaviors can 
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be exhibited by verbal or nonverbal actions that indicate actual processing of 
information. (p. 141) 
Testing their framework, Artzt and Armour-Thomas (1992) investigated the group 
problem-solving practices of 27 seventh-grade students from an urban middle school in 
Queens, New York. Six groups containing four to five students each were randomly 
selected to participate. The study involved the six groups working on a problem together 
in the classroom setting. All sessions were videotaped and students were interviewed 
individually while watching particular portions of the video. Coding of the videotapes 
was consistent with the framework developed by the authors and interrater reliability 
percentages were above 90% for all coders.
In terms of overall group statistics, the results of the study revealed that the 
highest percentage of metacognitive behaviors occurred during the exploring and 
understanding episodes. By a very large margin, the exploring episodes contained the 
highest percentage of students’ cognitive behaviors. In most cases, the metacognitive 
verbalizations of individual students redirected group work and curtailed erroneous ideas.  
Additionally, results indicated that watching-and-listening is an important factor 
in group problem-solving success. The only group that failed to solve the problem 
contained members who did not listen to one another or communicate well. In fact, the 
group that was unable to solve the problem had the lowest percentage of metacognitive 
behaviors, the highest percentage of cognitive behaviors, and the lowest percentage of 
watch-and-listen behaviors. On the other hand, one of the groups to successfully solve the 
problem provided evidence indicating negative aspects of watching-and-listening. In this 
group, one member dominated the problem-solving session while the others watched and 
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listened, participating only intermittently and showing signs of not understanding the 
evolution of the solution process. Artzt and Armour-Thomas (1992) described the level 
of interaction among group members on a continuum from students who work 
independently and do not contribute to students who actively pursue problem solutions in 
tandem with their fellow group members.  
Finally, the study indicated that having high-ability students is not sufficient for 
proper group functioning or problem-solving success. The group that failed to solve the 
problem contained a very high achieving student who admittedly never works well with 
other students in groups. Another group contained a high achieving student who 
independently solved the problem, but failed to see the need in ensuring that others 
contributed to group success or learned from the experience. Artzt and Armour-Thomas 
(1992) concluded that group work has the potential for fostering student learning and 
metacognitive development, but many factors are involved that may confound group 
problem-solving endeavors.   
 Goos, Galbraith, and Renshaw (2002) pointed out that Artzt and Armour-
Thomas’s (1992) framework failed to differentiate between an individual student’s 
monitoring of their own actions and thinking and monitoring of their partners’ actions 
and thinking. Thus, Goos et al. suggested an alternative framework for analyzing 
metacognitive discourse during group problem-solving: 
! Self-disclosure – Self-oriented statements and responses that clarify, elaborate, 
evaluate, or justify one’s own thinking. 
! Feedback Request – Self-oriented questions that invite a partner to critique one’s 
own thinking. 
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! Other-monitoring – Other-oriented statements, questions and responses that 
represent an attempt to understand a partner’s thinking. (p. 199) 
The authors conducted a three-year study of senior secondary students in Queensland, 
Australia working novel problems in the classroom setting. One lesson per week was 
observed, videotaped, and audiotaped over the three-year duration. The problems worked 
by the participants were novel in that they represented new content and were presented as 
mathematical problems. The topics included projectile motion, combinatorics, and 
compound interest.  
Goos et al. (2002) reported and analyzed the results of one successful and one 
unsuccessful problem solving session. The successful problem session, which involved 
students solving a projectile motion problem, indicated that group members were actively 
engaged in metacognitive assessments of their actions and thoughts, as well as those of 
others. Surprisingly, the unsuccessful problem-solving session, which involved multiple 
combinatorics problems, contained a similar percentage of metacognitive activities as the 
successful session. However, further analysis revealed that the main difference between 
the sessions involved the transactive nature of the metacognitive activities. In this study, 
the difference between successful and unsuccessful group problem solving was 
attributable to the degree that individual group members engaged in assessing and 
monitoring the thinking and actions of the group as a whole. In other words, a group was 
successful when all members engaged in the serious consideration and analysis of every 
thought and action posed by the group. In summary, Goos et al. suggested that cognitive 
and metacognitive analyses of group problem-solving sessions should include interactive, 
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dynamic facets of group discourse, which is an extension of Artzt and Armour-Thomas’s 
(1992) framework that focused on individual students’ metacognitive behaviors.    
Muis’s (2008) Study of Mathematical Problem-Solving, Epistemology, and SRL
Muis (2008) conducted a two-part study investigating the relationships between 
student epistemic profiles and SRL processing while engaged in mathematical problem 
solving. She framed SRL from the perspective of Schoenfeld’s (1985) view of problem-
solving control and epistemology from the perspective of Royce and Mos’ (1980) 
empirical and rational epistemic styles. In the first part of the study, 268 undergraduate 
university students enrolled in mathematics and statistics courses were given the Psycho-
Epistemological Profile (PEP; Royce & Mos, 1980) and the metacognitive self-regulation 
scale from the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, Smith, 
Garcia, & McKeachie, 1991), both described in detail in the Chapter III: Methodology.
Royce and Mos designed the PEP to classify students as predominantly empirical, 
rational, or metaphorical. Muis also developed a scaled scoring method to determine 
students’ epistemic profiles, as follows: predominantly rational, both rational and 
empirical, and predominantly empirical. In Muis’ study, rational and empirical epistemic 
profiles were assumed to have the same connotation as that intended by Schoenfeld 
(1985). The number of students classified as metaphorical, a third classification of 
epistemic style from the PEP, was so low that Muis did not include them in the study. 
Using MANOVA, the results indicated that rational students scored significantly higher 
on the metacognitive self-regulation subscale of the MSLQ than either group, with 
students classified as both rational and empirical scoring significantly higher on the same 
subscale as empirical students.
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For the second half of the study, a sub-sample of 24 students majoring in 
mathematics was taken from the original sample of participants. Students completed six 
problems (two from geometry, one from algebra, and three on the binomial distribution) 
outside of the classroom environment. The two geometry problems and one algebraic 
problem were taken from Schoenfeld’s (1982) study and students worked these problems 
with no prior exposure to content. For the three binomial distribution problems, students 
studied a brief excerpt on the binomial distribution and then worked the problems with 
the option of referring back to the material just read. In completing all six problems, 
students adhered to the think-aloud protocol methodology (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) and 
sessions were audiotaped. Once completed, student work was coded for evidence of SRL 
processing and application of either a rational or empirical beliefs orientation. The SRL 
codes used in the study were “planning, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive 
control” (Muis, 2008, p. 190). Validation of coding and interpretations was obtained via 
retrospective interviews (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), member-checking, and inter-rater 
agreement. Inter-rater agreement percentages all exceeded Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
80% suggestion.  
Findings from the second half of the study indicated that students categorized as 
rational by the PEP demonstrated statistically higher usage of planning, monitoring, and 
metacognitive control than the other two groups. Additionally, students categorized as 
rational correctly solved more problems that the other two groups. These findings are in-
line with Schoenfeld’s (1982, 1985) assertions regarding approaches to problem solving 
made by students exhibiting rational beliefs. However, Muis stated, “What has yet to be 
explored is why, in the context of mathematics problem solving, individuals profiled as 
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predominantly rational engage in more regulation of cognition” (p. 200). The qualitative 
results of Muis’s study also indicated that students’ epistemological beliefs may be 
enacted during the definition of the task phase (Winne & Hadwin, 1998). Once enacted, 
Muis suggested that students’ epistemological beliefs carry through other phases of SRL 
based mainly on the relationship between beliefs and learning standards. This finding 
provided support for Muis’s (2007) model infusing epistemological beliefs into Winne 
and Hadwin’s model of SRL. Finally, Muis cautioned researchers that, despite the 
advantages, sole use of think-aloud protocols may not provide a rich description of 
students’ engagement in a task. Multiple forms of data collection are certainly preferable.
Theoretical Framework: An Integrated Model 
Three major theoretical constructs were considered in this study: self-regulated 
learning (SRL), epistemology, and mathematical problem solving. Thus, the design of the 
study necessitated a framework integrating these constructs for the purposes of data 
collection, data analysis, and discussion. The SRL model used in this study provided the 
most overarching tool for describing students’ navigation through complex problem-
solving tasks. Steeped in the tenets of social cognitive theory, Zimmerman’s (2000) 
cyclic model involves the following three phases: (1) forethought, (2) performance 
control, and (3) self-reflection. Preceding these three phases is Winne and Hadwin’s 
(1998) definition of the task phase.  
A survey of relevant literature (Hofer, 1999, 2000, 2004a, 2004b; Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Mos & Royce, 1980; Muis, 2004, 2007, 
2008; Muis & Franco, 2009; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1992) informed the 
integration of epistemological beliefs into the model. Muis and colleagues have made 
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significant progress in determining relationships between SRL and epistemological 
beliefs both theoretically (Muis, 2004, 2007) and empirically (Muis, 2008; Muis & 
Franco, 2009). Muis’s (2007) model that integrated epistemological beliefs into Winne 
and Hadwin’s (1998) recursive model of SRL initiated the work of theorizing possible 
phases of SRL at which beliefs may be enacted. Additionally, Muis (2007, 2008) 
suggested further influences that beliefs may have on each phase of SRL. Finally, 
Schoenfeld’s (1982, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1992) problem-solving contributions that 
incorporated cognitive control strategies and mathematical beliefs were infused into the 
model. The result was an integrated framework that guided all facets of the design and 
implementation of the study.  
An Integrated Model 
As students navigate a mathematical problem space, issues of control and beliefs 
arise that affect both current and future functioning (Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1982, 1983, 
1985, 1988, 1989, 1992). Issues of control may be assessed by evaluating students’ 
application of SRL processing, as exemplified by this study, which employed a 
combination of Winne and Hadwin’s (1998) and Zimmerman’s (2000) models of SRL. 
Recent theoretical and empirical work has revealed that significant relationships exist 
between epistemological beliefs and SRL processing (Hofer, 2004a; Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997; Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). In particular, 
Muis (2008) suggested students’ epistemic profiles are related to their performance and 
SRL processing while engaged in mathematical problems, and epistemological beliefs 
may be enacted during the task definition phase of SRL and then affect subsequent 
phases of SRL.   
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Based on a thorough review of relevant literature, a theoretical framework 
encompassing epistemological beliefs and SRL theory was developed to guide the study. 
Figure 1 below provides a visual representation of the model that is the basis of the 
framework. To begin, SRL is displayed as a cyclic, recursive process (Winne & Hadwin, 
1998; Zimmerman, 2000) that students may utilize to guide their actions through a 
problem space. Ideally, students who practice SRL processing navigate through a task in 
an A-B-C-D progression (see Figure 1) and positively alter subsequent SRL processing 
based on self-reflections from D. However, students tend to be unpredictable and do not 
necessarily follow this pattern verbatim (Boekaerts & Niemivirta, 2000; Pintrich, 2000; 
Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). Thus, the multitude of two-way arrows 
indicate that students may navigate through the phases in virtually any combination of 
ways, with events from a current phase prompting motion to subsequent, but not 
necessarily sequential, phases.
Additionally, the model depicts students’ epistemological beliefs, both general 
and mathematics-specific, as being enacted at any phase and affecting all aspects of SRL 
processing. In theory, epistemological beliefs are enacted at the definition of the task 
phase, affect the goals and plans developed during forethought, influence the strategies 
used during performance control, and influence standards set during definition of the task
that are used to assess efforts during the self-reflection phase (Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & 
Franco, 2009). However, students often enter SRL processing at various phases (not 
always beginning with task definition and then progressing sequentially), but they will 
bring their beliefs with them regardless of the entry point.  
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Figure 1. Model of Epistemology and SRL for Mathematical Problem Solving  
Thus, the researcher suggests that the enactment and influence of epistemological 
beliefs may follow the recursive, cyclic, and unpredictable pattern found in the actual 
practice of SRL. For instance, a student with a non-availing belief in problem-solving 
duration may jump blindly into implementing a seemingly appropriate, but erroneous, 
strategy without curtail. When unsuccessful, the student may stop working and move on 
to other tasks because of the belief that the problem should be solved quickly or not at all 
(Schoenfeld, 1985). In this case, the student’s belief that problems should be solved 
quickly has been enacted at the performance control phase and subsequently stifled 
monitoring and reflecting processes. Finally, the two-way arrow at the bottom of the 
model depicts the reciprocal nature of the relationship between epistemological beliefs 
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Definition of the Task
In terms of navigation of the problem space, students will likely engage in the 
definition of the task phase of SRL during the reading and analysis episodes (Schoenfeld, 
1985). Students will read the problem, and possibly later re-read the problem, then rely 
on their mathematical resources in developing an appropriate definition of the task. 
Experts will often jump to implementation and remain on auto-pilot as they navigate a 
familiar problem space. The particularly well-attuned problem solver may envision a 
chunk of the problem resembling prior work, a schema based on categorizing the 
problem, or a more elaborate functional response to the problem situation (Schoenfeld, 
1985). Novice problem solvers typically must engage in analysis in an attempt to 
understand the problem more fully. Often, initial heuristic strategies are employed, such 
as drawing a picture, to gain further insight before developing a plan. Any of these 
progressively more sophisticated initial responses has the potential to develop into a 
rational approach to the problem at hand (Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985). It should be noted 
that information gleaned from this phase is subject to change as the problem-solver 
delves into problem specifics, but all or part of the task definition may remain intact 
dependent upon the circumstances (Winne & Hadwin, 1998). Extremely novice problem 
solvers may fail to tap into their available mathematical resources and thus, have little or 
no logical vision of a possible solution technique, which implies that this phase may be 
skipped by naïve problem solvers. As discussed in detail above, this may result in the 
student engaging in empirical wild goose chases (Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985).   
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Forethought
In terms of mathematical problem solving, students exhibit evidence of 
forethought processing during the analysis, exploration, and planning episodes of 
problem execution (Schoenfeld, 1985). As a student navigates through these episodes, 
each epistemological belief espoused by the student may influence the standards on
which goals are based (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2007). More constructivist-based 
beliefs tend to produce mastery-oriented goals, which are more conducive to self-
regulatory processing (Pintrich, 2000; Muis, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009). For instance, if 
a student believes that effort can yield increases in mathematical ability, as opposed to 
mathematical prowess being innate (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Schoenfeld, 1985), then 
the student may adopt a mastery-oriented approach to a task rather than simply focusing 
on their performance.
Additionally, students’ arsenal of heuristics heavily influences the forethought 
phase. An experienced, or particularly adept, problem solver includes heuristics in their 
problem-solving plans. As mentioned above, heuristic planning must include the 
multitude of sub-strategies that fall under the heuristic of choice (Schoenfeld, 1985). For 
instance, if a student chooses to use the sub-goal heuristic approach, then the student 
must plan for each mathematical exercise that has been deemed an appropriate sub-
problem to build a solution for the original problem. Naïve, or inexperienced, problem 
solvers may not have advanced heuristic strategies at their disposal and may simply plan 
to apply a seemingly appropriate mathematical operation to the problem. If this fails, 
other mathematical operations will be applied, in a manner congruent with the empiricist 
approach. This may not be entirely the students’ fault–many mathematics teachers, with 
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the best intentions, demonstrate appropriate heuristics, but “bypass all of [the] 
complexity” and “leave the students completely unprepared to use the strategy” 
(Schoenfeld, 1985, p. 91). 
Performance Control
Whether planning is overt or implied, students will begin applying strategies in an 
effort to solve the given problem. Schoenfeld (1985) called this set of actions the 
implementation episode. Self-regulating students will apply their plan during this phase 
and monitor progress based on standards set when establishing goals (Zimmerman, 
2000). Recent theoretical and empirical works have suggested that students’ 
epistemological beliefs influence the standards they set and thus, may affect strategy use 
and monitoring (Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). 
Specifically, Schoenfeld’s (1985) problem-solving control continuum, Types A–D,
provides a means of assessing students’ abilities to self-evaluate and make on-line checks 
of progress based on their goals. Briefly, Type A-controlled problem solvers apply 
strategies without considering consequences and often fail to solve problems. Type B-
controlled problem solvers apply some level of control but fail to tap all necessary 
resources. Type C-controlled problem solvers, the optimum level, monitor solution 
processes such that regulation results in positive actions toward success. Finally, Type D-
controlled problem solvers easily access solution methods and need virtually no control 
interventions.  
The results of self-monitoring are inputs into internal feedback loops that may 
result in the need to alter strategy use, re-assess goals and plans, or re-read the problem to 
better define the task (Butler & Winne, 1995; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 
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2000). In fact, Schoenfeld (1985) stated, “One of the hallmarks of good problem solvers’ 
control behavior is that, while they are in the midst of working problems, such 
individuals seem to maintain an internal dialogue regarding the way that their solutions 
evolve” (p. 140). External feedback from peer and teachers may also serve as inputs into 
internal feedback loops that may alter students’ solution paths (Butler & Winne, 1995; 
Nicol & Macfarlane-Dick, 2006). Such interruptions in cognitive processing often occur 
when students are engaged in group problem solving and may curtail wild goose chases 
or have adverse effects on solution paths (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Goos et al., 
2002).   
Self-reflection 
From a mathematical problem-solving perspective, the verification episode 
involves checking a solution for either accuracy or agreement to a set of conditions, 
depending on the nature of the task (Schoenfeld, 1985). For instance, an ill-defined task 
will not typically have a correct answer, rather students would simply need to make sure 
that their solution did not oversimplify the conditions, completely ignore a condition, etc. 
However, a well-defined task will have a particular unique solution or set of solutions 
that may be checked for accuracy. Schoenfeld (1985) and Polya (1957) suggested that 
adept problem solvers assess their solution paths and reflect on such factors as whether 
alternative solutions may exist or whether solutions may be generalized for further 
application. This deeper assessment of the navigation of a problem space is more 
synonymous to the self-reflection phase than the mere checking step described above. 
One consequence of students’ participation in self-reflection is the assessment of causal 
attributions to task results (Zimmerman, 2000). Epistemological beliefs may emerge 
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during this phase, as suggested by Zimmerman, who stated that “attributions of errors to a 
fixed ability prompt learners to react negatively and discourage efforts to improve” (p. 
22).   
Summary
 This review of relevant literature delved into SRL, epistemology, and problem 
solving to inform and frame this study. Educational aspects of SRL emerged from the 
development of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986). Much of the early literature was 
dedicated to describing and defining general aspects of the construct (e.g., Zimmerman, 
1989). Then studies began appearing tying SRL to multiple aspects of education, 
including student learning and achievement, pedagogical practices, and even specific 
disciplines (Butler & Winne, 1995; Hadwin et al., 2004; Muis, 2008; Muis & Franco, 
2009; Perels et al., 2005; Schunk, 1996; Usher, 2009). Additionally, theoretical and 
empirical advancements have provided researchers with a plethora of general SRL 
models (e.g., Pintrich, 2000; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000) and a model 
integrating SRL and epistemological beliefs (Muis, 2007).  
 Perry’s (1970) study is generally cited as the origin of educational epistemology. 
His work investigated the development of epistemology amongst college students. 
Shortly after Perry’s work, Royce and colleagues  suggested that students could be 
assigned epistemic profiles based on three ways of knowing: rational, empirical, or 
metaphorical (Diamond & Royce, 1980; Royce & Mos, 1980; Wardell & Royce, 1978). 
Schoenfeld (1983, 1985) applied the empiricist and rationalist titles to his descriptions of 
mathematical beliefs with respect to problem solving. A major turning point in the study 
of epistemology was Schommer’s (1990) study introducing the conception of 
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epistemological beliefs as a multitude of independent dimensions. Several studies and 
theoretical reviews have suggested the nature of these epistemological beliefs and 
developed various integrated models (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kloosterman 
& Stage, 1992; Muis, 2007; Muis et al., 2006; Schommer-Aikins, 2004).  
Winne and Perry’s (2000) work prompted researchers to consider either 
augmenting self-report questionnaires with other types of data or developing more robust 
tools to analyze fine-grained instances of SRL processing. Recently, research has been 
both conducted and requested utilizing think-aloud protocols and qualitative methods 
(Greene & Azevedo, 2009; Hadwin et al., 2004; Muis, 2007, 2008; Usher, 2009; 
Zimmerman, 2008). Studies utilizing qualitative methods and think-aloud protocols are 
also common in both epistemological beliefs (Hofer, 2004a, 2004b; Muis, 2008) and 
problem-solving (Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985) disciplines. We now turn to a 
detailed description of the methods employed in this case study, which explored the 





This study investigated the relationships that exist between advanced mathematics 
students’ epistemological beliefs and SRL processing while engaged in mathematical 
problem solving. Specifically, the current study sought to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. How are students’ epistemological beliefs related to self-regulatory processing 
practices during engagement in mathematical problem-solving  tasks?
2. What self-regulation strategies do students employ while preparing for the AP 
Calculus exam and engaging in problem-solving episodes?
3. What epistemological beliefs influence students’ choice and use of heuristic 
strategies to solve mathematical problems?
4. How are self-regulated learning strategies and epistemological beliefs related 
to student performance on problem-solving tasks? 
 The researcher selected the case study methodology to obtain in-depth, 
exploratory descriptions and explanations of the above phenomena. Yin (2008) provided 
confirmation of the appropriateness of this methodological decision: 
 The more that your questions seek to explain some present circumstance (e.g., 
 “how” or “why” some social phenomenon works), the more that the case study 
 will be relevant. The method also is relevant the more that your questions require 
 an extensive and “in-depth” description of some social phenomenon. (p. 4)
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Additionally, Winne and colleagues questioned the use of self-report 
questionnaires as the sole, or predominant, form of data collection in SRL studies (Muis, 
2008; Muis, Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2007; Winne & Perry, 2000; Winne & Jamieson-
Noel, 2003). Winne and Perry further suggested that studies investigate SRL at a finer 
grain size to accumulate extensive descriptions of SRL processing. Such studies have the 
potential to produce more dynamic and accurate models of SRL. Thus, recent studies 
have sought to investigate SRL processing more closely, such as Hadwin, Boutara, 
Knoetzke, and Thompson’s (2004) case study and Greene and Azevedo’s (2009) 
quantitative study applying think-aloud protocols. 
Expressing similar skepticism for self-report questionnaire use in epistemological 
studies, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) stated, “Although each of the dimensions is 
conceptualized as a continuum, it may be difficult to assume that a continuum of 
epistemological beliefs can be represented or measured by simply stating extreme 
positions and registering degrees of agreement” (p. 110). Muis and colleagues provided 
more recent criticism of self-report instruments and requested more fine-grained, 
qualitative studies, which utilize think-aloud protocols, and mixed-methods designs 
(Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006). These recommendations are in line 
with design suggestions from current self-regulated learning literature (Muis, 2007; 
Zimmerman, 2008). Hofer (2004a, 2004b) utilized think-aloud protocols and case study 
methods recently to investigate epistemological beliefs. Muis and colleagues have begun
to tie epistemological beliefs to facets of SRL via mixed methods studies (Muis, 2008; 
Muis & Franco, 2009). Suggestions and studies from both SRL and epistemological 
beliefs literature provide a rationale for the design of the proposed study. 
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Due mainly to his mathematical and engineering background, the researcher 
adhered to the postpositivist qualitative paradigm, described by Creswell (2007), an 
admitted postpositivist himself: 
In terms of practice, postpositivist researchers will likely view inquiry as a series 
of logically related steps, believe in multiple perspectives from participants rather 
than a single reality, and espouse rigorous methods of qualitative data collection 
and analysis. They will use multiple levels of data analysis for rigor, employ 
computer programs to assist in their analysis, encourage the use of validity 
approaches, and write their qualitative studies in the form of scientific reports, 
with a structure resembling quantitative approaches (e.g., problem, questions, data 
collection, results, conclusions). (p. 20)
 Evidence of the postpositivist paradigm pervaded this study, which began with a 
“thorough review of literature” (Yin, 2008, p.3) that established “a priori theories” 
(Creswell, 2007, p.20) that were utilized to develop codes, analyze data, and interpret 
results. A thorough description of the methods employed in this study is presented below 
and organized as follows: (1) the setting, (2) selection of participants, (3) instrumentation 
and protocols, (4) data collection procedures, (5) data analysis, (6) validity and reliability, 
and (7) ethical issues.
The Setting
 This case study was conducted at Pine Valley High School, located in the suburbs 
of a large metropolitan city in southeastern USA, during the spring semester of the 2009–
2010 school year. At the time of the study, Pine Valley High School had a population of 
2168 students. Demographic data for the 2009–2010 school year were unavailable at the 
95
time of this writing, so remaining data will correspond to the 2008–2009 school year. The 
breakdown of students at Pine Valley High School by race was as follows: 65% 
Caucasian, 19% African American, 8% Hispanic, 4% Asian, and 3% Multiracial. 
Additionally, 19% of the student body was eligible for free or reduced meals, 9% of the 
students had various disabilities, and 2% were limited in their English language 
proficiency. Pine Valley High School had a mathematics and science magnet program, 
which means that students from all over the district applied for admission into the 
rigorous program and, if accepted, were provided transportation to the school. The school 
was also both locally and globally renowned for its character education program, student 
government involvement, and academic rigor. In fact, it was not uncommon for visitors
from other states and even other nations to travel for the purposes of observing various 
facets of the school.  
Selection of Participants
At the time of this study, the researcher taught Advanced Placement (AP) 
Calculus AB and BC at Pine Valley High School and purposefully selected one of his AP 
Calculus BC classes to participate in the study. AP Calculus AB is a course designed by 
College Board to provide advanced high school students an opportunity to experience 
first-semester college calculus. AP Calculus BC is an extension of AP Calculus AB and 
introduces students to topics such as power series, two-dimensional vector calculus, and 
the calculus of parametric- and polar-defined relations. Both courses culminate in a 
standardized exam that gives students the opportunity to earn college credit, dependent 
upon their exam scores and individual college’s entrance requirements. The selected class
contained 30 students, who represented a more disparate group of students with respect to 
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achievement in AP Calculus AB, the course prerequisite for AP Calculus BC, when 
compared to the researcher’s other classes. With respect to gender, the selected class
contained 22 male and 8 female students. With respect to race, the class contained 24 
Caucasian, 3 Hispanic, 1 African American, 1 Pacific Asian, and 1 Middle-Eastern Asian 
student. The 30 students were amongst the highest mathematics achievers in the school 
and were generally motivated either intrinsically to learn or extrinsically to perform. 
Additionally, these students were heavily involved in extracurricular and community 
service activities (e.g., sports, academic clubs, band, student government) that placed 
added demands on them before and after school. 
Before data collection, the researcher obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval from both the participating school district and the university supervising the 
study. Additionally, participant and parental consent (see Appendix A) were obtained 
prior to data collection. Then, all students completed an abbreviated version of the 
Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & 
McKeachie, 1991), the Psycho-epistemological Profile (PEP; Royce & Mos, 1980), and 
the Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (IMBS; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992). See 
Appendix B for full reproductions of the IMBS and PEP. Permission to use each 
questionnaire was obtained either from the first author or the university owning the 
copyright (see Appendix C). Full reproduction of the MSLQ questions used in this study
could not be reproduced due to copyright restrictions. Full-length versions of the PEP and 
IMBS were administered, but only select, intact subscales of the MSLQ were used in this 
study. Each questionnaire was selected based on the theoretical framework and research 
questions. Pintrich et al. (1991) reported validity and reliability statistics for each 
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subscale and stated explicitly that subscales could be used separately or as a complete 
questionnaire. The PEP provided domain-general insights into students’ rational and 
empirical beliefs, as identified by Mos and Royce (1980) and Schoenfeld (1983, 1985). 
The IMBS quantified various mathematics-specific beliefs, including students’ beliefs in 
the importance of conceptual and procedural approaches to problem-solving 
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Schoenfeld, 1992). The subscales selected from the MSLQ 
generated data consistent with the four-phase model of SRL in the theoretical framework 
(Pintrich et al., 1991; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000). As part of the course 
verification process at the beginning of each semester, the researcher had access to 
students’ transcripts, from which grades were obtained for all students from AP Calculus 
AB, the prerequisite for the course involved in this study. From these data, six students 
were selected as participants for the purposes of individual case and cross-case analyses.  
Using SPSS Version 15, descriptive statistics were generated to analyze the above 
data and determine appropriate categorizations for the purpose of applying a mixture of 
quota and maximum variation sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994). For mathematics 
achievement, the class mean and standard deviation for grades from AP Calculus AB 
were determined. Students scoring more than two standard deviations above the mean 
were considered Category I achievers. Students scoring between one and two standard 
deviations above the mean were considered Category II achievers. Similarly, students 
were considered Category III and Category IV achievers for scores having standard 
deviations below the mean. Using the PEP, a researcher may determine an individual’s 
epistemological profile as either rational, empirical, or metaphorical by summing scores 
for each subscale and assigning the appropriate predominant profile based on the highest 
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score. Thus, students were assigned a predominant profile based on their highest score 
obtained from the three subscales of the PEP.
Difficulties arose in determining quantifying values for students based on the 
abbreviated MSLQ and the IMBS, which have seven scales and six scales, respectively.
For both questionnaires, individual students’ scores for each scale were assigned an 
integer score from the interval [–3, 3] based on the score’s distance from the mean, M.
More specifically, six subintervals of width equal to one standard deviation, SD, were 
obtained for each scale from the continuous interval [M – 3SD, M + 3SD]. For instance, a 
student may have scored 2.2 standard deviations above the mean for the Critical Thinking 
scale of the MSLQ. This student would receive a score of 3 for that scale since their score 
fell in the interval (M + 2SD, M + 3SD). All students’ scores were summed to obtain a 
combined score for the MSLQ and IMBS allowing for comparison to the class 
population. Ultimately, the researcher considered six quantifiers when applying the 
sampling strategy: achievement, MSLQ combined score, IMBS combined score, and 
three individual PEP scores. Distributions for all 16 scales from the three questionnaires 
used in this study can be found in Appendix D.  Data from the scales were relatively 
normal since skewness and kurtosis values for most measures fell between ± 2 (George & 
Mallery, 2008). The only exception was the Belief 6 scale of the IMBS, which had a 
kurtosis value of 2.12. This is not surprising as advanced mathematics students would 
generally be expected to find mathematics useful. 
A matrix was developed to aid in selecting participants that appropriately 
represented the variation in scores from the class. Figure 2 represents the effectiveness of 
the sampling strategy in obtaining a valid quota and maximum variation sample based on 
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AP Calculus  
AB Grade 
IMBS MSLQ Rational Empirical Metaphorical 
the factors considered in this study. To obtain a single scale for graphing purposes, z-
scores were calculated to standardize all relevant data. For simplicity, a single value was 
computed for the IMBS and MSLQ since the questionnaires together had 13 scales. 
Participants’ IMBS and MSLQ values were obtained by calculating the mean of 
participants’ z-scores for the respective questionnaires. Despite data being categorical, a 
line graph was chosen to aid the reader in tracking the scores of individual participants.
Each participant was assigned a pseudonym to aid in maintaining confidentiality. Similar 
categorical sampling techniques have produced robust results in both SRL and 
epistemological research (Hadwin et al., 2004; Muis, 2008).  








Ultimately, six participants were selected to represent the diversity of the overall 
class based on the prescribed categories–this is the essence of quota sampling (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). To begin the quota sampling process, students were chosen who 
provided the most accurate representation of the spread of all 30 students’ mathematics 
achievement categories. Simultaneously, various combinations of mathematics 
achievement and questionnaire categorizations were considered until a sample was 
obtained that represented the diversity of the class (see Figure 2). Quota sampling added 
richness to the study by providing in-depth descriptions of representatives from the 
various categorizations. Quota sampling also allowed for cross-cases analysis that made 
this study more compelling. Additionally, two of the participants represented the 
extremes, or outliers, from the class with respect to mathematical achievement–this is the 
essence of maximum variation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Participants representing 
extreme cases based on questionnaire data were merely coincidences from other sampling 
strategies. For instance, the selection of Martin added an additional Category I
mathematics achiever to build the quota sample and provided an extreme case since he 
had the highest Rational score on the PEP (see Figure 2). The inclusion of “outlier cases” 
helped to determine “whether main patterns still hold” (p. 28). Main patterns which 
emerge from the data may be compared and contrasted with specific data from outlier 
cases. Since the outlier cases came from the higher and lower performance subgroups 
developed for quota sampling, they also served to provide rich, cross-case analysis. 
Additionally, the outlier cases provided both confirmation of some findings and prompted 
the consideration of alternative explanations for other findings. Both of these 
contributions added richness to the study. On the one hand, confirmation increased the 
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validity of the study. On the other hand, alternative explanations prompted further 
investigation within this study.  
Instrumentation and Protocols
The sampling procedures, described in detail above, utilized questionnaire data to 
determine case-study participants. The questionnaires also provided self-reported
quantitative data indicating students’ epistemological beliefs and their intentions to self-
regulate. However, Winne and colleagues have pointed out that students’ self-reported 
use of SRL processing may not suffice as accurate or reliable sole sources of data (Muis, 
2008; Muis, Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2007; Winne & Perry, 2000; Winne & Jamieson-
Noel, 2003). Along the same vein, epistemological beliefs literature has questioned the 
validity and plausibility of examining such complex, multi-dimensional constructs using 
self-report questionnaires (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2008; Muis, Bendixen, & 
Haerle, 2006). Thus, the self-report instruments utilized in this study identified 
participants and served as a starting point for data collection. To closely examine how 
students’ epistemological beliefs and SRL processing related the self-report questionnaire 
instruments were augmented heavily by qualitative data.  
All instruments and protocols are described below and the discussion is 
partitioned into the phases of data collection. Under Phase I: Self-report questionnaire 
administration, the following instruments will be discussed: (1) the MSLQ (Pintrich,
Smith, Garcia & McKeachie, 1991), (2) the PEP (Royce & Mos, 1980), and (3) the IMBS 
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992). Then, Phase II: AP calculus exam preparation instruments 
and protocols will be discussed: (4) AP Calculus AB free-response exam questions, (5) 
observational protocols, (6) reflective journals. Phase III: Think-aloud problem solving 
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data collection features the following sources of data: (7) problem solving tasks, (8) 
student solutions to problem-solving tasks, (9) think-aloud transcriptions. Finally, during 
Phase IV: Confirmation of findings, the single source of data will be (10) follow-up 
interview transcriptions.
Phase I: Self-reported questionnaire administration
MSLQ. The MSLQ (Pintrich et al., 1991) is an 81-question, 7-point Likert scale, 
self-report questionnaire designed to measure multiple aspects of students’ self-
regulatory attributes and processing and is divided into two separate sets of scales:
Motivation and Learning Strategies. Pintrich et al. performed a confirmatory factor 
analysis on the MSLQ, which yielded factor validity for six subscales from the 
Motivation category and nine subscales from the Learning Strategies category. 
Additionally, “Chronbach’s alphas are robust, ranging from .52 to .93” for the 15 
subscales (p. 4). Due to the length of the questionnaire, individual subscales were chosen 
for administration based on alignment with the literature reviewed. From the Motivation 
category, the following subscales were used: (1) Task Value, (2) Intrinsic Goal 
Orientation, and (3) Extrinsic Goal Orientation. From the Learning Strategies category,
the following subscales were used: (4) Critical Thinking, (5) Metacognitive Self-
regulation, (6) Peer Learning, and (7) Help Seeking. Particular attention was given to 
assuring that the MSLQ subscales were congruent with the theoretical framework 
developed in the previous chapter. Thus, the definition of the task, forethought, 
performance control, and self-reflection phases will be related to each subscale, as 
appropriate, in the ensuing discussion. 
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Task Value. The Task Value subscale ( .90" # ) is most closely related to Winne 
and Hadwin’s (1998) definition of the task phase, but only requires students to consider 
motivational aspects of their assessment of a task. None of the cognitive or metacognitive 
behaviors so crucial to navigation through a problem space is assessed via this scale.  
Pintrich, et al. (1991) stated, “On the MSLQ, task value refers to students’ perceptions of 
the course material in terms of interest, importance, and utility” (p. 11). This subscale 
contains five items, including: “I am very interested in the content area of this course” (p. 
11).  
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goal Orientation. The Intrinsic Goal Orientation subscale 
( .74" # ) is closely related to the mastery-goal orientation from Pintrich’s (2000) SRL 
model. In fact, Pintrich et al. (1991) stated, “Intrinsic goal orientation concerns the degree 
to which the student perceives herself to be participating in a task for reasons such as 
challenge, curiosity, mastery [italics added]” (p. 9). This subscale contains four items, 
including: “When I have the opportunity in this class, I choose course assignments that I 
can learn from even if they don’t guarantee me a good grade” (p. 9). 
The Extrinsic Goal Orientation subscale ( .62" # ) is the antithesis of the previous 
subscale and is, thus, closely related to the performance-goal orientation of Pintrich’s 
(2000) SRL model. Pintrich et al. (1991) defined extrinsic goal orientation as “the degree 
to which a student perceives herself to be participating in a task for reasons such as 
grades, rewards, performance [italics added], evaluation by others, and competition” (p. 
10). This subscale contains four items, including: “The most important thing for me right 
now is improving my overall grade point average, so my main concern in this class is 
getting a good grade” (p. 10).  
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Critical Thinking. The Critical Thinking subscale ( .80" # ) is most closely 
related to the performance control phase of SRL and is directly related to aspects of 
mathematical problem solving. Pintrich et al. (1991) stated, “Critical thinking refers to 
the degree to which students report applying previous knowledge to new situations in 
order to solve problems [italics added], reach decisions, or make critical evaluations with 
respect to standards of excellence” (p. 22). This scale contains five items, including: 
“When a theory, interpretation, or conclusion is presented in class or in the readings, I try 
to decide if there is good supporting evidence” (p. 22). 
Metacognitive Self-regulation. The metacognitive self-regulation subscale 
( .79" # ) is the most all-encompassing of the subscales and includes aspects of the 
forethought, performance control, and self-reflection phases of SRL. The scale includes 
12 items on subjects such as goal-setting, self-monitoring, and making adjustments to 
cognitive activities.
 Although some goal-setting items are in this scale, the metacognitive self-
regulation scale is most closely related to the performance control and self-reflection 
phases of the theoretical framework. Unfortunately, the scale does not fit well with 
Schoenfeld’s (1985) control aspect of mathematical problem solving. The scale instead 
focuses more on study habits than on the cognitive aspects of learning inherent to 
problem solving. This misalignment must be considered as data are analyzed and 
interpreted. Overall, this scale provided a very general, broad-ranged quantifier of student 
SRL processing.  
Peer Learning and Help Seeking. The final two subscales assess students’ abilities
to manage resources. The Peer Learning subscale ( .76" # ) contains three items that 
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measure the degree to which students utilize peers to aid in the learning process. A 
sample question is as follows: “When studying for this course, I often set aside time to 
discuss the course material with a group of students from the class” (Pintrich et al., 1991, 
p. 28). The Help Seeking subscale ( .52" # ) contains four items that measure the degree 
to which students utilize peer and instructor assistance when they need help with an 
academic task. A sample item is: “I ask the instructor to clarify concepts I don’t 
understand well” (p. 29). Both subscales measure students’ use of external resources to 
control cognitive activities.  
PEP. The Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP, Royce & Mos, 1980) is a 90-
question, 5-point Likert-scale questionnaire that provides a hierarchical assessment of an 
individual’s epistemological profile. Specifically, the PEP delineates the degree to which 
individuals self-report adhering to rational, empirical, and metaphorical epistemological 
beliefs. Thirty questions from the questionnaire apply to each type of profile. Thus, the 
maximum score per scale is 150. Although Royce and Mos suggested that an individual 
may exhibit behaviors consistent with all three ways of knowing, results from the PEP 
indicate an individual’s predominant adherence to one of the three beliefs based on the 
individual’s highest score. 
 Royce and Mos (1980) reported that multiple factor analyses have been 
performed on the PEP and items consistently loaded onto the aforementioned three 
epistemological beliefs. In a recent study, Muis (2008), concerned with the datedness of 
the questionnaire, performed a confirmatory factor analysis on the PEP with 268 
university students and obtained a CFI value of .86. Her findings concurred with Royce 
and Mos’ assertion that the PEP is a good fit to the three factors. In terms of internal 
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validity, Royce and Mos reported adjusted Spearman Brown split-half correlation 
coefficients ranging from .75 to .77 for the Rational scale, .76 to .77 for the Empirical 
scale, and .85 to .88 for the Metaphorical scale. The three ways of knowing presented by 
Royce and Mos (1980) are steeped in philosophical literature contemporary to the time of 
PEP development. Table 2 provides a summary of the “three ways of knowing,” as 
defined by Royce and Mos (p. 3). Expert mathematicians are generally associated with 
the rational epistemic style (Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1985). Additionally, 
research has suggested that rational problem-solvers tend to perform better and 
demonstrate more SRL processing than their empirical peers while problem solving 
(Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1982, 1983, 1985). 
Table 2  
Royce and Mos’s (1980) Three Ways of Knowing 
Profile Assessment of Reality Cognitive Processing 
Rationalism Logical consistency Clear thinking, rational 
analysis, synthesis of
ideas
Empiricism Observational Active perception,  
sensory experience
Metaphorism Insight and awareness Symbolizing 
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IMBS. The Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (IMBS) is a 36-item, 5-point Likert 
scale questionnaire that measures “secondary school and college students’ beliefs about 
mathematics as a subject and about how mathematics is learned” (Kloosterman & Stage, 
1992, p. 109). Students’ beliefs about mathematical problem solving are measured by the 
following six scales, with Kloosterman and Stage’s reported Chronbach’s alpha values:  
(1) I can solve time-consuming mathematics problems. $ %.77" #
(2) There are word problems that cannot be solved with simple, step-by-step 
procedures. $ %.67" #
(3) Understanding concepts is important in mathematics. $ %.76" #
(4) Word problems are important in mathematics. $ %.54" #
(5) Effort can increase mathematical ability. $ %.84" #
(6) Mathematics is useful in daily life. $ %.86" #  (pp. 112, 115) 
The first five scales were developed by Kloosterman and Stage and originally contained 
ten items. However, multiple stages of testing for scale validity reduced each scale to six 
items. The sixth scale contains six items from Fennema-Sherman’s (1976) Usefulness of 
Mathematics Scale. Scales (1) through (4) and scale (6) contain three positively-oriented 
items and three negatively-oriented items. All six items from Scale (5) are positively-
oriented.
Scale (1) is based on Schoenfeld’s (1985) assertion that many students feel that 
mathematics problems should be solved quickly or not at all. A positively-oriented 
sample item from this scale is: “Math problems that take a long time don’t bother me” (p. 
115). The theoretical basis for scale (2) is that good problem solvers tend to be motivated 
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to solve problems even when no apparent algorithm applies; whereas poor problem 
solvers either give up or apply incorrect algorithms to such problems. A negatively-
oriented sample item from this scale is: “Any word problem can be solved if you know 
the right steps to follow” (p. 115). Scale (3) measures the degree to which students have 
the availing belief that conceptual understanding is important, as opposed to the non-
availing belief that solely applying algorithmic procedures leads to successful problem-
solving. A positively-oriented sample item from this scale is: “Time used to investigate 
why a solution to a math problem works is time well spent” (p. 115). 
The belief measured by scale (4) is the degree to which students relate 
mathematical acuity to the attainment of computational skills, a non-availing belief, or 
problem-solving skills, an availing belief. A negatively-oriented sample item from this 
scale is: “Math classes should not emphasize word problems” (p. 115). Scale (5) 
measures the degree to which students have availing beliefs about effort yielding positive 
results in obtaining mathematical skills. All items were positively-oriented in this scale 
and a sample item is: “Ability in math increases when one studies hard” (p. 115). 
Kloosterman and Stage (1992) included six items from the Fennema-Sherman (1976) 
Usefulness of Mathematics scale because of relations between availing beliefs about the 
usefulness of mathematics in daily life and motivation to learn. A negatively-oriented 
sample item from this scale is: “Studying mathematics is a waste of time” (p. 115). In 
sum, the IMBS provided an appropriate fit to the theoretical framework developed for 
this study. Additionally, the IMBS provided data for sampling procedures and a 
springboard for more in-depth analyses of students’ mathematical beliefs via qualitative 
data.  
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 Phase II: AP Calculus  exam preparation  
AP Calculus AB free-response exam questions. During all classroom 
observations, students were engaged in completing AP Calculus AB free-response exam 
questions from previous years’ exam administrations (see Appendix E) in small 
heterogeneous groups. Permission was obtained to use the questions prior to the initiation 
of this study (see Appendix C). Care was taken to fully abide by the legal specifications 
detailed by the College Board with regard to citations and exclusion from the views 
expressed by this study. Use of these questions provided students with an authentic sense 
of the difficulty level of their ensuing sitting for the AP exam. Additionally, research has 
suggested that on-line observations of student engagement having an impact on 
performance may be more conducive to determining actual student functioning than 
solely relying on assessments of student engagement on contrived tasks (Hadwin, et al., 
2004). Assessment of student behaviors during observations was dependent on detailed 
field notes taken by the researcher and student journal entries.
Observational protocols. Researcher-generated products from AP exam 
preparation sessions were classroom observation protocol forms (see Appendix E)
completed during each AP exam preparation session. Since all classroom-observation 
sessions involved students working in groups, participants’ actions were recorded that 
demonstrated aspects of group-regulation, as identified in the literature review (Artzt & 
Armour-Thomas, 1992; Goos, Galbraith, & Renshaw, 2002).Each of the six participants 
was observed twice during the study, resulting in twelve total sessions of approximately 
15-minute duration. The researcher sat in relatively close proximity to the appropriate 
group and recorded detailed notes focused on the behaviors and actions of the participant
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with respect to group navigation of each problem space. For clarity, the term participant
will refer to individuals from the class selected from the sampling strategy and the term 
student will refer to individuals from the class not selected from the sampling strategy.
Reflective journals. Student-generated products from AP exam preparation 
sessions were problem-solving journal entries. Using the AP Exam Preparation Journal 
Format (see Appendix E), students recorded their solution to a given AP exam problem 
on the left side of the journal entry form. Then, students recorded their plans, thoughts, 
and resource use for particular stages of the problem solution on the right side of the 
form, directly across from the applicable mathematical work recorded on the left side. 
Care was taken not to lead students’ right-side responses and questions were answered 
with the statement: Please provide as much detail as possible. Each student in the class 
maintained and submitted a journal, regardless of whether they were selected as a 
participant. The journals completed the triangulation of data with self-report survey 
results and researcher observation notes for the AP exam preparation phase of the study. 
Phase III: Think Aloud Problem-Solving 
Problem-solving tasks. The purpose of the think-aloud problem-solving sessions 
was to produce a vast amount of data for analyzing the six participants’ SRL processing
and epistemological beliefs during mathematical problem-solving episodes. Two 
problems were developed by the researcher that reflect single-variable calculus concepts 
learned by students during the previous semester (see Appendix F). Both problems fit 
Polya’s (1957) definition of a “problem to find” by requiring students to find, or develop, 
unknown functions or quantities in consideration of given constraints (p. 154). 
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Additionally, both problems were aligned with Schoenfeld’s (1985) distinction between a 
mathematical problem and a mathematical task: 
The difficulty with defining the term problem is that problem solving is relative. 
The same tasks that call for significant efforts from some students may well be 
routine exercises for others, and answering them may just be a matter of recall for 
a given mathematician. Thus being a “problem” is not a property inherent in a 
mathematical task. Rather, it is a particular relationship between the individual 
and the task that makes the task a problem for that person. The word problem is 
used here in this relative sense, as a task that is difficult for the individual who is 
trying to solve it. (p. 74) 
Thus, problems were developed that drew on topics discussed in AP Calculus AB; 
however, solution paths to the particular problems were never explicitly discussed. So, 
the problems were based on material that students had not seen in several months and 
asked questions that stretched that content knowledge, which is in line with Schoenfeld’s 
definition of a problem described above.
Student work from problem-solving tasks. During the problem solving sessions, 
each individual case participant worked on the problems described above during two 30-
minute sessions, thinking-aloud as they worked. Participants were allowed to write on the 
paper containing the problems and were given extra paper if needed. All work was 
collected. Participants were instructed to write down all work and, rather than erasing, to 
draw a line through any work they deemed incorrect. Collection of work provided a 
complete, written account of participants’ efforts in solving the problems. This method 
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for preserving student work was employed successfully by Schoenfeld (1982, 1985) in 
his problem-solving queries. 
Think-aloud session transcriptions. The bulk of data collected during this phase 
came from transcriptions of participants’ think-aloud sessions. Students were asked to 
think aloud while working the problems and provide a retrospective report of their work.
The think-aloud sessions were conducted in strict adherence to Ericsson and Simon’s 
(1993) and Schoenfeld’s (1985) methodological prescriptions. See Appendix F for the 
think-aloud scripts used by the researcher. The retrospective report that followed each 
session involved participants’ recall of their thinking as they reviewed their work. 
Ericsson and Simon (1993) recommended the use of both think-aloud and retrospective 
reports when analyzing problem-solving behaviors. They rationalized the usage of 
retrospective reports following think-aloud sessions as follows:
Even for cognitive processes of long duration, where we know that the 
retrospective report will be incomplete, it will be quite useful. In this case, it will 
more clearly convey the general structure of the process, as most of the detailed 
information will not be retrieved, and retrieval will use the higher-level 
organizational cues, like subgoals, or recall cues. (p. 379)  
All sessions were recorded by a digital recording device and, in case of data loss, a 
traditional tape-recorder. Each recorded session was transcribed verbatim and 
supplemented with notes that were written during the researcher’s observations of the 
think-aloud session. Transcriptions were completed immediately following sessions to 
ensure the most accurate rendition of events.
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Phase IV: Confirmation of findings 
Follow-up interview transcriptions. Semi-structured, follow-up interviews with 
the six participants served as member-checking sessions and provided a final opportunity 
for the researcher to obtain additional information pertinent to this study (see Appendix G 
for the interview protocol). Students reviewed the initial findings of their individual case 
narratives and commented as to the degree of accuracy of events and behaviors reported. 
Additional questions were asked of each participant based upon their behaviors and 
verbalizations during this study. A protocol was not developed because questions were 
unique to each participant’s experiences. All interviews were recorded by a digital 
recording device and, in case of data loss, a traditional tape-recorder. Each interview was 
transcribed and the researcher applied any necessary changes to the findings based on 
student comments. Additional findings and clarifications gleaned from final interview 
questions were included in the results and discussion of the findings. 
Data Collection Procedures
 During this study, multiple sources of data were collected from each participant to 
help achieve triangulation of findings, a crucial element to validity in case studies and 
qualitative inquiries in general (Creswell, 2007; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Yin, 2008). 
Prior to data collection, IRB approval, participant consent, and parental consent were 
obtained (see Appendix A). Then, the four phases of data collection commenced: (1) self-
report questionnaire administration, (2) AP Calculus exam preparation, (3) think aloud 
problem-solving sessions, and (4) follow-up interview sessions.
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Phase I: Self-Report Questionnaire Administration
The MSLQ, PEP, and IMBS (see Appendix B) were administered to serve as 
participant sampling criteria and initial data for participants’ narratives. Due to the length 
of the questionnaires, administration was conducted in two days. The abbreviated MSLQ 
and IMBS have a combined 74 items and took approximately 20 minutes to administer. 
The PEP contains 90 items and administration took approximately 20 to 30 minutes, in 
congruence with Royce and Mos’ (1980) estimation. Instructions for administration 
described in the MSLQ and PEP manuals and the IMBS article were followed precisely 
to obtain reliable and valid results from participants (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; 
Pintrich et al., 1991; Royce & Mos, 1980). 
Phase II: AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
 A key component of the AP Calculus BC course involved preparation for the 
ensuing AP exam, which is the gateway to receiving college credit. During the early part 
of the semester, exam preparation consisted of reviewing material learned in the previous 
course, AP Calculus AB. Based on College Board’s approval (see Appendix C), this goal 
was achieved by having students work actual AP Calculus AB free-response exam 
questions from prior years’ administrations (see Appendix E). During these activities, 
participants were observed for data collection purposes. 
Once the six participants were confirmed, the class was divided into ten 
heterogeneous groups of three students. To achieve heterogeneity, the researcher ordered 
students from lowest to highest based on their grade from the prior course, AP Calculus 
AB. Then the researcher subdivided the class into three groups of ten, which naturally 
formed high, average, and low student groupings. Heterogeneous groups of three were 
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then formed by selecting a student from each group and checking the average AP 
Calculus AB grade for each group to ensure that differences between groups were not 
excessive. The group AP Calculus AB grade means ranged from 85.00 to 88.67, which 
are relatively consistent with the overall class mean of 86.80. Additionally, six of the ten 
groups contained one participant for the purposes of individual observation.
 Students worked all of the AP Calculus exam preparation problems while in 
assigned groups. During each session, students recorded work and reflections in their AP 
exam preparation journals and the researcher took detailed observational notes on one of 
the six groups containing a participant (see Appendix E). Each AP exam preparation 
session was conducted during approximately fifteen to twenty minutes of regular class 
time. There were two to three AP exam preparation sessions each week for the duration 
of the study, ultimately providing a total of twelve opportunities for data collection. The 
twelve sessions allowed for two observations of each participant collaboratively 
preparing for a high-stakes exam. Data were coded and analyzed simultaneously with 
data collection to determine any necessary adjustments in the design of the study and to 
begin preparing individual case narratives.    
Phase III: Think-Aloud Problem-Solving Sessions 
Phase III data collection was conducted concurrently with Phase II outside of the 
classroom environment. The six participants worked on two calculus-based problem-
solving tasks (see Appendix F) during two sessions, thinking aloud as they worked. 
Participants were presented with the application of differentiation problem during the 
first session and then returned to continue working on the problem during a second 
session if the task had not been completed. Participants were allowed to work on or think 
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about the problem during the interim between sessions but were required to submit all 
work from the first session to the researcher for the purposes of analysis. If a participant
solved the application of differentiation problem during either session, then they would 
receive the application of integration problem and could work on it for the remainder of 
their allotted time. To avoid revealing possible problem-solving solution methods, the 
application of differentiation and application of integration problems were re-named as 
problem solving task #1 and problem-solving task #2, respectively, when presented to 
participants during the think-aloud sessions.  
Think-aloud problem-solving sessions were conducted in the classroom 
immediately following school for approximately one hour. The researcher coordinated 
schedules with the six participants and scheduled sessions well in advance. At the 
beginning of the first session, participants were trained to think aloud, as prescribed by 
Ericsson and Simon (1993). Each participant was instructed to verbalize their in-line 
thinking while solving problems. Ericsson and Simon cautioned that having participants 
expound on or explain their thoughts may affect problem solving performance, so 
students were trained to simply speak exactly what thoughts were on their minds without 
explanations or justifications. Participants were given a computational practice problem 
and asked to practice the think-aloud and retrospective report procedures. Another
practice problem was available to participants if needed. Once questions were answered, 
participants were given approximately thirty minutes to complete the appropriate
problem. If the researcher felt that the participant was engaged in a productive problem-
solving activity at the 30-minute mark, then a few additional minutes were allowed for 
the participant to complete the line of reasoning. The researcher prompted participants to 
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“keep talking” when instances of silence exceeded ten to fifteen seconds (Ericsson &
Simon, 1993, p. 83). Upon completion of each session, participants were asked to provide 
a retrospective report of their thinking as they reviewed their work. Additionally, the 
researcher provided general cognitive feedback for the purposes of exploring SRL 
processing but did not discuss specifics concerning the problem unless a student had 
solved it (Nicol & Macfarlane-Dick, 2006; Butler & Winne, 1995). For instance, Julia 
considered the parent function f (x) = x3 while working part (a) of the application of 
differentiation problem (see Appendix F). Unable to use the parent function to solve part 
(a) during her first think aloud session, the researcher prompted her to consider how the 
parent function may be used to develop a solution. 
The second session was conducted similarly, however participants were given the 
option of doing a practice think-aloud problem or immediately commencing the timed 
session. An additional difference was that after the retrospective report, an informal 
interview was conducted to discuss and clarify specific aspects of each participant’s 
individual problem-solving approaches and manifested epistemological beliefs. It should 
be noted that no interview protocols were developed for the informal interviews since the 
content of each interview was specifically related to participants’ navigation through the 
problem space. Questions were developed by the researcher during the sessions. Finally, 
each think-aloud problem-solving session was recorded by digital recording device and, 
in case of data loss, traditional tape recorder. All participant work, including scratch work 
and work completed during the interim between sessions, was collected for the purposes 
of data analysis.  
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Phase IV: Follow-up interview sessions
Since initial data analysis was conducted concurrently with data collection, all 
open coding and some axial coding had been completed shortly after the final think-aloud 
and classroom observation sessions. Then, draft narrative reports were written for each of 
the six participants. Once the draft reports were completed, an individual, semi-structured 
follow-up interview (see Appendix G) was scheduled with each of the six participants. 
The purpose of this interview was to provide member-checking validation of the findings 
and further insight into discrepancies and inconsistencies that emerged during initial data 
analysis. Each participant was presented their narrative report, asked to read it carefully, 
and determine whether or to what degree they agreed with the findings. This created a 
dilemma. On one hand, the reports needed to be ready for participants soon after data 
collection while experiences were fresh in their minds. On the other hand, hurried data 
analysis may yield poor results at best. So, the researcher was diligent to analyze data 
during data collection and kept a running draft report for each participant that simply 
required editing and finalizing at the end of data collection. This strategy allowed the 
researcher to produce quality narratives for participants to review in a timely manner. 
Each follow-up interview session was recorded.
Data Analysis
 The final product of data analysis consisted of six individual, narrative case 
reports and an extensive cross-case analysis. Quantitative data from the MSLQ, PEP, and 
IMBS provided a small amount of data to begin developing narrative reports. The 
remainder of each narrative report was developed via deep analysis of qualitative data 
from observations, journals, think-aloud and interview transcriptions, and quantitative 
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results from student performance on problem-solving and AP exam preparation tasks. 
Finally, pattern and theme development via even deeper analysis yielded findings used in 
the cross-case analysis. The overall results of data analysis provided a rich, thick 
description of the significant findings of the study. Data analysis procedures are 
described below and subdivided as follows: (1) quantitative analyses, (2) coding, (3) 
problem-solving task assessment, (4) development and analyses of matrices, and (5) 
technology use.
Quantitative Analyses 
 Quantitative data collected from the MSLQ, PEP, and IMBS mainly served to 
delineate six participants from the intact AP Calculus BC course involved in this study
(see Figure 2). However, the quantitative data also served as initial building blocks for 
each participant’s narrative report. Using SPSS Version 15, descriptive statistics were 
calculated for the entire class with respect to each scale of the MSLQ and IMBS and the 
three ways of knowing scores from the PEP. Then, each participant’s scores were 
analyzed and compared to whole-class means and standard deviations to determine a 
quantitative, self-reported categorization (low, average, or high) of specific aspects of 
SRL and epistemological beliefs. For instance, the overall class’ mean score for the 
problem-solving duration scale of the IMBS was 22 with a standard deviation of 
approximately 3.97. A participant who scored 30 on the problem-solving duration scale, 
which is more than 2 standard deviations above the mean, was categorized as having a 
high belief that mathematical problems may require time to solve. Each participant’s self-
reported results were heavily augmented by qualitative data to provide contextually rich 
narrative reports and cross-case analysis.
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Coding 
 The qualitative data from the AP exam preparation and think-aloud problem-
solving sessions were exhaustively coded based on the SRL, epistemological beliefs, and 
problem solving constructs. The data sources coded were AP exam preparation journal 
entries, observational protocol transcriptions, student solutions to problem-solving tasks, 
think-aloud with retrospective interview transcriptions, and member-checking interview 
transcriptions. The first phase of the coding process involved open coding, defined by 
Creswell (2007) as a process that “involves taking data (e.g., interview transcriptions) 
and segmenting them into categories of information” (p. 240). In this study, data were 
initially coded at the micro-level for specific instances of the construct being analyzed. 
Micro-level coding was repeated in an iterative fashion until all data were saturated of 
information. Creswell (2007) stated, “In this process, I finally come to a point at which 
the categories are ‘saturated’; I no longer find new information that adds to my 
understanding of the category” (p. 240). Then, data were collapsed into macro-level 
nodes that served as general categories for the study’s findings (Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  
Detailed micro- and macro-level code lists were developed for each construct 
based on the literature review presented in the prior chapter (see Appendix H). For SRL, 
micro-level codes were based primarily on Zimmerman’s (2000) SRL framework, 
Greene and Azevedo’s (2009) expanded coding scheme, and Schoenfeld’s (1985) 
episodic problem-solving framework. Greene and Azevedo’s coding scheme was used on 
think-aloud protocol data and contained 35 separate SRL categories. For example, 
Greene and Azevedo subdivided “monitoring” into “judgment of learning, feeling of 
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knowing, self-questioning, content evaluation, identify adequacy of information, monitor 
progress towards goals, and monitor use of strategies” (pp. 25–26). Although Greene and 
Azevedo’s codes provided an excellent initial list, the researcher augmented them with 
more appropriate mathematical problem-solving based codes, based primarily on 
Schoenfeld’s work, and deleted others that did not fit this study. For example, the 
researcher included specific heuristic strategies, such as solve a simpler problem, in the 
performance control phase, providing a mathematics-based problem-solving context for 
students’ strategy use (Polya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1985). Additionally, the researcher 
deleted items such as “free search” (p. 26), which is a code that applied specifically to 
student use of the hypermedia environment used in Greene and Azevedo’s study. Once 
micro-level coding was completed, data were collapsed into macro-level categories, or 
nodes, based on the four phases of SRL inherent to my theoretical framework, which 
were definition of the task, forethought, performance control, and self-reflection (Winne 
& Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000).  
Data were also coded for specific evidence of epistemological beliefs that 
manifested as participants worked problems. Rather than an extensive list of micro-level 
codes, operational definitions were developed for both general and mathematics-specific 
epistemological beliefs (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kloosterman & Stage, 
1992; Muis, 2004; Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1992). Overt participant 
behaviors that exemplified specific beliefs were coded as evidence of adherence to that
belief. General epistemological beliefs included certainty/simplicity of knowledge, source 
of knowledge, justification of knowledge, attainability of truth (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997). Mathematics-specific problem-solving epistemological beliefs included 
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unique/arbitrary nature of problem solutions, rational/empirical approach to problem 
solving, duration of problem solving, procedural/conceptual approach to problem solving, 
importance/usefulness of mathematics, and effort/inherent mathematical ability 
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1992). 
Upon completion of open coding by hand, data sources and their respective codes 
were input into NVivo Version 8 for the purpose of deeper analysis. Axial coding was the 
next phase in the coding process, defined by Creswell (2007): 
The researcher takes the categories of open coding, identifies one as a central 
 phenomenon, and then returns to the database to identify (a) what caused this 
 phenomenon to occur, (b) what strategies or actions actors employed in response 
to it, (c) what context (specific context) and intervening conditions (broad 
 context) influenced the strategies, and (d) what consequences resulted from these 
 strategies. (p. 237)  
In this study, NVivo Version 8 expedited the axial coding process by generating matrices 
that related aspects of the study (e.g., participants, actions, beliefs) to each major 
phenomenon, or theme that emerged from the data. Examination of matrices revealed 
multiple categories of information converging on each phenomena.  
Further exploration of the data via NVivo Version 8 facilitated selective coding. 
This final phase of coding was described by Creswell (2007): “The researcher takes the 
central phenomenon and systematically relates it to other categories, validating 
relationships and filling in categories that need further refinement and development” (p. 
240). For example, monitoring emerged as a major theme and matrices were generated in 
NVivo Version 8 that allowed for the examination of this major construct with respect to 
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all other categories, including but not limited to individual, categorized participants and 
various aspects of participants’ beliefs.
Problem-Solving Task Assessment
Student performance on the think-aloud problem-solving tasks were scored using 
a modified version of Schoenfeld’s (1982) scoring scheme, which provided for multiple 
levels of analysis based on both full and partial problem solutions. Recall that students 
submitted all work for the four parts of the application of differentiation and application 
of integration problems. All solution attempts were graded using the following scheme: 0 
points for “an approach that is not pursued,” 1 to 5 points for an approach “making ‘little’ 
progress,” 6 to 10 points for “‘some’ progress,” 11 to 15 points for “‘almost’ solutions,” 
and 16 to 20 points for “‘solved’” problems (Schoenfeld, 1982, pp. 39–40). Individual 
scores obtained from the multiple-count scoring categories were determined based on the 
amount of progress attained. For example, the range given for solved problems above 
was applied if students correctly solved a problem but failed to adequately justify their 
solution. Specifically, a participant working the application of differentiation problem 
solved for a, b, c, and d using purely empirical means by guessing values based on 
flawed logic. Upon graphing the guess using a calculator, the participant noted that 
problem conditions were met. However, the only justification provided was that the graph 
of the function met the conditions. A score of 17 was applied to this participant’s work 
for the accurate solution and partial justification. Schoenfeld (1982) reported that 
“reliability with the researcher’s grading was better than 90%” (p. 40).  
For the AP exam preparation problems, College Board provides specific scoring 
guidelines for previous exams. Participants’ solutions from journal entries were graded 
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using the appropriate scoring guidelines and produced integer scores ranging from zero to 
nine. Due to the specificity of the scoring guidelines, little subjectivity was involved in 
scoring participants’ AP exam preparation problems. 
Development and Analyses of Matrices
To answer the research questions, multiple matrices were assembled for 
individual and cross-case analyses. Preliminary matrices contained general categories 
such as the four phases of SRL, general epistemological beliefs, and mathematical 
problem-solving beliefs. For example, an initial matrix had the six participants as rows 
and accumulated codes from the four phases of SRL as columns. All matrices were 
generated with NVivo Version 8 and thus, each cell was hyperlinked to corresponding 
text, providing access to particular quotations corresponding to the relations being 
analyzed. From an individual case analysis perspective, matrices of this type provided a
means for analyzing a participant’s overall utilization of SRL processing. Matrices with 
numeric values provided frequencies of occurrence for phenomena. The hyperlinked 
access provided by NVivo Version 8 to text corresponding to matrix cells allowed for the 
development of thick descriptions and text-based analysis of phenomena. 
As data analysis progressed, matrices became increasingly more specific in 
nature. An example of a more specific matrix included availing and non-availing beliefs 
as rows and specific instances of monitoring as columns. Yet again, NVivo Version 8 
provided access to both frequencies and corresponding text for all cells. From a cross-
case analysis perspective, this matrix provided a means for comparing and contrasting 
epistemological beliefs with performance control phase processing. Both quantitative and 
thick descriptive data obtained from matrices were analyzed based on the multitude of 
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SRL and epistemological beliefs descriptors identified and reported in each participant’s 
narrative report. Data analysis continued as multiple general, specific, individual-case, 
and cross-case matrices were developed. These matrices provided rich, detailed, and 
accurate interpretations of actual events. 
Technology Use
Descriptive statistics for quantitative data were obtained via SPSS Version 15. 
Due to the volume of qualitative data collected, NVivo Version 8 was used for all data 
coding organization and matrix development. NVivo Version 8 is essentially a powerful 
organizational software program and will only organize coded data and develop matrices 
based on information input by the researcher. Thus, the researcher conducted open coding 
line-by-line by hand over multiple iterations to obtain data saturation. However, once 
finished, NVivo Version 8’s organizational and categorical capacity allowed axial 
coding, selective coding, and matrix development via mouse clicks, as opposed to the 
arduous development of such analytical tools using bulky stacks of data and simple 
spreadsheet software.
Validity and Reliability
Issues of validity arise in any research endeavor and must, therefore, be addressed 
at the design phase. For case study research, validity essentially refers to the quality, 
trustworthiness, and credibility of a study. Considering validation a mutual process, 
Creswell (2007) stated, “I consider ‘validation’ in qualitative research to be an attempt to 
assess the ‘accuracy’ of the findings, as best described by the researcher and the 
participants” (pp. 206–207). The researcher employed data triangulation, thick, rich 
descriptions, and member checking to bolster validity for this study (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 
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2008). Data triangulation was achieved by collecting multiple sources of data from all 
participants and then carefully analyzing every source to increase accuracy and depth of 
descriptive and inductive findings. Creswell (2007) stated, “In triangulation, researchers 
make use of multiple and different sources, methods, investigators, and theories to 
provide corroborating evidence” (p. 208). In this study, the multitude of data sources, 
variety of data collection methods, and diversity of the individual participants provided 
the means for assessing the degree of convergence of the findings. Well-developed, 
research-based codes and categories ensured that the appropriate operationalized 
construct was being measured. Thick, rich descriptions of experiences allow readers to 
determine the degree to which results are transferable to other contexts. Finally, follow-
up interviews with case participants provided member checking of initial findings and 
themes. Participants were presented with draft narrative reports. To bolster credibility in 
the findings of the study, participants were encouraged to identify any inconsistencies, 
inaccuracies, or omissions in the text provided to them (Creswell, 2007). 
Reliability refers to the repeatability of a study’s procedures and the “stability of 
responses to multiple coders of data sets” (Creswell, 2007, p. 210; Yin, 2008). Reliability 
for this study was enhanced by creating a case study database, establishing a chain of 
evidence, and conducting peer review of the coding scheme (Creswell, 2007; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2008). Creating an exhaustive case study database will provide an 
outside auditor, or curious academic, access to all evidence (i.e., transcriptions, student 
work) so that the degree of consistency between raw data and final reports may be 
assessed. The case study database was kept digitally, organized in folders, on my 
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computer’s hard drive, external hard drive, and CD-ROMs and physically in multiple 
binders organized by participant. 
 Yin (2008) used the analogy of forensic investigations to explain the maintenance 
of a chain of evidence. Basically, the purpose of a chain of evidence is to provide a clear 
path from the origins of the case (or crime) to the final presentation of findings (or court 
case). My chain of evidence (see Figure 3) was established by clear, focused research 
questions. Then, the development of my proposal (or prospectus) established a rationale 
for the study, operational constructs to be measured, and appropriate methodology for 
collecting and measuring evidence of the phenomena. During the study, evidence was 
collected, analyzed, and organized in the case study database. Finally, the results of the
study were recorded in Chapter IV: Individual Case Results and Chapter V: Cross-Case 
Results of this dissertation and may be summarized for one or more scholarly journals. If 
appropriately maintained, the chain of evidence will allow bi-directionality of the above 
progression, thus allowing for assessments of accuracy at all stages of the research 
process. 
Figure 3. Chain of Evidence.  
Ethical Issues
 Common to most studies of human subjects are ethical issues involving the 












foreseeable ethical issues inherent in this study. Throughout this section the titles
researcher and teacher will be used to clarify my role in the given context. The reader is 
reminded that the researcher and teacher are one and the same person. First, issues of 
informed consent were considered. As consent forms were distributed, the researcher 
explained in detail the procedures involved in conducting the study and the general goals 
and aims of the study. This enhanced students’ understanding of the ramifications of 
signing the consent form and avoided ambiguity (Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 
1994). In reference to implications for analysis, Miles and Huberman (1994) stated, 
“Weak consent usually leads to poorer data: Respondents will try to protect themselves in 
a mistrusted relationship, or one formed with the researchers by superiors only” (p.291). 
Students may also have felt pressured to sign the consent form since the researcher was 
also their teacher. To counter this, the researcher assured students that there was no 
pressure to participate in the study and there would be no repercussions or ill will if they 
decided to withdraw for any reason. Additionally, students were ensured that withdrawal 
would be confidential. Full exclusion from the study was ensured for any student who 
wished to withdraw (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 Second, student confidentiality was enhanced by assigning letters to students and 
having them use those for all documents submitted to the researcher (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Participants were assigned pseudonyms for use in narrative reports and cross-case
analysis (Creswell, 2007). Files referring to students by their actual names were locked 
securely in a closet in the classroom and the researcher’s home. Digital files were saved 
onto the researcher’s laptop, external hard drive, and back-up CD-ROMs. This ensured 
that no data were lost but also that sensitive data were not saved on high traffic computers 
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at the researcher’s school. Computers holding any sensitive data were password-protected 
to further enhance data security. Finally, all forms of data (e.g., transcriptions, tape-
recordings, journal entries) will be kept for two years and then destroyed. 
 Third, it may have appeared that the teacher was ignoring students’ needs by 
simply observing while they struggled through AP practice problems in the classroom. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) referred to this ethical dilemma as “detached inquiry versus 
help” and identified two extremes: (1) focusing solely on understanding and (2) offering 
assistance to the point of losing intellectual objectivity and going native (p. 296).
However, the teacher’s philosophy has always been that students need opportunities to 
struggle with such problems before intervention is provided. There is a 45-minute time 
limit imposed on students to answer 3 questions during their actual sitting for the exam. 
Giving students time to work on their own provides opportunities for solution 
development independently of the instructor, which is a more authentic scenario with 
respect to standardized exam experiences.  So, in the past, the teacher has allowed 
students 15–20 minutes to do as much as they can and struggle with each problem. 
However, the teacher always discussed every problem solution in great depth once time 
was called; the same process was applied to the problems worked during this study. 
Therefore students did not lose any instructional time due to the researcher’s needs to 
obtain observational data. Additionally, the dual roles of teacher and researcher were 
appropriately separated to avoid the extremes of ignoring students’ needs or going native. 
Finally, participants’ emotional and psychological states were potentially in 
jeopardy should certain wording appear in the draft narrative reports given to them during 
member checking (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Care was made to omit terminology such 
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as low and poor. The reports simply described the facts of each participant’s experiences 
and results from data analysis. When possible, participants were asked if they agreed with 
certain categorizations, such as rational or empirical problem-solver, as long as the 
categories did not contain potentially demeaning wording or titles. In conclusion, 
extensive effort was expended to ensure that students were treated fairly and without 
harm.
Summary
 This chapter has provided a detailed account of the methods employed in this case 
study investigation. Participants were selected based on a mixture of quota and maximum 
variation sampling with prior achievement and questionnaire responses as parameters 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). The validity and reliability of quantitative instruments were 
discussed in depth, as well as the development of qualitative instrumentation. Logistical 
and chronological details for collecting data were presented and means of overcoming 
barriers discussed. Then, coding schemes and matrix development were discussed in 
relation to analysis of the data. Finally, issues of validity, reliability, and ethical concerns 
inherent in this qualitative study were addressed. The next chapter provides descriptive 




This study examined the relationships between students’ epistemological beliefs 
and self-regulated learning (SRL) processing while engaged in mathematical problem 
solving tasks. Applying a multiple-case study design, six students purposefully selected 
from an Advanced Placement (AP) Calculus BC course engaged in individual 
mathematical problem-solving while thinking aloud and group AP Calculus exam 
preparation. Narrative accounts of each participant’s experiences based on self-report 
questionnaire data, think-aloud transcriptions, observational field notes, participant 
journal entries, and individual interviews are presented in this chapter. Quantitative data 
were analyzed via descriptive statistics obtained from SPSS Version 15 software. 
Qualitative data were analyzed by open, axial, and selective coding, matrix development, 
and extensive thematic analysis using NVivo Version 8 software.  
 The main purpose of this chapter is to provide rich, thick descriptions of 
participants’ experiences. In many cases, inferences and interpretations were necessary to 
bridge the gap between the theoretical framework (see Chapter II: Review of Relevant 
Literature) and the reality of the lived events described below. Thus, member checking 
was employed to enhance credibility (Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2008). The findings are broadly subdivided into two main categories: whole-class results 
and participant narratives. Accessibility to whole-class results facilitates the comparison
of individual participant results to a given population, which, in this case, encompassed
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the 30 students in the AP Calculus BC class. Participant narratives are presented in a 
time-elapse manner to re-create accurate and detailed events.
Whole-Class Results
Calculus Achievement
 For the calculus achievement category, student grades from the previous course, 
AP Calculus AB, were obtained for the 30 students involved in this study. The AP 
Calculus AB grades yielded a mean score of 86.80 (SD = 7.85), of which the lowest 
grade was 72 and the highest was 100. Both of these extreme cases, Robert and Cameron 
respectively, were included as participants in this study. Ensuring that extreme cases are 
included as participants, known as maximum variation sampling, was employed to ensure 
that data were obtained from outliers and to assess whether main patterns in the data still 
hold (Miles & Huberman, 1994). From the data, intervals of width equivalent to one 
standard deviation were computed and categorized for calculus achievement: Category I
(94.65, 102.50), Category II (86.80, 94.65), Category III (78.95, 86.80), and Category IV
(71.10, 78.95). For the purposes of quota sampling, four additional individual cases were 
selected to represent the diversity of the class (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A more 
complete and detailed account of sampling procedures may be found in Chapter III: 
Methodology.
Self-Report Questionnaires
The three self-report questionnaires used in the study were given to all 30 students 
in the AP Calculus BC course. Questionnaire data were subdivided categorically using 
descriptive statistics. For each scale, the mean and standard deviation were calculated. 
Then, three subdivisions of width equivalent to two standard deviations were obtained 
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and categorized: high (M + SD, M + 3SD), average (M – SD, M + SD), and low (M – 
3SD, M – SD).
The Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (IMBS; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992) is a 
five-point Likert scale questionnaire and all six scales contain six questions. Thus, a 
minimum score of 5 and a maximum score of 30 may be obtained for each scale. Table 3
summarizes the data obtained from all 30 students in the AP Calculus BC course. These 
scores are higher than those reported by Kloosterman and Stage (1992), who validated 
the scales using a sample of remedial college students and college students majoring in 
early education. However, higher scores are not surprising as Kloosterman and Stage 
predicted that “one might expect highly able students to score higher” (p. 114). 
Additionally, it should be noted that student scores for Belief 6 were so high that it was 
impossible to obtain the high categorization, implying that the majority of students in this 
course self-reported a belief that mathematics is useful. Thus, in the ensuing analysis, 
only students who scored in the low range will be discussed. 
 Students’ scores on the IMBS informed quota sampling by capturing a broad 
range of self-reported mathematical beliefs. Due to the preponderance of data, an integer 
quantifier was calculated for each student’s overall IMBS scale scores. The quantifier 
was determined by establishing six intervals of width equivalent to one standard 
deviation from the mean for each scale, assigning an integer value on the interval [– 3, 3] 
based on the relative positioning of each student’s scale scores, and summing the results. 
For instance, Edwina scored 21 points for Belief 3, which fell in the interval (M – 2SD, M
– SD) and thus, was assigned a score of 2& . Her other scale scores were similarly 
calculated and the sum resulted in an overall score of 1 for mathematical beliefs. With 
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respect to the whole class, mathematical beliefs scores ranged from 10&  to 10. For 
sampling, student performance data were merged with mathematical beliefs data and 
multiple students were considered as potential participants. The six students who were 
selected and consented to participate in the study had mathematical beliefs scores ranging 
from 4&  to 9.  
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (N = 30)  
Scale Minimum Maximum M SD
Belief 1 14 30 22.00 3.97
Belief 2 14 27 20.80 3.18
Belief 3 15 30 24.83 3.52
Belief 4 12 29 20.07 4.95
Belief 5 16 30 24.27 4.28
Belief 6 12 30 25.67 4.41
Note. Belief 1 = I can solve time-consuming mathematics problems; 
Belief 2 = There are word problems that cannot be solved with simple,
step-by-step procedures; Belief 3 = Understanding concepts is
important in mathematics; Belief 4 = Word problems are important in
mathematics; Belief 5: Effort can increase mathematical ability; 
Belief 6 = Mathematics is useful in daily life. (Kloosterman & Stage, 
1992, p. 115) 
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The Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, et al., 
1991) is a seven-point Likert scale questionnaire, which is divided into two main subsets 
of scales: Motivation and Learning Strategies. Since the scales contain varying amounts 
of questions, an overall mean is calculated for each scale for the purposes of data 
analysis. Thus, a minimum score of one and a maximum score of seven may be obtained 
for each scale. Based on the theoretical framework and purposes of the study, an 
abbreviated version of the MSLQ was used in this study. The Motivation scales used 
were Intrinsic Goal Orientation, Extrinsic Goal Orientation, and Task Value. The 
Learning Strategies scales used were Critical Thinking, Metacognitive Self-regulation, 
Peer Learning, and Help Seeking. Table 4 summarizes the results obtained from the 
MSLQ for all 30 students in the AP Calculus BC course.
The same technique described above for the IMBS was utilized to obtain integer 
scores from students’ MSLQ results, thus providing an SRL score. The resulting range of 
scores for the whole class was –12 to 14. The SRL score provided a third indicator for 
participant selection. The six individual students that participated in the study had scores 
ranging from –3 to 14. 
Finally, the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP; Royce & Mos, 1980) is a 90-
question, 5-point Likert scale questionnaire that determines whether a person’s epistemic 
style is predominantly rational, empirical, or metaphorical. Traits of a rational 
perspective include the use of logic, rigid analysis, and synthesis of ideas. The empirical 
perspective is largely based on observational phenomena, perception, and the senses. The 
metaphorical perspective is synonymous to symbolism and insightfulness (Royce & Mos, 
1980). Since each scale contains 30 questions, the minimum score per scale is 30 and the 
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maximum is 150. Table 5 summarizes the results obtained from the PEP for the 30 
students in the AP Calculus BC course.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics the for Motivated Strategies for Learning  
Questionnaire (N = 30) 
Scale Minimum Maximum M SD
IGO 1.75 7.00 4.79 1.35
EGO 3.00 6.50 5.28 0.86
TV 1.50 7.00 5.42 1.28
CT 1.00 7.00 3.79 1.53
MSR 2.83 6.50 4.49 0.72
PL 1.33 7.00 3.96 1.54
HS 1.00 7.00 4.63 1.55
Note. IGO = Intrinsic Goal Orientation; EGO = Extrinsic Goal 
Orientation; TV = Task Value; CT = Critical Thinking; MSR =  
Metacognitive Self-regulation; PL = Peer Learning; HS = Help Seeking 
 Overall, 18 students profiled as predominantly rational, 12 as predominantly 
empirical, 1 as predominantly metaphorical, and 2 students obtained the same score for 
Rational and Empirical scales. Continuing to meet purposeful sampling goals, the 
researcher chose the participants with the highest scores on each scale: Martin with a 
Rational scale score of 123, Julia with an Empirical scale score of 125, and Olivia, the 
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only predominantly metaphorical student, with a Metaphorical scale score of 113. Further 
sampling enhancement was obtained as Cameron, the upper-bound maximum variation
case with respect to performance, obtained the exact same Rational and Empirical scale
score, 105, and had the lowest Metaphorical scale score, 67, in the class.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (N = 30)  
Scale Minimum Maximum M SD 
Rational 96 123 106.93 6.60
Empirical 77 125 102.37 11.54
Metaphorical 67 113 91.83 11.37
  
AP Calculus AB Exam Practice
All 30 students in the AP Calculus BC course also participated in the in-class, 
group AP Calculus exam preparation sessions. Despite working in groups, some within-
group variation in scores occurred as students submitted individual work via journal 
entries. Additionally, due to absenteeism, all 30 students were not present for every 
session. Each student’s journal entries were graded by the researcher using the College 
Board Scoring Guidelines for the appropriate problem. The maximum score for each 
problem is 9 points. Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics obtained from the AP 
Calculus exam preparation sessions for the students in the AP Calculus BC course. AP 




Descriptive Statistics for AP Calculus Exam Preparation
Question N Minimum Maximum M SD
AB 2003B #2 30 3.00 7.00 4.53 1.04
AB 2004B #4 26 1.00 9.00 5.12 2.14
AB 2004B #6 29 1.00 8.00 2.66 1.45
AB 2005B #5 26 3.00 9.00 5.85 1.99
AB 2006B #3 30 0.00 9.00 4.83 2.26
AB 2006B #4 30 2.00 8.00 4.90 1.67
AB 2007B #2 19 2.00 7.00 4.42 1.74
AB 2007B #5 30 2.00 9.00 4.97 1.90
AB 2007B #6 28 0.00 7.00 3.21 2.06
AB 2008B #3 28 2.00 9.00 6.43 2.41
AB 2009B #2 30 1.00 9.00 4.73 1.91
AB 2009 #1 30 4.00 9.00 7.33 1.52
AB 2009 #1 30 4.00 9.00 7.33 1.52
Note. Question titles are abbreviated as follows: AB 2003B #2 = 2003 AP 
Calculus AB (Form B) Free Response Question 2. The remaining questions
follow the same format of abbreviation. The question in the last row was not 
from a Form B exam. The variation in N is due to student absenteeism on 
days in which the class engaged in AP exam preparation. 
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Participant Narratives
 The purpose of this section is to provide detailed narratives of participants’ 
experiences. Each narrative is subdivided into three main categories: (1) achievement and 
questionnaire data, (2) think-aloud problem-solving sessions, and (3) AP exam 
preparation sessions. Subdivision (1) of each narrative provides a detailed report with 
interpretations of a participant’s categorizations based on achievement and self-report 
questionnaire data. Subdivision (2) of each narrative contains rich, thick descriptions of a 
participant’s experiences during the think-aloud problem-solving sessions based on think-
aloud transcriptions, student work, and interview transcriptions. Finally, subdivision (3) 
of each narrative describes a participant’s experiences within their group while working
on two AP exam practice problems based on AP exam preparation journal entries and 
researcher observational field notes. In the interest of space and alleviation of 
redundancy, the following abbreviations were developed and used throughout the 
narratives: TA1 = first think-aloud problem solving session, TA2 = second think-aloud 
problem solving session, RRI1  = first retrospective report and interview, RRI2 = second 
retrospective report and interview, and MCI = member-checking interview.  
Robert’s Narrative
Mathematical Achievement and Questionnaire Data 
Robert was categorized as a Category IV calculus achiever compared to his peers 
because he scored a 72 in AP Calculus AB. Since his grade was lowest in the class, 
Robert constituted the lower-bound maximum variation participant. For the IMBS, 
Robert was categorized as having average beliefs for all scales except Belief 2, for which 
he received a low rating. A low rating indicates that he self-reported a belief that word 
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problems can be solved by following procedural, algorithmic steps (Kloosterman & 
Stage, 1992). The remainder of his self-reported mathematical beliefs was consistent with 
his peers. 
For all MSLQ scales, Robert was categorized as average. One point of interest is 
that Robert scored higher on Extrinsic Goal Orientation (5.5) than on Intrinsic Goal 
Orientation (4.25). Thus, based on self-report data, Robert may tend to participate in 
tasks for reasons such as grades or other performance indicators instead of being driven 
by the desire to master content (Pintrich et al., 1991). Finally, Robert’s PEP 
categorizations for each belief dimension were all average. For the Rational, Empirical, 
and Metaphorical scales, he scored 105, 103, and 101, respectively. These results 
indicated that Robert was predominantly rational, but due to the proximity of the scores, 
the results were deemed inconclusive. Qualitative methods were employed to derive 
further categorization of Robert’s predominant adherence to either the rational, empirical, 
or metaphorical epistemic style.  
Think-Aloud Sessions 
 Session 1. Robert began TA1 by spending 15 seconds reading part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem (see Appendix F). This was the extent of his 
cognitive activity in the definition of the task phase. Then, fixated on the exactly one root
condition of part (a) of the problem, he spent 28 min 25 sec on a fruitless exploration. 
During this exploratory episode of Robert’s navigation through the problem space, 
evidence of the forethought phase was restricted to the first minute. His plan to use 
substitution consumed him and he never diverted from it. When probed later during his 
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RRI2, Robert cited problem recognition from a prior course, Algebra 2, as the reason for 
trying to use substitution to solve for a, b, c, and d.
A significant number of overt instances of metacognitive monitoring were coded 
during this exploratory excursion, potentially indicative of activity in the performance 
control phase of SRL. Despite 11 instances of locally assessing his problem strategy and 
2 instances of globally assessing his progress toward his perception of the goals of the 
problem, no corrective actions or problem-solving transitions were employed by Robert. 
In each instance of monitoring, Robert’s references to his current solution state were 
vague and did not focus on the specific conditions and goals of the problem. Rather, his 
assessments were focused on his substitution strategy or were general statements such as 
the following: “As of right now, I don’t really know if I’m doing this right, but I’m 
getting rid of variables, so I guess that’s a good thing.”  
His inability to focus on the particular goals of the problem may be explained by a 
persistent confusion between the goals and conditions of the application of differentiation
problem that was still present during his RRI2. In fact, during that interview Robert 
stated, “Maybe I wasn’t supposed to solve for a, b, c, and d. I was supposed to just deal 
with those and try to find tangent lines or the roots in terms of them.” Since the problem 
clearly asks the solver to find a, b, c, and d using conditions involving roots and tangents, 
Robert seems to have struggled with appropriately defining the task. His lack of attention 
to the preliminary phases of SRL processing may also explain his inability to convert his 
monitoring to problem-solving control aimed at progression toward a solution during the 
performance control phase. During his RRI2, I asked Robert whether mathematical 
resources, strategies, or control were his most significant barriers. Although he cited lack 
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of control as the most significant barrier for the application of differentiation problem, a 
statement later in the interview referring to the same problem seemed to contradict his 
assessment and imply that lack of mathematical resources was an issue. “I really just 
couldn’t think of anything else to do. That’s really all I could come up with,” he stated.  
 At 28 min 40 sec into TA1, Robert concluded that part (a) was not possible due to 
the failure of his substitution method to produce a solution, instead yielding 0 = 0. He 
then made a statement indicative of the self-reflection phase of SRL: “I feel like if I did 
this right and I get zero equals zero, that might mean that the if possible just means it’s 
not possible.” His reference to doing the problem right indicated a causal attribution that 
was strategy-focused, which is less likely to cause learning deficiencies than ability-
focused causal attributions (Zimmerman, 2000). At this point, Robert moved on to part 
(b) of the application of differentiation problem. He spent 1 min 27 sec reading and re-
reading the problem, then moved on to promising analysis of the problem conditions. For 
43 seconds, Robert worked with the second derivative, tying its roots to possible points of 
inflection. If only he had considered the type of function that he was working with, the 
fact that no solution was possible would have fallen into his lap! However, the arbitrary 
constants, which he claimed in subsequent interviews plagued him throughout both 
sessions, confused him to the point of reverting to his substitution strategy, and he spent 
his final 1 min 21 sec on this fruitless exploration. Additionally, during TA1, Robert’s 
only instances of heuristic strategy use were setting up the equations for finding the roots 
of the function and its first two derivatives. 
Robert’s work and verbalizations from TA1 exhibited three distinct 
epistemological beliefs. First, Robert’s work during TA1 represented a continuous 
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application of trial-and-error strategies, devoid of reason and logic, which demonstrates 
an empirical belief in mathematical problem solving. With respect to questionnaire data, 
this finding is not surprising since his PEP results yielded virtually the same score for all 
three scales of beliefs. The following quote from TA1 provides an example of Robert’s 
manifestations of an empirical belief in problem solving: “I’m going to plug it into the 
modified equation that I just got–see if that will get me anywhere.” Second, his devotion 
to the substitution strategy and his citation of this strategy as a causal attribution to his 
success or failure imply a belief that applying the right procedures to a mathematical 
problem will result in a solution. This finding is triangulated by questionnaire data since 
Robert received a low categorization for Belief 2 on the IMBS. Finally, Robert’s lack of 
contextual consideration for his substitution technique and failure to relate the conditions 
of the problem in some meaningful manner indicate a straightforward belief in the 
simplicity of knowledge (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The following quote 
from his RRI2 is indicative of Robert’s manifestations of all three beliefs: 
So, I just went through this whole process of a few pages of work trying to solve 
for a, b, c, and d and initially I thought it was a pretty good idea. But, then I 
started to get these pages upon pages of work, which really didn’t make sense to 
me. But, I just kept going with it because I was in the thick of it.
Session 2. At the beginning of TA2, Robert continued to work on the application 
of differentiation problem. It should be noted that he was given the opportunity to work 
on the problem at home, if desired, during the interim between sessions, which amounted 
to two evenings since he had school during daytime hours. Robert reported that he simply 
thought about the problem during the interim, but wished that he would have done some 
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work on it. He spent the first 29 seconds of TA1 engaged in analysis of the problem 
space, relating the roots of the first derivative to horizontal tangents. Then, just as in 
TA1, the arbitrary constants a, b, c, and d diverted Robert’s attention from his promising 
work and eventually led him back to his substitution technique, which amounted to a 7 
min 2 sec fruitless exploration. During this portion of TA2, six occurrences of either 
monitoring strategy or goal state were coded but did not lead to any meaningful 
transitions in Robert’s navigation of the problem space. At one point during his 
exploration, Robert stated, “See if there’s an easier way to solve for a, b, c, and d. Hmm, 
the function, f, equals zero–it could be any number of values.” This quote represents a 
belief that all mathematical problems do not have a unique solution, and thus, certain
liberties in solution path development may exist. However, he continued to assume that a 
single, algebraic method existed and attempted to use the computer algebra system (CAS) 
built into his calculator to solve for a, b, c, and d.
Robert then turned his attention to part (b) of the application of differentiation 
problem. He spent 18 seconds reading the problem and 48 seconds engaged in analysis,
working with the second derivative. Then, 2 min 16 sec of exploration ensued, producing 
little progress toward the solution. This portion of the session ended when Robert stated, 
“Neither one of them [referring to parts (a) and (b) of the problem] are possible, because 
it does give me that option to say that they’re not possible, which I know good and well 
they most likely are. I’m just not thinking of the right way to do it.” This self-evaluation 
is evidence of the self-reflection phase of SRL. Robert’s assignment of causal attributions 
to his own ability may eventually prove detrimental to future learning endeavors, as 
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“attributions of errors to a fixed ability prompt learners to react negatively and discourage 
efforts to improve” (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 22).  
At this point, a brief transition period occurred while the researcher retrieved the 
application of integration problem (see Appendix F) for Robert. He spent approximately 
30 seconds reading the problem and then engaged in 55 seconds of analysis. During the 
analysis, Robert employed the draw a picture heuristic by sketching a graph of the 
function along with its bounds and then shading the appropriate region. This analysis led 
directly to a productive exploration lasting 3 min 46 sec, which resulted in expressions 
for the entire area and half the area of the enclosed region in terms of m (with a minor 
error). At this point, Robert transitioned back to the forethought phase of SRL and 
recycled the goal in working memory, stating, “Now, I just have to find the line that 
bounds that.” Despite this plan, Robert was unable to develop a strategy to find an 
equation for the vertical line.
With no immediate strategies available for completing part (a), Robert decided to 
move to part (b). He spent 11 seconds reading the problem, followed by 50 seconds 
engaged in analysis. Yet again, the analysis phase consisted mainly of Robert applying 
the draw a picture heuristic by sketching the graph of the curve, bounds, and shaded 
region. This analysis appeared to lead to productive exploration. However, Robert made a 
costly error when calculating the area of the enclosed region. His integral expression did 
not account for the boundary y = 1/2. So, despite three occurrences of monitoring either 
strategy use or goal state, Robert allowed this major error to go unchecked. Additionally, 
even if he had caught his mistake, the goal of part (b) was to find a horizontal line, which 
would have required a completely different approach. Calculating the area using 
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integration with respect to x lends itself to finding an equation for a vertical line, but not a 
horizontal line. At any rate, Robert then moved into a fruitless exploration that would last 
the final 13 min 32 sec of the session.  
Congruent with his earlier perusals of problem spaces, Robert’s actions during 
this exploration logged multiple instances of monitoring either strategy use or goal state–
12 instances, in fact. The culprit of his lack of attaining control, yet again, was the 
arbitrary constant m. A significant amount of metacognitive monitoring occurred as 
Robert grappled with the significance of m. To begin, he quickly dismissed solving for m,
recalling his earlier problems solving for a, b, c, and d, and decided to keep the m in the 
function. A good example of monitoring during this exploratory episode presented itself
when Robert stated, “I know it’s not as easy as just saying it’s three-fourths because the 
halves wouldn’t be equal.” A very lengthy exploration of the effects that m may have on 
the graph of h followed but was never resolved. He did consider making the substitution 
m = 1, which would have had some heuristic promise if he had considered solving this 
simpler problem. Instead, he merely used the substitution to view a graph. Then, Robert 
ended the session by trying a proportionality approach to solving for the necessary lines, 
but to no avail. 
From an epistemological standpoint, Robert’s overall navigation of the problem 
space during TA2 was coded as predominantly empirical, despite some flashes of 
rational logic mainly occurring during the application of integration problem. A sample 
quote supporting this assessment is as follows: “Well for the sake of I don’t really know 
what, I’m just going to factor out an m.” Similarly, despite some glimpses of a conceptual 
belief in mathematical problem-solving, most notably connecting integration to area 
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under the curve, this session was coded as demonstrative of a predominantly procedural
stance with respect to mathematical problem solving. Evidence of this assessment is 
Robert integrating part (b) with respect to x just as he did in part (a) without considering 
the conceptual ramifications of this decision with respect to the goal of finding an 
equation for a horizontal line. In fact, after reading part (b), he stated, “So, it’s basically 
the same concept, it looks like. I’ve just got to figure out what that concept is.” Yet again, 
questionnaire results provided triangulation for both the empirical and procedural
epistemological classifications. 
Interestingly, Robert’s MCI contradicted the procedural coding of his problem-
solving activities. Despite approving of the accuracy of his narrative which included the 
procedural coding, Robert made the following statement when asked whether procedural 
or conceptual understanding is more important to problem solving success: 
There have been plenty of people who don’t follow conventional steps and are 
still able to solve the problem in a round-about way. If you solve everything 
procedurally, some hiccup comes up and you don’t know how to handle it 
because you’re just focused on doing something you think just has to go step by 
step. . . If you know calculus, you can get through, well not everything, but you 
can sometimes formulate your own pathway, I guess.   
With respect to his problem-solving actions, this statement provides compelling evidence 
of a disconnect between Robert’s idealized belief in a conceptual approach and his 
realized manifestation of a procedural approach to mathematical problem solving. 
Robert’s RRI2 and MCI revealed an additional epistemological belief that 
manifested during the study. Robert’s confusion regarding the arbitrary constants a, b, c,
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d, and m had a rather deep-seeded, mathematical-beliefs basis. Schoenfeld (1992) 
suggested that many students have the non-availing belief that all mathematical problems 
have a unique solution. To situate this belief in the current context, consider the following 
statements. A unique belief regarding problem solutions would imply that a student 
would expect a unique solution for a, b, c, and d in the application of differentiation 
problem and require a unique value for m in the application of integration problem. An 
arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions would imply that a student is open to the 
possibility of infinite or no solutions for a, b, c, and d in the application of differentiation 
problem and comfortable with m representing a family of exponential functions from 
which a general solution with respect to m may be obtained.  
Based on his problem-solving actions and interview responses, Robert’s belief 
regarding problem solutions was coded as predominantly unique. It should be noted that 
Robert stated that a, b, c, and d could be any number of values, which is demonstrative of 
an arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions. Based on the theoretical framework for 
this study, beliefs lie on a continuum and thus, may manifest in a contradictory fashion 
based upon context (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990). Then, the above finding 
implies that Robert lies somewhere between the extremes of this belief’s continuum, but 
is closer to the unique classification. An alternative hypothesis may be that Robert held 
an arbitrary belief for the duration of the application of differentiation problem but 
lacked the mathematical resources to develop additional strategies. Based on this data, the 
researcher asserts that Robert’s non-availing, unique belief and a lack of mathematical 
resources worked in tandem to produce his unsuccessful problem-solving attempt. The 
arbitrary/unique belief regarding problem solutions dimension seems closely related to 
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Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) fixed and fluid beliefs in the certainty of knowledge. Further 
discussion of this suggestion may be found in Chapter V: Cross-Case Results.
In a manifestation of his unique belief, Robert expressed his confusion regarding 
the role that the constant m played in the application of integration problem during his 
RRI2:
I still have the whole m problem, which I feel more confident about the value of m
being irrelevant, just because it tells me it’s a nonzero positive integer. And I 
guess that could be a guideline, so when you solve it and you get negative one, 
you’re just wrong. But I feel like you just have to know it’s positive, more so than 
figuring out the actual value for it. But, it still just messed with my head a little 
bit. I’m not good with having a variable that I don’t know the answer for.
When probed further as to whether substituting an arbitrary value for m would produce an 
acceptable solution for the problem, Robert responded: 
It would have been, because as long as I keep my m consistent, it really shouldn’t 
matter, I wouldn’t think. Because if I plugged in a seventy-two, I have a seventy-
two all the way through; so, I don’t think it would matter because in the end, 
using given values it would give me, I don’t know if it would give me a different 
answer. It would give me different work, certainly. But, I think the answer would 
probably still be the same.  
Finally, during his MCI, the researcher asked Robert to discuss his confusions with the 
arbitrary constants and, if possible, indicate a source for his confusions. His response 
indicated that his unique belief continued to persist as of this writing and provided a 
possible source for its inception:
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Well, just having variables there. I’ve always been taught you need to solve for 
your variables.  Because other than calculus there has never really been a problem 
where you’ve had variables, but that’s not really the focus of the problem.   
As will be discussed further below, Robert was not alone in this confusion with arbitrary 
constants and variables. 
Think-aloud problem-solving session performance. Robert made progress on both 
problems, but was unable to fully solve either of the problems given during the think-
aloud sessions. For part (a) of the application of differentiation problem, the researcher 
deemed that his problem-solving approaches led to little progress and applying 
Schoenfeld’s (1982) scoring range of 1–5 points (see Chapter III: Methodology for 
details), assigned him a score of 4 points for part (a) of the application of differentiation 
problem. The rationale for assigning four points is that Robert’s recognition of the 
calculus connections between the conditions and the first derivative merited some 
recognition, but no progress was made toward connecting the conditions to the goal of 
the problem. For part (b) of the application of differentiation problem, Robert was 
awarded 10 points based on Schoenfeld’s (1982) 6–10 point range given for approaches 
yielding some progress. The rationale for this score is that accurate calculation of the 
second derivative was a significant step in the solution of this problem. In fact, 
recognizing that a linear function with nonzero, defined slope may never be strictly 
positive was all that was left to obtain full credit. So, Robert’s total score for the 
application of differentiation problem was 14 out of 40 points. 
For part (a) of the application of integration problem, Robert made little progress 
and, factoring in a minor calculation error, a score of four points was assigned for part (a) 
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of the application of integration problem. For part (b) of the application of integration 
problem, he made little progress and, factoring in a major integral setup error, a score of 
two points was assigned for part (b) of the application of integration problem. So, 
Robert’s total score for the application of integration problem was 6 out of 40 points. His 
total combined score for both problems was 20 out of 80 points. 
AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
Each participant was asked to describe the differences in the problem-solving 
tasks used during AP Calculus exam preparation and think-aloud sessions. Regarding the 
AP Calculus exam preparation problems, Robert made the following statement:  
The ones in class were difficult calculus but they were straightforward calculus. 
There weren’t too many that were just out there. They were difficult concepts, 
you know, a lot of steps [emphasis added] and that sort of stuff. 
From the researcher’s perspective, the AP Calculus exam preparation problems generally 
provided either an explicit or implicit solution path. However, mindless application of 
procedures would not have yielded a successful solution; connections to various concepts 
based on multiple representations of information were required to successfully solve the 
problems (Stein, Smith, Henningsen, & Silver, 2000).  
In contrast, Robert indicated significant differences in the think-aloud session 
problems: 
The ones outside of class seemed to be a lot more abstract, you know, you had the 
variables and it was just kind of weird. . . The ones after school seems like you 
needed a little bit more practice, you needed to be a more seasoned calculus 
student, or user, I guess.       
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The researcher concluded that the think-aloud problems required participants to exert 
significant cognitive load, develop non-algorithmic solution paths, and apply multiple 
calculus concepts learned at various times throughout the course (Stein et al., 2000). 
Overall, the exam preparation problems were categorized as “procedures with 
connections tasks” and the think-aloud problems as “doing mathematics tasks” (Stein et 
al., 2000, p. 16). 
Classroom observation 1. Robert was observed working on question 3 of the AP 
Calculus AB 2006 (Form B) exam with his partners, Dan and Tom (see Appendix E). 
Students were provided a graph that modeled the height of a skateboard ramp and 
conditions that the graph met and given four problems, (a)–(d), to solve. For part (a), the 
group had to show that the general quadratic f (x) = ax2 did not meet one of the given 
conditions. The researcher got the impression very early in the session that Tom had 
become the de facto leader of the group. He developed a plan for solving part (a) and 
shared his plan with the group. Dan and Tom embraced the plan and began working. 
However, Robert was unable to move forward due to the abstract nature of the function. 
He self-disclosed his problems and requested feedback from his partners. Ironically, as 
Dan and Tom helped Robert, they caught an error in their work. Due in large part to 
Robert’s request for help and the ensuing group monitoring, all three group members 
received the full two points for part (a).
 For part (b), students had to find a coefficient for a family of cubic functions that 
met one of the given conditions. There was virtually no discussion about this part; all 
three seemed to understand what needed to be done. Possibly based on the monitoring 
lesson learned above, the group actually engaged in two separate instances of monitoring 
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for part (b). The result was a verified solution whose accuracy earned all three members 
the one point designated for part (b). 
 For part (c), the group had to show that the function they developed in part (b) did 
not meet one of the conditions given in the problem. Tom had to assume his leader role 
again, as Dan and Robert were unable to contribute any ideas. Upon presenting his plan, 
Dan began working, but Robert stated that he had “no idea what is going on.” This was 
another example of group monitoring by Robert, as self-disclosure of current state and 
feedback requests ensured that all group members understood the problem. So, aided by 
direction provided by Tom, Robert calculated the required derivative and provided an 
explanation based on his work. The result was that all three group members received the 
full two points for part (c).
 For part (d), a new function, h (x) = xn/k, was introduced and students were 
required to find values for n and k such that all conditions were met. Upon reading this 
part, Robert said that “his head was starting to hurt.” His verbalizations indicated that he 
understood the general connections between the conditions of the problem and the goal. 
However, as in his think-aloud sessions, the arbitrary constants k and n confounded the 
development of a solution path. Despite requesting and receiving feedback from Tom, 
Robert was unable to rectify part (d) and finished the session watching and listening. Dan 
and Tom continued working on part (d) until time was called. Thus, Robert received zero 
points, Dan received two points, and Tom received three points out of four possible 
points. In sum, Robert received 5 points, Dan received 7 points, and Tom received 8 
points, resulting in a mean group score of 6.67 out of 9 possible points. The group 
outperformed the class, which averaged only 4.87 points. 
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Classroom observation 2. For his second classroom observation, Robert worked 
with his group on question 2 of the AP Calculus AB 2007 (Form B) exam (see Appendix 
E). This question provided students with a velocity function and its graph on a closed 
interval and four subsequent problems, (a)–(d). For part (a), Robert suggested they use 
the second derivative to calculate the acceleration and asked for feedback from the group. 
Tom pointed out that the given function and graph represented velocity and thus, only 
one derivative was needed. This instance of monitoring and discussion resulted in all 
group members receiving the full one point for part (a).
 Unfortunately, the group was unable to do much after their early success on part 
(a). For part (b), Tom erroneously informed the group that total distance is the definite 
integral of the velocity function over a domain. Dan and Robert assented without 
argument and began working. The group moved on upon obtaining a solution but 
returned to part (b) later and discussed whether the solution was accurate. During this 
discussion, Tom recalled the need for absolute value, but wanted to use the position 
function. Dan and Robert applied group monitoring and convinced Tom that velocity was
the correct function. Unfortunately, no one considered the conceptual significance of 
their arguments. They were all trying to recall procedures and never considered 
examining the role of the integral and the physical aspects of the problem. Thus, all three 
students left their answers as before and received zero out of two possible points.  
 For part (c), students were to find the final position of the object given an initial 
position and an interval of time. No one was able to even provide an idea for part (c) and 
all three left the problem blank, earning zero out of three possible points. For part (d), 
students were to determine the point at which the object is farthest right over a given time 
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interval. At the beginning, Dan and Tom discussed the problem and seemed to be on 
track to provide a full solution. Robert was watching and listening and at one point asked 
which part the group was working on. At this point, Tom described the current state of 
his solution to Robert, who assented but did not indicate whether he fully understood the 
problem. Despite having an accurate solution and engaging in some group monitoring, no 
one received full credit because their analyses were incomplete. Robert and Tom each 
received one point and Dan received two out of a possible three points. In sum, Robert 
and Tom received 2 points and Dan received 3 points, resulting in a mean group score of 
2.33 out of 9 possible points. The group was outperformed by the class, which averaged 
4.42 points. 
 AP Calculus exam preparation performance. All three members of Robert’s 
group were present for all twelve AP practice sessions. Group statistics for the twelve 
problems were as follows: Robert averaged 4.50 points, Dan averaged 4.75 points, and 
Tom averaged 5.92 points. Thus, the group’s overall average score for the 12 problems 
was 5.06 points, resulting in a difference between Robert’s and his group’s average score 
of 0.56&  points. The overall class average for the 12 problems was 4.92, resulting in a 
difference between Robert’s average score and the overall class’ average score of 0.42&
points. 
Edwina’s Narrative 
Mathematical Achievement and Questionnaire Data 
With respect to her peers, Edwina was categorized as a Category IV calculus 
achiever with a grade of 76 in AP Calculus AB. Her inclusion in the study was for the 
purposes of quota sampling, as she placed slightly higher in the achievement interval than 
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Robert (Miles & Huberman, 1994). For the IMBS, Edwina was categorized as average 
for all scales except Belief 3, for which she received a low categorization. Thus, based on 
self-reported data, Edwina tended to believe that understanding mathematical concepts is 
not important as long as performance can be maintained to a satisfactory level 
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992).  
For the MSLQ, Edwina was categorized as average for all scales except for the 
Peer Learning scale, for which she received a high categorization. So, Edwina self-
reported that she found value in collaborating with peers while working on assignments 
and studying for this course (Pintrich, et al., 1991). Additionally, like Robert, Edwina 
scored higher on Extrinsic Goal Orientation (5.75) than on Intrinsic Goal Orientation
(3.75). Thus, based on self-report data, Edwina tended to participate in tasks for reasons 
such as grades or other performance indicators instead of being driven by the desire to 
master content (Pintrich et al., 1991).  
Edwina’s PEP scores for the Rational, Empirical, and Metaphorical scales were 
104, 113, and 94, respectively. All three scores categorized Edwina as average and 
indicated that she was predominantly empirical in her views on knowledge construction 
and development. Based on her self-reported empirical epistemological preference, 
Edwina indicated a tendency to apply perceptual cognitive processing and to justify 
knowledge claims via observational criteria (Royce & Mos, 1980).  
Think-Aloud Sessions 
 Session 1. Edwina began TA1 by spending 27 seconds reading part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem and spending 1 min 58 sec engaged in analysis of 
the problem space. Unfortunately, two issues emerged during her analysis that plagued 
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her future work on the problem. First, Edwina exhibited conceptual confusion by trying 
to tie the first derivative of f to the roots of f. When questioned later during her RRI1, 
Edwina was unable to identify the meaning of the root of a function. Second, Edwina 
stated, “This is weird because I am working mostly with variables and constants,” 
indicating confusion with the arbitrary constants a, b, c, and d. Her interviews provided 
confirmation of this assertion and will be discussed further below. So, despite making 
some progress with the conditions, Edwina entered part (a) with a poor definition of the 
task, due in large part to her misconceptions. 
After this analysis of part (a), Edwina spent 17 seconds reading part (b) of the 
application of differentiation problem. Then, the remaining 23 min 2 sec were spent 
engaging in a series of fruitless explorations. Edwina began her exploration by applying 
the heuristic draw a picture by graphing the function with her calculator. During the 
session, I was confused by how she produced a graph since f represented a family of 
curves. In her retrospective interview, my probes revealed that she had fixed a = 1, b = 1, 
c = 1, and d = 0. Her substitutions provided a means for viewing a sample graph and a 
special case of f to begin building a function. However, she had no plans to use her 
special case in this manner. Rather, she used this special case in place of f in an attempt to 
solve for a, b, c, and d, not realizing the circular nature of her logic. When questioned as 
to the ramifications of substituting for a, b, c, and d during the retrospective report and 
interview, Edwina’s responses were indicative of continued confusion with the role of the 
arbitrary constants and the final goal of the problem. Further probing during the interview 
presented evidence of a unique belief regarding problem solutions as described in 
Robert’s narrative above and as indicated by the following statement:
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I knew I had to solve for a, b, c, and d. I just didn’t know how so I just took 
circular routes, doing stuff I thought I knew how to do. I think that’s it. I’m just 
really bad when, it sounds bad, but the less information, when you do have more 
constants and more coefficients that aren’t given confuses me–that’s my one 
weakness. 
During her exploration, Edwina showed some signs of forethought, as her actions 
produced five codes for planning. Her plans were generally empirical in nature and did 
not result in significant progress toward the overall goal of the problem. Early in the 
exploration Edwina lost sight of the goal of the problem and made a plan early to solve 
for x, seemingly to find the locations of the horizontal tangents and the root. Upon 
solving for x using the first derivative of her special case for f, Edwina continued to show 
signs of conceptual confusion, particularly with respect to the role of the first derivative: 
x equals negative two thirds, but this can’t be right because I’m solving for 
tangents. And I just solved for the slope. But the derivative is the tangent line, but 
not the horizontal tangent, so this doesn’t make sense. 
Other examples of plans included constructing sign lines for both derivatives, writing 
equations of tangent lines, and substituting the value of x obtained above into the original 
function. All plans were indicative of both empirical and procedural beliefs in problem 
solving. 
Evidence of actions in the performance control phase of SRL processing included 
six instances of local assessments of strategy use and two instances of global assessments 
of goal state. Each of her assessments focused on surface qualities of current strategies 
and general statements of an inability to move forward, producing no information to alter 
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current strategies or transition to other ideas. For example, she stated, “I graphed the 
second derivative and that didn’t do anything for me because it just went straight to the 
origin as a line. It has nothing to do with concavity right here.” Her linear graph of the 
second derivative had everything to do with the concavity of f and analysis of the graph’s 
qualities leads directly to a solution for part (b). However, her conceptual confusions 
mentioned above stifled her ability to monitor her current state, assess the graph, and 
produce transitional metacognitive feedback necessary for productive action during the 
performance control phase.  
 Edwina’s session ended with her giving up on the problem after 26 min 14 sec, 
rather than completing the thirty-minute session. Just before she stopped working, 
Edwina made a statement that shed some light on her conceptual confusions: “I’m not 
used to finding a, b, c, and d. This is probably really easy if I saw how to do it once.” Her 
statement was indicative of a procedural belief in mathematical problem solving, which 
is in direct contradiction to a conceptual stance. This result is consistent with her low 
score on the Belief 3 scale of the IMBS, which measures the degree to which students 
feel conceptual knowledge is important to mathematics. Further evidence and discussion 
of this belief will be presented below.
Interim between sessions. Despite stopping before the session ended, the 
researcher encouraged Edwina to take the application of differentiation problem home 
and continue working on or thinking about it during the interim between sessions, which 
consisted of three evenings since she was in school during the day. By a stroke of luck, a 
calculus teacher was visiting next door to Edwina. Demonstrating the help-seeking
qualities of SRL, Edwina asked this teacher for help and, thus, was able to solve part (a) 
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of the problem, providing the function f (x) = x3 + 2x2 + 10. Unfortunately, she was only 
able to partially explain and justify the solution path. Additionally, Edwina stated that 
part (b) was not possible but was unable to provide any justification for her answer.  
Session 2. Satisfied with her progress on the application of differentiation 
problem, Edwina spent all of her time during TA2 working on the application of 
integration problem. She spent the first 52 seconds of the session reading part (a) of the 
problem, noting the conditions and identifying the goal. Then, she spent the next 5 min 5 
sec engaged in analysis of the graphical properties of the function and the accompanying 
shaded regions (see Figure 4). During this period she used her graphing calculator to 
view two special cases such that m = 1 and m = 5 to determine the effects that m may 
have on the graph. She also recycled the goal in working memory, indicating that she had 
not lost sight of the desired end state. So, Edwina entered the remainder of the problem 
session with an accurate and adequate definition of the task for part (a).
Upon properly defining the problem space for (a), Edwina spent 19 seconds 
reading part (b), noting the conditions and identifying the goal state. Then, she spent 1 
min 51 sec engaged in analysis similar to that in part (a), which resulted in an erroneous 
sketch of the shaded region since she bounded the region by the x-axis, instead of the y-
axis. Additionally, Edwina stated, “This is the same kind of problem,” which implied that 
she failed to note the significant alteration inherent in the requirement of finding a 
horizontal line, rather than a vertical line. Thus, Edwina did not enter the problem space 
with a sufficient definition of the task for part (b).
Edwina made virtually no progress on either part after this point. She spent her 
remaining 17 min 13 sec in a series of fruitless explorations. Her first exploratory action 
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was prefaced with the following statement: “Maybe I’ll take the derivative, just for the 
heck of it, and see what it does.” This statement is indicative of the empirical mindset 
that pervaded the remainder of the session. Finding no application for the derivative, 
Edwina examined her graphs again and discovered a problem with the shaded region for 
part (b)–it was boundless. Unable to resolve this issue, Edwina developed a plan to find 
the area of the enclosed region and then divide it in half. This sole instance of activity in 
the forethought phase showed that Edwina had a general notion of the demands of the 
problem. However, Edwina was unable to recall the difference between the integral-
defined formulas for area and volume: 
OK, we’ll try that, we will solve for area right now. And, area is different from 
 volume; I’ll have to remember that. Volume is right over left and bottom over the 
 top. 
Edwina had truly confused the calculus of area and volume. She partially recalled the 
mnemonics right minus left and top minus bottom, which many novice calculus students 
apply when trying to determine the order of subtraction for area problems, not volume 
problems as indicated by Edwina. 
 Unable to develop the integral expression for area, Edwina tried to approximate 
the area. Her first attempt involved using the Pythagorean Theorem to estimate the area 
of the region, which she assumed to be approximately triangular. Unfortunately, she used 
a height value, or y-value of 4, which should have been 1 and obtained a large value for 
the hypotenuse. Unable to rectify this, she turned to part (b) and discovered that the 
unbounded nature of her shaded region was due to an error in her sketch. Based on this 
local assessment of her current strategy, she corrected the problem and thus, obtained an 
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accurate sketch of the shaded region (see Figure 5). Deciding the region was too small to 
estimate, Edwina made one last attempt to recall calculus-based area. When this was 
unsuccessful, Edwina decided to stop working after 25 min 20 sec instead of waiting for 
the thirty-minute session to expire. Over the duration of the session, only six instances of 
self-monitoring were coded and led to no productive transitions or alterations in strategy, 
providing little evidence of the performance control phase.




Figure 5. Edwina’s Corrected Sketch for Part (b) of the Application of Integration 
Problem-Solving Task. 
At one point during her exploration, Edwina recalled the goal of the problem and 
made the following statement, indicating an underlying reliance on procedures: “I don’t 
remember how to solve [emphasis added] for a vertical line and I don’t know how we’re
going to find out where it divides it exactly in half.” Edwina expected a procedural 
method for finding equations of vertical lines. For this problem, there is no such 
algorithmic procedure; one must conceptualize the meaning of enclosed area and the role 
of bounds to develop a means for finding the vertical line. This interpretation of Edwina’s 
procedural belief in mathematical problem solving is supported by her low score on the 
Belief 3 scale of the IMBS. Additional support for this finding is her response to a query 
concerning barriers to problem solving from her RRI2: “Having memorized the equations 
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in the past and not really knowing how to apply them, so therefore you forget the 
equations and it’s not good because you need to remember them.” Edwina also cited lack 
of access to mathematical resources as an issue that prevented her from considering 
multiple problem-solving strategies.  
Edwina shed some light onto the source of her procedural belief and lack of 
mathematical problem-solving resources: 
My experience in the past–and not to hate on the teachers I’ve had–but they’ve 
never really encouraged you to think.  It’s all been cookie-cutter questions, even 
with word problems. I remember my Algebra One teacher, she had a little trick 
for everything. So, of course, I don’t remember the trick now and I don’t 
remember why I was doing it. So, I felt like there were a lot of short cuts, and I 
was never really taught why you were using it. So, I memorized everything, 
which is what I’ve been doing ever since.                      
So, Edwina attributed her beliefs in procedural mathematical problem-solving and her 
lack of mathematical resources to a consistent focus on memorization and cookie-cutter
mathematical problems presented in past courses. In a manner similar to Robert, 
Edwina’s responses during the MCI indicated a disconnect between desired beliefs and 
manifested beliefs. Her comments to my query regarding the importance of procedural or 
conceptual understanding to problem solving were as follows:  
Understanding the underlying concepts because you can’t get very far without 
them, like I was unable to do. I didn’t understand all the concepts, so I wasn’t able 
to solve any parts of the problem. Even if I understood part of it, I couldn’t get 
very far. 
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So, Edwina realized that her lack of conceptual understanding was her demise, but her 
prior experiences in mathematics courses appears to have resulted in a manifestation of 
procedural dependence while solving mathematical problems.  
Finally, Edwina indicated having difficulty with the arbitrary constant m, which 
was consistent with her issues with a, b, c, and d during the first session. The inability to 
reconcile these arbitrary constants may be attributed to a unique belief regarding problem 
solutions. When asked to comment on her confusions and their possible source, Edwina 
made the following statement: 
So I wasn’t really sure how to [emphasis added] solve the problem when you’re 
just given constants because that requires you to think conceptually [emphasis 
added] and think, well what’s going on in this equation, rather than oh, let’s see 
what’s going on once I plug  these numbers in. So that’s where I had the problem, 
it goes back to the whole conceptual knowledge part, I think. 
True to her deeply ingrained belief in procedural problem solving, Edwina ironically used 
the words how to in the same sentence that ended with think conceptually. Edwina’s 
comments also introduce a possible link between the non-availing unique belief regarding 
problem solutions and the non-availing procedural belief in problem solving. 
Think-aloud problem-solving session performance. For part (a) of the application 
of differentiation problem, Edwina made little progress during her first session. Despite 
having the help of a calculus teacher during the interim between sessions, Edwina was 
unable to adequately justify each step leading to her answer for part (a). Thus, based on 
Schoenfeld’s (1982) scoring guidelines, Edwina was awarded 16 points out of 20. For 
part (b) of the application of differentiation problem, Edwina made significant progress 
166
by calculating the second derivative but could not recall its connection to concavity. 
Then, during her interim interview, she stated, “I wasn’t sure how it could be concave up 
from negative infinity to infinity, so I don’t think it’s possible.” Her uncertainty was still 
apparent during RRI2, as she stated that the problem confused her and she was uncertain 
of her answer. Based on the above, Edwina was determined to have made some progress 
on part (b) and was awarded 10 points out of 20. In total, Edwina scored 26 points out of 
40 on the application of differentiation problem. 
 For the application of integration problem, Edwina made very little progress on 
both parts (a) and (b). By the end of TA2, Edwina had made accurate sketches of the 
regions for both parts, but made no progress toward connecting conditions to goals. Thus, 
Edwina received 1 point for each part of the application of integration problem, resulting 
in a total score of 2 out of 20 points. Overall, Edwina scored 28 out of 80 points for the 
think-aloud sessions.
AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
During each MCI, participants were asked to comment on the differences in the 
tasks given during the AP Calculus exam preparation sessions held during class and the 
think-aloud sessions held after school. With respect to the think-aloud problems, Edwina 
stated, “The after school problems were definitely more abstract and required me to think 
all on my own.” This description is consistent with categorizing the think-aloud problems 
as “doing mathematics tasks” (Stein et al., 2000). However, Edwina’s comments 
regarding the AP exam practice problems were too vague to assign a classification.  
Classroom observation 1. Edwina was observed while working on question 6 
from AP Calculus AB 2004 (Form B) exam with her partners, Bob and Ken (see 
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Appendix E). The question provided a graph of the general power function y = xn and its 
tangent at the point $ %1, 1  and posed three problems, (a)–(c). For part (a), students were 
asked to calculate the integral of the function y = xn with respect to x from zero to one. 
Bob, who appeared to be the de facto leader, integrated the expression without problem, 
but Ken and Edwina seemed confused. Bob and Ken discussed the problem, resolved the 
issue of uncertainty as to whether bounds are substituted in for n or x, and both were 
satisfied with their work. Edwina assented to their plan and followed along procedurally. 
For part (a), all three group members earned the full two points. 
For part (b), students were required to calculate the area under the tangent line. 
After lengthy discussions, Bob and Ken successfully determined a method for finding the 
slope of the tangent and chose to integrate with respect to y to find the area. Edwina was 
unable to follow along, but assented and carried out the established plan. The method for 
finding the slope of the tangent was successful, but integrating with respect to y proved 
too difficult. Finding the area using geometric formulae or integrating with respect to x
would have been simpler. Due to a minor arithmetic error, Bob and Ken earned two 
points out of three. Unfortunately, despite group verification, Edwina’s answer contained 
the arithmetic error and the integral was not properly set up. So, she only received one 
point out of three for part (b). 
Finally, part (c) required students to find the area contained between the general 
power function, y = xn, and the tangent, then determine the value of n that maximizes the
area. Upon recognizing the need for optimization, Bob provided a general plan for 
solving the problem but could not adapt his plan to the current context. Ken and Edwina 
could not follow his logic and were unable to contribute. None of the group members 
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made any significant progress on part (c), so all three received zero points out of four. In 
sum, Edwina received 3 points and Bob and Ken received 4 points, resulting in a mean 
group score of 3.67 out of 9 possible points. Despite the low score, the group 
outperformed the class, which averaged 2.72 points. This was the lowest average score 
for the class of all twelve problems.
Classroom observation 2. For her second observation, Edwina was observed 
working on question 3 from the AP Calculus AB 2008 (Form B) exam with her group 
members (see Appendix E). The question provided a table of water depth values at 
various distances from the shore of a river and a function describing the river’s velocity. 
Based on the given information, four problems, (a)–(d), were posed. For part (a), students 
were required to use the trapezoidal rule to approximate the cross-sectional area of the 
river. After a brief conversation, all three students appeared to understand the concept 
and began working. Unfortunately, despite group verification, only Bob and Ken received 
the one point for part (a). Edwina had the correct answer, but her Trapezoidal rule setup 
was incorrect and did not lead to her answer. So, she received zero points for part (a). The 
reason for this and other instances of point discrepancies between Edwina’s and her 
group’s scores may be explained by her lack of questioning, as she indicated during her 
MCI, stating, “I didn’t want to keep asking questions. I felt bad for interrupting their 
thinking process.” So, group dynamics definitely affected the number of group 
monitoring codes recorded for each group.     
 For part (b), volumetric flow was defined as the product of cross-sectional area 
and velocity. Students were required to calculate the average volumetric flow over a 
given time period. Bob immediately recognized that average value was needed and 
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conceptually explained his reasoning to Ken. Edwina assented to their plan and all three 
began working. Edwina had calculator problems and upon asking for help, Ken appeared 
to rectify the issue. Unfortunately, Edwina’s final answer was still inaccurate, so she 
received two points out of three. Bob also received two points out of three for having an 
inaccurate setup. Finally, Ken received the full three points for part (b).
 For part (c), a function was proposed to model the depth of the river in lieu of the 
table of values given. Students were required to find the cross-sectional area using the 
newly-defined function for depth. After initial confusion with wording, Bob yet again 
developed the group’s solution path, suggesting that simple integration was sufficient. 
Both Ken and Edwina assented and all three began working. Just as in part (b), Edwina 
had problems inputting the necessary commands into her calculator. She again relied on 
her partners to monitor her problems, as Bob was called upon to assess her calculator 
issues. In the end, all three students earned the full two points for part (c). 
Finally, part (d) required students to decide if water must be diverted based upon 
a constraint given for the volumetric flow. Bob developed a plan involving the use of 
results from (c) and information from (b) to generate a solution. Edwina did not follow 
his plan and upon request, Bob clarified for her. Once satisfied, all three worked the 
problem and earned the full three points for part (d). Throughout the observation, Edwina 
remained a passive observer and assented to plans developed by Bob and Ken. In sum, 
Edwina received 7 points, Bob received 8 points, and Ken received 9 points, resulting in
a mean group score of 8 out of 9 possible points. Once again, the group outperformed the 
class, which averaged 6.43 points.  
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 AP Calculus exam preparation performance. Since Ken missed two AP exam 
practice sessions, all group data contain only the ten sessions for which the group was 
intact. Group statistics for the ten problems were as follows: Edwina averaged 4.0 points, 
Bob averaged 5.8 points, and Ken averaged 5.2 points. Thus, the group’s overall average 
score for the 10 problems was 5.0 points, resulting in a difference between Edwina’s 
average score and her group’s average score of 1.0& . Edwina’s overall average 
performance on all 12 in-class AP Calculus AB practice problems was 4.17 out of 9 
possible points. The overall class average for all 12 problems was 4.92, resulting in a 
difference between Edwina’s average score and the overall class’ average score of 0.75&
points.  
Julia’s Narrative
Mathematical Achievement and Questionnaire Data 
With an AP Calculus AB grade of 85, Julia was very close to the class average (M
= 86.8) and was categorized as a Category III calculus achiever. Her inclusion in the 
study was a result of continuing to build the quota sample (Miles & Huberman, 1994) 
and a preponderance of high scale categorizations from the questionnaires. For the IMBS, 
Julia was categorized as average for every scale except Belief 5, for which she was 
categorized as high with a maximum score of 30. Thus, Julia self-reported a strong, 
availing belief that students can increase mathematical proficiency via effort 
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992).  
For the MSLQ, Julia was categorized as average on four scales and high on three 
scales. For the Motivation scales, Julia’s only high categorization was for the Extrinsic 
Goal Orientation subscale. Additionally, like Robert and Edwina, Julia scored higher on 
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Extrinsic Goal Orientation (6.5) than on Intrinsic Goal Orientation (5.5). Thus, based on 
self-report data, Julia tends to participate in tasks for reasons such as grades or other 
performance indicators instead of being driven by the desire to master content (Pintrich et 
al., 1991). For the Learning Strategies scales, Julia was categorized as high for Peer 
Learning and Help Seeking. Thus, Julia self-reported the ability to manage resources and 
use peers, teachers, and other sources to facilitate her learning and achievement (Pintrich 
et al., 1991).  
Finally, Julia was categorized as high for both rational and empirical 
epistemological persuasions from the PEP. She was identified as predominantly 
empirical, producing the highest score for this scale (125) in the class. However, with a 
high categorization for the Rational scale as well, Julia self-reported the tendency to 
apply cognitive processing that may exhibit a mixture of perception and analysis, and 
justifications that may be based on a combination of observations and logic (Royce & 
Mos, 1980).  
Think-Aloud Sessions 
 Session 1. Julia began TA1 by spending 47 seconds reading both parts of the 
application of differentiation problem. Then, she engaged in analysis for 1 min 45 sec, 
establishing a relationship between the conditions and the goal of part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem by setting up two equations–one to solve for the 
roots of the function f and one to solve for the roots of the derivative of f. So, Julia 
appeared to enter part (a) of the application of differentiation problem with a well 
established definition of the task. However, Julia did not recognize the arbitrary nature of 
the problem and subsequently, set off on a fruitless exploration of the problem space that 
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lasted 9 min 45 sec. This exploratory phase of her problem solving effort was peppered 
with four instances of planning, indicative of processing in the forethought phase of SRL. 
However, the planning instances were not precluded by an assessment of the current state
of the problem and thus, promoted further distancing from the conditions of the problem 
and the goal state (Schoenfeld, 1985). For example, one of her plans was to set the 
function equal to the derivative and try to use the equation to solve for a, b, c, and d.
Clearly, this equation has little, if any, mathematical meaning and indicates that Julia was 
simply trying to accomplish something. 
Particularly lacking from Julia’s exploration were instances of monitoring. In fact, 
only three instances of locally monitoring strategy use and no instances of globally 
monitoring goal state were coded. Additionally, all four instances focused on deficiencies 
in the current state of her efforts, as follows: “That’s pointless;” and “That one didn’t take 
out the a.” The instances of monitoring also yielded no fruitful transitions or 
modifications to the strategies being employed. 
Julia spent 5 min 9 sec alternately re-reading and analyzing parts (a) and (b) of the 
problem. During this period, 50 seconds were spent re-reading and the remaining 4 min 
19 sec were spent in analysis. Julia employed some rather productive heuristics during 
this period of analysis. She drew a few graphs and began considering the simpler case of 
the function y = x3. During this analysis, she stated that a cubic will be concave up if the 
value of a is positive. This statement baffled me until she explained, during RRI2 that she 
was confusing the concept of a quadratic graph opening up with a general polynomial 
being concave up. Two very enlightening, yet simultaneously frustrating, statements were 
made during this phase. The first, which regards part (b), is as follows: “It couldn’t be 
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cubic–if it were going to be concave up the whole time, so a would have to be zero, but it 
can’t be. (Exasperated) So, I don’t know.” The problem clearly contained the wording if
possible, implying that no solution was a possibility. Julia had developed a sufficient and 
appropriate argument that part (b) is not possible, but doubted her assertion. The second 
statement, which regards part (a), is as follows: “If it has two horizontal tangents and one 
root, that means one horizontal tangent is below the x-axis and one’s above.” Clearly this 
is a false statement, but this direction would have been fruitful to explore; however, Julia 
left it unchecked and moved to other explorations. 
Despite this promising analysis of the problem space, Julia was unable to make 
the necessary critical connections, and instead reverted to her substitution methods and 
spent the remaining 15 min 12 sec on this fruitless exploration. This phase of her problem 
solving endeavor began with the statement, “OK, let’s try. . . (loud sigh) I have to solve 
for something.” Then, despite having just developed a rational argument for part (b) 
having no solution, Julia attempted to solve for a, b, c, and d by setting the second 
derivative equal to zero. This led her to the equation 6ax + 2b = 0 and having just stated 
that 0a ' , she was once again primed to show that part (b) was not possible. Instead, she 
spent the remainder of the session trying to find solutions for a, b, c, and d for the roots of 
the second derivative and for the conditions she had developed from part (a).  
During this exploration, the extent of Julia’s actions in the forethought phase 
encompassed two instances of planning. Each plan resulted in a transition to a new 
problem-solving strategy, but Julia never considered the consequences of the transitions 
in terms of progression toward the goal state of the problem. Only two instances of 
monitoring were coded, indicating little evidence of performance control during this 
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exploration. Additionally, all three instances of monitoring were negative assessments of 
her current strategy, as the following example indicates: “c equals x over negative three 
ax plus 2x–that’s not helping.” As time was called, Julia was continuing to randomly try 
substitution, factoring, and other strategies to find the solution. Her work had led her to 
the equation x2 = –1, which unfortunately has no real solutions. 
Evidence of three epistemological beliefs was noted during TA1. First, Julia’s 
verbalizations during TA1 indicated conceptual understanding of roots, tangents, and 
concavity. However, Julia’s actions during TA1 indicated a predominantly empirical 
stance on mathematical problem solving. Support for this assertion includes her 
Empirical score on the PEP, which was highest in the class, and her own words during 
RRI1. Wording like “I tried” and “I thought I would” can be found throughout her 
retrospective report, with little, or no, discussion of the conceptual support for her 
strategies. 
Second, Julia’s actions were representative of a procedural, rather than 
conceptual view of mathematical problem solving. Overt evidence of this belief includes 
her development of the implausibility of part (b), only to attempt to solve for a, b, c, and 
d anyway. Julia discussed this event during her RRI2: 
I didn’t see how it could always be concave up, because that would make it a 
quadratic and if a can’t equal zero, then it has to be cubic, no matter what. So, I 
didn’t really think that was possible, but I don’t know. And, um, but then, I knew 
that to solve for the concave up intervals, you could do the second derivative to 
find those intervals.
175
So, despite having a conceptual argument as a solution for (b), Julia felt the need to 
attempt to build a procedural solution. This finding contradicts her IMBS score for Belief 
3, which indicated that Julia did not feel that all problems have an algorithmic procedure. 
Finally, Julia’s actions provided evidence of a belief in knowledge as 
straightforward, as opposed to interrelated. Evidence of this belief was elicited every 
time Julia engaged in a strategy that disregarded the conceptual context established by the 
conditions and goals of the problem. A specific example is when Julia developed a plan 
early in the session to set the derivative function equal to the original cubic function. This 
plan exhibits a disregard for conceptual aspects of the problem since any solutions 
derived from the established equation would have been devoid of conceptual importance 
for the problem.  
Interim between sessions. Of the six participants, Julia accomplished the most 
during the interim between sessions, which amounted to two evenings since she was in 
school during the day. During an interview about her efforts in the interim, Julia stated 
that she had worked for a couple of hours on the problem at home. The extra time 
allowed her to make a very important realization about the direction of her TA1 
explorations: “I realized that, like, the main goal was to solve for a, b, c, and d. I was 
getting further and further away from that.” This assessment led her to more productive 
exploration and ultimately, to a successful solution. She used the Internet to look up the 
definition of horizontal tangent and access an interactive grapher. By looking up the 
definition of horizontal tangent, she was able to correct a misconception–during the first 
session, she was confusing the term horizontal tangent with horizontal asymptote. Julia’s 
confusion explains her conjecture from session one that a cubic with one root should have 
176
one horizontal tangent below and one above the x-axis. Then, equipped with a more 
appropriate image of her goal state, she used an online interactive grapher to explore the 
effects of different values for a, b, c, and d until she had built a cubic function that met all 
conditions of the problem. Her final answer was f (x) = 3x3 – 2x2 – x + 2. She also 
provided the values of the roots and the relative extrema.  
She then explained that with her improved definition of the task, the fact that part 
(b) had no solution became obvious. Despite some rather awkward statements for her 
justification, Julia’s explanation indicated conceptual understanding of the reasoning for 
the not possible solution for part (b). Her main justifications were graphical reasoning 
and the fact that 0a '  and thus, reduce f to a quadratic function. 
  Julia’s discussion of her work during the interim provided additional information 
regarding her epistemological beliefs and SRL processing. To begin, her work on part (a) 
revealed that Julia can successfully employ both rational and empirical problem-solving 
strategies. She established an accurate definition of the task that connected conditions to 
goals, which is indicative of a rational approach to problem solving. Then, armed with 
her logically-based understanding of the problem, she applied empirical means to test her 
assertions. Additionally, she attributed time and access to mathematical resources as the 
most important contributors to her success. By spending a couple of hours of her spare 
time working the problem and attributing time to successful mathematical problem-
solving, Julia certainly demonstrated a belief that difficult mathematical problems may 
require a long duration of time to solve. Her work during the interim between sessions 
also affirmed her high categorization for Belief 5 on the IMBS, which measures the 
degree to which an individual attributes increases in mathematical proficiency to effort 
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(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992). Julia also made a revealing statement regarding the 
relationship between mathematical resources and SRL processing: “Yeah, I realized I 
worked on one path that I knew was not working for me, but I just couldn’t think of 
anything else to do.” In essence, students cannot control strategy use unless they can 
access alternative strategies.   
Session 2. With the application of differentiation problem solved to her 
satisfaction over the interim, Julia moved on to the application of integration problem for 
TA2. She began the session by reading part (a) of the problem for 33 seconds. Then, she 
spent 2 min 33 sec engaged in analysis of the problem conditions and goals. Most of this 
time was spent applying an appropriate heuristic–sketching a graph with a shaded region 
that defined the area in question. She then spent 15 seconds re-reading the problem and 
stated that she did not understand what A meant. The researcher interjected and 22 
seconds were spent making sure that Julia understood that A simply represented the 
bounded area for both parts (a) and (b). Julia then spent 5 min 38 sec engaged in 
productive exploration of the problem space. With the aid of her graphing calculator, this 
phase began with an examination of the effects that various values of m had on the graph 
of the function h. Then, Julia decided to let m = 1 and solve part (a) for this special case. 
In sum, the first 9 min 21 sec were spent developing an appropriate definition of the task, 
establishing goals for the purposes of analyzing and exploring the problem space, and 
transitioning to the next phase of her plan based on informed assessments and conceptual 
justification.
This rational-based demonstration of controlled problem-solving prowess came to 
an abrupt halt and Julia spent the next 14 min 16 sec on a lengthy empirical search for a 
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solution for her special case of part (a) for m = 1. Upon obtaining an accurate area for the 
enclosed region and dividing the area in half, Julia fixed the lower bound of her integral 
to zero and spent the remainder of her time substituting guesses in for an upper bound 
that yielded half of the original area. Although seven instances of monitoring were coded 
during this period, all were related to assessments of the validity of her guesses. So, from 
a purely frequency-based analysis of this portion of her session, it appeared that Julia was 
engaged in performance control processing but a more qualitative assessment revealed 
that she was merely controlling the surface features of a flawed plan. This phase ended 
with her solution of 0.5662036x # , which is fairly accurate for the special case m = 1, 
but the solution did not provide her with a means of generalizing a solution with respect 
to m.
Satisfied with her work, Julia decided to work on part (b) of the application of 
integration problem. She spent 21 seconds reading the problem and then 35 seconds 
engaged in analysis, consisting mainly of sketching the shaded region to be considered. 
Then, failing to note the conceptual significance of the goal of obtaining a horizontal line, 
as opposed to the vertical line for part (a), Julia procedurally mimicked her work from 
part (a) while working on part (b). Thus, the final 8 min 2 sec of her session were spent 
trying to find the equation of a horizontal line by testing x-values, which can only 
represent vertical lines. Additionally, her integral expression for the bounded region was 
not properly set up, so the area that she obtained was inaccurate. With respect to 
forethought, all goal-setting was done with little attention to her current problem-solving 
state. Additionally, this final phase of her session contained only two instances of 
monitoring and both were simply assessing the validity of a proposed upper bound. The 
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session ended with Julia in the middle of guessing an upper bound. Then, she stated, 
“OK, I didn’t like that. I know I was doing something wrong.” This statement is 
indicative of the self-reflection phase of SRL and although the statement is deficit-
focused, the causal attribution was based on her strategy, as opposed to the more 
academically debilitating attributions to ability (Zimmerman, 2000).
Overall, Julia’s TA2 was coded as indicative of a belief in both rational and 
empirical approaches to mathematical problem-solving. Her work logically established 
an appropriate definition of the task for part (a) and thus, was coded as a rational belief in 
problem solving. However, the remainder of her session was deemed an empirical
perusal of the problem space. These results are supported by her high categorizations for 
both the Rational and Empirical scales of the PEP. 
Despite some glimpses of conceptual insight, Julia’s TA2 was coded as indicative 
of a predominantly procedural belief in mathematical problem solving. For example, her 
use of the exact same plan for part (b) that was used in (a), regardless of changes in 
problem conditions, provided a concrete example of this assertion. However, keeping 
with the trend set by Robert and Edwina, Julia reported an idealized conceptual belief in 
mathematical problem solving during her MCI. However, manifestations of a procedural
belief proliferated in her work. Julia verbalized her idealized conceptual belief in her 
MCI, as follows:
I think it’s more important to have a conceptual knowledge of it even if you know 
the procedures, but if you have the conceptual knowledge, you can reinvent the 
procedures.  Like, if you know what’s going on, you can still solve for it. 
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So, there appears to be a fundamental disconnect between Julia’s desired problem-solving 
belief system and her practiced problem-solving belief system.
Additionally, Julia’s confusion regarding a, b, c, d, and m, resulted in a coding of 
a predominantly  unique belief regarding problem solutions. In fact, Julia made the 
following statement during RRI2 when asked what her most significant barrier was to 
success:
The m thing. The variables are the hardest part, I guess. I know math was easy 
until you get to letters and alphabets that are not supposed to be there. But, I just 
didn’t see any way at all to solve for m. They didn’t give you any information 
about m to be able to solve for it. [emphasis added] 
Julia’s expectation that a solution existed for m is indicative of a unique belief. When 
probed to comment further, Julia made a statement that hinted at the source her unique 
and procedural beliefs:
Usually, I’m used to directions giving you, like, here’s the information you need 
to know about it, so then you use that to solve for it. And I’m sure if I was given 
that, then that would have made more sense, but critically thinking . . . 
Julia made a similar statement during her MCI that blamed prior mathematics courses for 
her procedural belief:
Until calculus it didn’t really matter because you would learn something, then you 
would take a test on it, and then you would just drop it. I mean, you would build 
upon certain basic knowledge and that’s what I understood and that kind of thing. 
But then specific things you just learned for a test and then you can just drop it; 
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whereas in calculus, you build on everything you learn which I think has kind of 
helped me though, because you still have to recall back at things you’ve learned. 
So, Julia seemed to indicate that past experiences have given her an expectation of a 
unique solution for variables and sufficient information to develop a procedure to solve 
given problems. Julia cited the calculus as a course that seems to be improving her ability 
to work with abstraction. However, as the following quote from her RRI2 indicates, 
Julia’s confusions continued to persist: 
I think that’s what messed me up in the beginning was that the first day I was 
thinking, OK, there’s a specific answer for a, b, c, and d; that’s the only way it 
works. And then I think once I realized that there were an infinite number of 
answers, it’s not as hard as I thought it was. But, I was surprised because you used 
to, just always, as you’re solving for a variable and usually the variable has a 
given number to it. And that’s why I wasn’t sure if m is a variable and that’s just 
supposed to stay like that and so it has different solutions or if it had a specific 
answer. 
In this single quote, Julia seemed to go full circle from a unique to an arbitrary belief, 
then back to a unique belief.
Think-aloud problem-solving session performance. Julia received nearly full 
credit for the application of differentiation problem, but made little progress on the 
application of integration problem. During TA1, she made little progress on parts (a) and 
(b), but took full advantage of the interim between sessions, developing a full solution for 
both parts. For her efforts, she was awarded the full 20 points for part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem. However, her justification for part (b) was rather 
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vague and incomplete. She rightly stated that as long as a is not zero, making the function 
quadratic, then a cubic can never be concave up on the continuum of real numbers. Then, 
a wild excursion into taking the cubed root of the function and other comments that 
danced around the issue constituted the remainder of her justification. Hence, Julia was 
awarded 17 points for solving part (b) with a partial justification for the answer and thus, 
received a combined score of 37 out of 40 points for the application of differentiation 
problem. 
For part (a) of the application of integration problem, Julia showed early promise, 
but her work only produced an approximation for the special case of m = 1. So, Julia was 
awarded 8 out of 20 points for her efforts. The rationale for the score is that solving the 
area in terms of m and solving a simpler problem with m = 1 is indicative of making some 
progress, but failure to use the simpler problem as a heuristic to move to the general case 
or make other connections to problem conditions hampered further solution efforts. Very 
little progress was made with respect to solving part (b) and the path chosen was 
procedurally identical to part (a), despite the change in goal state. Thus, Julia was 
awarded a score of 1 out of 20 for part (b). Her total score for the application of 
integration problem was 9 out of 40, resulting in a combined score of 46 out of 80 points 
for both problems. 
AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
During the MCI, all participants were asked to comment on the differences in the 
AP Calculus exam preparation problems and the think-aloud problems. Julia responded
as follows:
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The after-school sessions were definitely more conceptual and you had to kind of 
like, I had never seen this stuff before. I had a clue of the basic knowledge but I 
had no clue how to deal with it, and whereas the in-school group was all stuff we 
had been working on this year. So, I knew what to do and it was more procedural; 
you could find stuff from what you knew from the procedure you learned earlier 
in the year. 
Julia’s response provided further justification for categorizing the AP exam practice
problems as “procedures with connections tasks” and the think-aloud problems as “doing 
mathematics tasks” (Stein et al., 2000, p. 16).   
Classroom observation 1. Julia was observed working question 4 from the 2004 
AP Calculus AB (Form B) exam with her partners, Ron and Lee (see Appendix E). This 
problem provided the graph of a derivative for a function f and then presented three 
questions, (a)–(c), about the function f. For part (a), the group had to determine x-
coordinates for the points of inflection of f and provide an explanation for their solution. 
The group worked quickly and quietly, with very little noted interaction. This is 
unfortunate, because this was the only part for which group members had a discrepancy 
in score. Julia received the full two points, but her fellow group members only received 
one point because their explanations were insufficient. Had group monitoring occurred, a 
discussion may have helped to clear up Ron and Lee’s confusions in developing their 
justifications. 
For part (b), the group had to find the absolute extrema for f on a closed interval. 
This part really confused the group; in fact, Julia at one point claimed that it could not be 
solved and that the problem writers should have provided more information. Her 
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requirement of a unique, well-defined function, f, represented a further manifestation of a 
unique belief regarding problem solutions, as described above to explain Julia’s trouble 
dealing with the arbitrary constants in the think-aloud problems. Fortunately for Julia, 
Ron and Lee engaged in a nice mathematical discussion about the problem and developed 
an accurate solution. However, the three group members could not develop a sufficient 
justification, so all got two points out of four.  
 Finally, part (c) defined a function g (x) = x f (x) and required the group to write 
the equation of a tangent line for g at a given point. For this part, the group demonstrated 
much more control. Julia’s actions were coded three times for group monitoring during 
part (c). She was on the receiving end of the most notable monitoring action. The whole 
group had disclosed their progress and upon review, Ron reminded Julia and Lee that the
product rule was required for calculating the derivative of g. Due in part to their 
monitoring, all group members received the full two points for part (c). In sum, Julia 
received 7 points and Ron and Lee received 6 points, resulting in a mean group score of 
6.33 out of 9 possible points. The group outperformed the class, which averaged only 
5.12 points. 
Classroom observation 2. Julia’s second classroom observation occurred while 
working on question 6 from the 2007 AP Calculus AB (Form B) exam with her group 
members (see Appendix E). This question provided students with two ordered pairs for a 
function, f, and then posed four problems, (a)–(d), regarding the function, f, and another 
function, g (x) = f ( f (x)). For part (a), the group had to apply the Mean Value Theorem 
(MVT) to the function f. Although he could not recall the name of the MVT, Lee was 
able to adequately explain the concept to his group members. Then, silent work ensued, 
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with the only further discussion concerning whether continuity had to be explicitly 
shown. Despite a lack of group monitoring and verification, all three group members 
earned the two points for part (a).
Part (b) was similar to part (a), but the difficulty level increased because the MVT 
had to be applied to the derivative of g. Part (b) provided the only evidence of group 
monitoring during the observational period. Julia was the primary instigator, with two 
instances of group monitoring coded during this part of the problem. In the first instance, 
Julia asked Ron how he was working the problem. She received some assistance from 
him in understanding the similarities between parts (a) and (b). Soon after, however, she 
was asking for help again when she disclosed that she was struggling with the 
explanation. The group interactions resulted in a score of two points out of three for all 
members. Each student’s work was accurate, but no one was able to develop an adequate 
explanation using the MVT.   
Once satisfied with part (b), the group moved on to part (c), which dealt with 
concavity of f and g, and worked silently until the end of my observation. This was 
unfortunate for Julia and Lee since they did not earn the full two points. Both students’ 
calculations of the second derivative omitted the product rule. (This is ironic because Ron 
had to remind them of the product rule during their first observation.) Had group 
monitoring occurred, this error would have been noted and Julia and Lee could have 
made corrections. Due to time constraints, the group was unable to work on part (d). In 
sum, Julia and Lee received 5 points and Ron received 6 points, resulting in a mean group 
score of 5.33 out of 9 possible points. Yet again, the group outperformed the class, which 
averaged only 3.14 points. 
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AP Calculus exam preparation performance. Julia was only present for ten of the 
twelve AP Calculus preparation sessions. Additionally, Lee was absent during another 
session. So, the group statistics below contain data from the nine sessions in which her 
group was intact and the overall class statistics contain data from the ten sessions for 
which she was present. Group statistics for the nine problems were as follows: Julia 
averaged 5.00 points, Ron averaged 5.33 points, and Lee averaged 5.67 points. Thus, the 
group’s overall average score for the 9 problems was 5.33 points, resulting in a difference 
between Julia’s average score and her group’s average score of 0.33& points. Julia’s 
overall average performance on the 10 in-class AP Calculus AB practice problems was 
5.30 points. The overall class average for the 10 problems that Julia completed was 4.70, 
resulting in a difference between Julia’s average score and the overall class’ average 
score of 0.60(  points.  
Olivia’s Narrative 
Mathematical Achievement and Questionnaire Data 
Olivia was categorized as a Category II calculus achiever, with an AP Calculus 
AB grade of 90. She was included in the study for her contribution to the quota sample 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), for multiple low scale categorizations, and for being the only 
predominantly metaphorical participant. For the IMBS, Olivia was categorized as 
average for four scales and low for the other two. Her low categorizations were for the
Belief 3 and Belief 6 scales. So, Olivia self-reported non-availing beliefs that conceptual 
understanding is not important as long as performance is maintained and that 
mathematics is not useful in daily life (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992). For the MSLQ, 
Olivia was categorized as average for all scales except Critical Thinking, for which she 
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received a low categorization. Thus, Olivia self-reported a lack of applying prior 
knowledge to new problems and a lack of critically evaluating newly presented content 
(Pintrich et al., 1991).  
Finally, for the PEP, Olivia’s scores for the Rational, Empirical, and Metaphorical
were 105, 105, and 113, respectively. She was categorized as average for the Rational 
and Empirical scales and high for the Metaphorical. As mentioned above, Olivia was the 
only student in the class who was predominantly metaphorical. So, Olivia self-reported 
that she predominantly utilizes symbolism in her cognitive processing and justifies 
knowledge claims via insight and awareness (Royce & Mos, 1980).   
Think-Aloud Sessions 
 Session 1. Olivia worked on the application of differentiation problem for the 
duration of TA1. She began the session by spending 33 seconds reading part (a) of the 
problem, noting conditions, and identifying the goal. Then, she spent 1 min 27 sec 
engaged in analysis of the problem space. During this time, she connected the term root
to the zeroes of the function and the term horizontal tangent to the zeros of the first 
derivative. So, Olivia developed an adequate definition of the task for part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem.  
 The remainder of her work with part (a) amounted to a 21 min 5 sec fruitless 
exploration of the problem space. Early in the exploration, she applied the heuristic draw 
a picture and sketched a graph of the function and its derivative. Not realizing the rich 
connections between her graphs and the problem goal, Olivia then began trying to work 
with the slope intercept and point-slope forms of linear equations, hoping to make some 
connections to the horizontal tangent lines. Shortly after this effort, Olivia turned to the 
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researcher and stated that she had tried everything. The researcher suggested that she 
could move to part (b). After the conversation, she began working with the second 
derivative, which seemed to indicate that she had moved on to part (b). However, 
Olivia’s verbalizations indicated that she was still working on part (a). During her RRI1, 
Olivia clarified my confusions–she had noted that part (b) dealt with concavity and 
decided to use the second derivative to eliminate variables, in this case c. This decision to 
use the second derivative without establishing conceptual connections to part (a), was 
indicative of Olivia’s belief that mathematical problems can be solved by procedural 
means. This finding is supported by her low rating on Belief 3 of the IMBS and her work 
that followed.  
 Upon deciding to use the second derivative, Olivia applied a system of equations 
approach that produced no promising leads for solving for a, b, c, and d. During this 
period, Olivia set no overt goals and she only logged three instances of monitoring. In 
each case, monitoring involved local assessments of her strategy use and indicated that 
she did not feel that her plan was working. Thus, little evidence of the forethought and 
performance control phases of SRL were present during her exploration.  
 Near the end of her exploratory excursion, Olivia turned and spoke to me twice, 
voicing her struggles and lamenting her inability to “get rid of d.” She also stated that she 
wished the problem merely asked for the horizontal tangents, not “all the letters.” Her 
statements further supported the interpretation that her problem-solving belief system was 
mainly procedural-based. Additionally, the confusion with all the letters indicated a 
unique belief regarding problem solutions. Additional triangulation came from her RRI1. 
189
When asked about alternative strategies that she considered, Olivia made the following 
statement:
The only other thing I could do that I guess would make sense is to take a 
derivative and find the max and min and that would be the minimum and that 
would be the maximum [pointing to her sketch]. But when I tried that you just end 
up with variables and letters and it doesn’t simplify anything. 
In this statement, Olivia continued to hold strong to the belief that a unique solution could 
be attained via procedural means.
 At 23 min 25 sec into the session, Olivia moved to part (b) of the application of 
differentiation problem. Oddly enough, there was no overt indication that she read the 
problem or noted the conditions or goal. She engaged in analysis lasting 4 min 11 sec and 
produced a complete solution. The solution was the result of the heuristic draw a picture, 
which in this case, was a sketch of the function and its first two derivatives on the same 
Cartesian plane. With this visual, Olivia easily determined that part (b) was not possible 
and developed a well-written justification for her claim. Thus, despite her lack of success 
on part (a), Olivia ended the session in a positive manner. 
Overall, Olivia’s actions during TA1 were coded as a predominantly empirical
approach to problem solving. Her work with part (b) during the last several minutes of 
the session was purely rational, based on conceptual insight and logical reasoning and 
justification. However, the first 23 min 25 sec of the session were filled with brute force 
algebra and attempts to solve for a, b, c, and d without regard to context or conditions. In 
fact, Olivia confirmed this assessment of her efforts during the RRI1, stating the 
following: 
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Well, I don’t think that’s really legal because I had to make the derivatives equal 
0. So, it’s really not going to be accurate, you know. It was just something to do. 
This statement indicates that Olivia had run out of options and was simply trying to do 
something since she was in the middle of the problem. Finally, Olivia’s verbalizations 
were also indicative of her classification as predominantly metaphorical for the PEP. Her 
references to functions and expressions as you provided a subtle indication that a portion 
of her cognitive processing consisted of constructing “internally generated forms,” which 
symbolized various aspects of the problem space (Royce & Mos, 1980, p. 6). Further and 
more direct evidence of her metaphorical beliefs is discussed below.
Session 2. Olivia did not work on part (a) of the application of differentiation 
problem during the interim between sessions, which only amounted to one evening since 
she was in school during the day. She had a lot of homework to complete, including 
studying for an AP Calculus BC power series quiz. Despite this fact, she felt that no more 
progress would be made and thus, worked on the application of integration problem for 
the duration of TA2. 
Realizing that the application of integration problem involved the area bounded 
by multiple curves, Olivia requested the use of her colored pencils. Then, she spent 3 min 
46 sec engaged in a combination of reading and analyzing part (a). Her analysis of the 
problem space involved sketching and color-coding each function to produce a sketch of 
the bounded region (see Figure 6). Upon completion of her sketch, Olivia engaged in an 
additional 4 min 15 sec of analysis, attempting to establish relationships between the 
problem conditions and goal. During this analysis, two instances of monitoring were 
coded, including the discovery that her graph representing  h (x) = e – mx was incorrect. In 
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terms of developing a definition of the task, Olivia’s sketches provided a clear 
understanding of the conditions of the problem. 
Figure 6. Olivia’s Sketch for Part (a) of the Application of Integration Problem-Solving 
Task.
However, Olivia was unable to tie conditions to the overall goal of the problem, 
as the product of her analysis was an inferred plan (i.e., participants’ actions rather than 
verbalizations provided evidence of a plan) to find the value of c via the equation
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Her problem-solving plan did not adequately connect problem conditions to desired goal 
since an integral with a squared integrand does not produce area and this expression 
would merely find an arbitrary value for c, rather than the value of c corresponding to 
half of the area. Thus, her actions continued to indicate an empirical approach to problem 
solving and an adherence to procedural means for navigating a problem space. 
Olivia then spent 9 min 22 sec in fruitless exploration since she was implementing 
a flawed plan that took her farther from the desired goal state. During this exploration, no 
instances of monitoring were coded and the result of her work was the solution c = 1, 
which makes sense with her setup, but certainly does not produce a bound for half the 
area of A1. Her lack of overt monitoring indicated that Olivia engaged very little in the 
performance control phase of SRL. At this point, which was 17 min 6 sec into the 
session, the researcher noted that Olivia did not have her calculator on her desk and 
reminded her that she could use one. She replied that she did not see the relevance of the 
calculator since it does not “do letters,” but she retrieved it anyway. 
Upon returning with her calculator, Olivia moved to part (b) and engaged in 
reading and analysis similar to that conducted in part (a) for 3 min 19 sec. Thus, yet 
again, she had a color-coded sketch of the bounded region and entered the problem space 
with an adequate and appropriate representation of problem conditions for her definition 
of the task (see Figure 7). Then, Olivia engaged in a 3 min 14 sec productive exploration 
of the problem space. Her first efforts during this exploration involved integral 
expressions with respect to x, which were not conducive for finding equations of 
horizontal lines. Global monitoring of the goal of part (b) indicated to Olivia that 
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integration with respect to y would yield a more desirable integral equation. Thus, at the 
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If the squares are taken from the integrands, this equation produces the correct solution 
for part (b). The presence of the squared integrands provided further indication of 
Olivia’s procedural belief in problem solving, as she was confusing procedures for 
applications of integration involving area and volume. Thus, Olivia navigated more 
productively between the forethought and performance control phases of SRL processing 
for part (b) than part (a).
Troubled by the difficulty of the above integral equation, Olivia turned to the 
researcher after 25 min 54 sec of work and made the following statement: 
If I ask you a question, can you tell me the answer? OK, I know that when you’re 
revolving, you square; if you’re not, you don’t. OK. 
Having apparently answered her own question, she turned and spent 1 min 47 sec 
correcting all of her erroneous work for part (a). The result of her corrections was a 
perfectly set-up equation for finding the solution to part (a):
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Despite having a calculator with a built-in CAS, she spent her final 7 min 35 sec trying to 
solve the equation by hand. Her work contained a multitude of errors, her verbal report 
indicated no overt instances of monitoring, and she never achieved a final solution. 
Additionally, she never corrected her work for part (b), leaving the squared integrands in 
her submitted work. After 34 min 16 sec of work, the researcher asked Olivia if she 
needed more time to complete her current work, but she declined and stated, “I just need 
to stop.” 
Figure 7. Olivia’s Sketch for Part (b) of the Application of Integration Problem-Solving 
Task.
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 Overall, Olivia’s navigation through the problem space for the application of 
integration problem was coded as both rational and empirical. Her early work was 
empirical in nature, resulting in unchecked strings of algebraic expressions that carried 
her farther from the goals of the problems. However, her empirical meanderings 
eventually led to her more rational latter work, which was indicative of a logical 
progression from problem conditions to goal state. As a possible explanation of the 
source of her capacity to work from both epistemological stances, Olivia provided the 
following statement during her RRI2: 
I believe that the public education system teaches students to regurgitate and I 
have never been taught how to think by the school. Fortunate for me, I have pretty 
amazing parents; they’ve really instilled that in me.  I was very fortunate to be 
born with some intelligence and a natural curiosity and a bit of common sense. 
Like I’ve said before, my dad pretty much taught me math–how to do it and you 
know if you don’t know what to do draw a picture, write everything you know, 
just keep doing whatever can possibly relate to it until something clicks. So, that’s 
pretty much what I did. 
So, Olivia cited her parents as her sole source for developing thinking skills and her 
father as the source of her ability to adapt to a problem and utilize heuristic strategies. 
Finally, Olivia’s TA2 provided further support for her metaphorical classification from 
the PEP. The main source of evidence came from her verbalizations while sketching. 
Rather than simply producing a sketch, Olivia assigned a color-code to each one, with 
statements like “You are blue, you are red,” etc. Olivia’s color assignments provided 
further evidence of the subtle cognitive activity of assigning symbols to structures, such 
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as the graphs produced by the functions in the application of integration task (Royce & 
Mos, 1980). 
 Olivia’s work during TA2 provided further support that she held a procedural
belief in mathematical problem solving. The majority of her work indicated that she was 
searching for a familiar process to map onto the problem, rather than considering the 
conceptual ramifications of problem conditions. Her continued use of a squared integrand 
could have been curtailed by examining the dimensionality of the integral, noting that 
solutions would be cubed and thus, not provide the desired area. Additionally, her first 
problem-solving plan applied a property of integration that produces solutions for interior 
bounds and was applied during the previous semester. Her use of this equation to solve 
part (a) provided further indication of a procedural mindset since no conceptual ties can 
be made between problem conditions and her plan.  
 Olivia’s response to whether procedures or concepts are more important to 
problem solving during her MCI provides further insight as to possible sources of her 
adherence to a procedural belief in mathematical problem solving: 
I have to learn the procedures first because I can’t understand the concepts until I 
actually do the problem. And once I do a couple of them and let it sit in the back 
of my mind I can start to get the concepts.  It helps me to know why I’m doing 
what I’m doing but I need to do whatever it is first before I understand why. 
Since the think-aloud problems were novel with respect to Olivia’s current calculus 
functioning level, she was unable to frame them conceptually and thus, reverted to her 
procedural approach. Additionally, Olivia’s stance may be counterproductive to a 
constructivist philosophy of education, which implies that students actively construct 
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conceptual knowledge, as opposed to applying rote-memorized rules and procedures 
(NCTM, 2000). 
 During her RRI2 and MCI, Olivia’s comments indicated conflicting 
interpretations with respect to her beliefs regarding problem solutions. For example, 
when asked how many solutions were possible for part (a) of the application of 
differentiation problem during her RRI2, Olivia stated, “At least one, maybe more. Part 
(a) was not very friendly to me, but there might be more than one cubic that would satisfy 
those conditions.” Her comments indicated openness to an arbitrary belief regarding 
problem solutions and a sophisticated understanding of the role of the arbitrary constants 
a, b, c, and d in producing a family of cubic functions.  
Then, later in the RRI2, Olivia made the following statement when asked a 
similar question about the application of integration problem: 
Depending on what m is, well, it wouldn’t have any effect on c. So, I guess in that 
particular problem, I would say that the variables were pretty much independent, 
obviously m and x are related, but c and m, I didn’t necessarily see a relationship. 
Although her last statement is false, c and m are related, this statement provided further 
evidence that Olivia may hold a more arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions than 
indicated by her TA1.  
 During her MCI, Olivia seemed to revert to a more unique belief, with statements 
indicative of the certainty of a solution path: 
Well, often with problems that have some symbolic representation for a numerical 
value, you can use algebra to isolate them and figure out what the letters or
whatever actually stands for. And so I tried that because I am an algebraic person, 
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I like that, it works, it makes sense, and it didn’t pan out for me in this, so I went 
to a graph and I tried to make some sense of it . . . It was difficult for me to have 
to deal with some conceptual, ideological letter that represented something else 
that I could not apply algebra to. 
So, Olivia seemed to rely on algebra to obtain a solution and when the algebraic
procedures failed to produce a unique solution, she was unable to adapt to the arbitrary
nature of the problem space. It is possible that she is currently developing a more 
arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions, but further examination of such 
development is beyond the scope of the current study. Thus, the contradiction will be 
interpreted as a disconnect between beliefs and practice since Olivia’s actions indicated a 
unique belief but some of her interview quotes indicated an arbitrary belief.   
Think-aloud problem-solving session performance. Olivia made progress on both 
the application of differentiation and application of integration problems. For part (a) of 
the application of differentiation problem, she was unable to make significant progress
beyond establishing that roots are the zeros of a function and horizontal tangents are 
related to the zeros of the derivative of a cubic function. Applying Schoenfeld’s (1982) 
grading scheme, Olivia made little progress on part (a) and was awarded 5 points out of 
20. For part (b) of the application of differentiation problem, Olivia provided a correct 
answer with an appropriate and sophisticated justification, thus earning the full 20 points. 
Overall, Olivia earned 25 out of 40 points for the application of differentiation problem.
For part (a) of the application of integration problem, Olivia eventually developed 
an equation whose solution would have yielded the correct answer. Unfortunately, she 
was unable to solve the equation and did not provide overt justification for her method. 
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Thus, her work indicated an almost solution, which merits a score between 11 and 15 
points. Since her work failed to yield a final answer, she was awarded 12 out of 20 points. 
For part (b), Olivia was on the right track, but never corrected the squared integrands and 
did not make any progress beyond setting up the integral equation. So, Olivia made some 
progress and was awarded a score of 8 out of 20 points. In sum, Olivia earned 20 out of 
40 points for the application of integration problem, resulting in a total of 45 out of 80 
points for her two think-aloud problem-solving sessions. 
AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
During each MCI, participants were asked to comment on the differences in the 
group AP Calculus exam practice session problems and the individual think-aloud 
session problems. Olivia’s comments were as follows:
The problems in the group sessions made more sense. There was more algebra 
and more just applying principles and using procedures that you had to find 
before, like you have this kind of problem this is what you need to do for it, 
versus the problems that I did alone were very conceptual. We hadn’t really done 
anything like that before so it was very new versus the other ones we had done 
before were similar enough.
Olivia’s comments provided further justification for the categorization of the AP exam 
practice problems as “procedures with connections tasks” and the think-aloud session 
problems as “doing mathematics tasks” (Stein et al., 2000, p. 16). 
Classroom observation 1. Olivia was observed working on question 4 from the 
AP Calculus AB 2006 (Form B) exam with her group members, Tim and Jon (see 
Appendix E). This problem provided students with a piecewise-defined, graphical 
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representation for a function describing the rate calories are burned as a person uses an 
exercise machine and posed four problems, (a)–(d). For part (a), students were required to 
calculate the derivative of the function at a given point and indicate units of measure. All 
three group members applied the slope formula since the graph was linear at the given 
point. Unfortunately, no one realized that their answers did not include units. So, despite 
having an accurate numeric solution, all three group members received zero points since 
part (a) was only worth one point. 
 For part (b), students were required to find the time that the function obtained its 
greatest rate on the given interval and provide reasoning for their answer. Based on 
empirically analyzing the graph, Jon made a conjecture as to the answer but then was 
confused since he could not “derive a graph.” He then developed an answer that his group 
members agreed with but over-complicated the problem by trying to use the second 
derivative. To this point, Jon had dominated group planning and interaction, but Olivia 
interceded and both group members developed a plan for obtaining a solution. Upon 
completion, the group members verified their solutions, which were numerically 
accurate. However, this problem required a deep level of analysis and, despite checking 
final solutions, it was obvious that analytical work was not verified by the group. Thus, 
due to incomplete analyses, Tim and Jon received three points, and Olivia received two 
points out of four for part (b). 
For part (c), students were required to find the total number of calories burned 
over a specified time interval. All three group members recognized that this part required 
combining integration and geometric area formulae to calculate total function change. 
Content with conceptual understanding, the group worked silently while calculating the 
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appropriate area. Upon completion, Olivia realized that she misread the problem and 
thought that the problem was asking for average value. Jon examined her work and 
helped her understand the conceptual aspects of the problem. As he was doing so, Tim 
and Jon realized that Olivia had a computational error in her work and were able to 
resolve it. At some point, Tim, who I thought had the correct answer, recorded the 
average value solution as his final answer. Thus, Olivia and Jon received the full two 
points and Tim received one point for part (c). 
 Part (d) introduced a vertical shift to the given function and required students to 
find the value of the vertical shift that would maintain a specified average value. Olivia 
was able to draw on her average value approach that was erroneous for part (c) to help 
Jon with his confusion. Once a plan was established, the group worked until time was 
called and thus, had no means for verifying solutions. Thus, Olivia received one point out 
of two for a perfect setup but no solution, Jon received the full two points for his setup 
with correct solution, and Tim received one point for recording the correct solution with 
an insufficient setup. In sum, Olivia received 5 points, Tim received 6 points, and Jon 
received 7 points, resulting in a mean group score of 6 out of 9 possible points. The group 
outperformed the class, which averaged only 4.90 points. 
Classroom observation 2. For her second observation, Olivia worked on question 
2 from the AP Calculus 2009 (Form B) exam with her group members (see Appendix E). 
The question provided a function that modeled the rate of change of the distance from a 
road to the edge of water during a storm, as well as various other given information, and 
posed four problems, (a)–(d). For part (a), students were required to compute the distance 
between the road and the edge of the water at the end of the storm. Jon suggested this 
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problem was an application of integration. The group agreed and worked silently. Upon 
completion, the members of the group monitored each other’s solutions and verified 
numerical accuracy. However, Jon had not set up his integral expression properly, so he 
only received one point out of two. Olivia and Tim each received the full two points for 
part (a).
 For part (b), students were required to provide an interpretation with proper units 
for the derivative of the function at a given time. Jon immediately complained of issues 
with the necessary units. Once he had finished his interpretation, Jon requested feedback 
from Olivia, who did not respond. Rather than following up with his request, Jon merely 
moved on to the next problem. This is unfortunate, because Olivia crafted an accurate 
interpretation with units and received the full two points for part (b). Jon received only 
one point due to incorrect units and Tim received one point because he had an inaccurate 
interpretation with correct units.
Part (c) required students to determine when the distance between the road and 
the water is decreasing most rapidly during the storm. Jon suggested that the problem was 
an extrema application for the first derivative. Despite its conceptual accuracy, Jon 
questioned his own plan and began arguing for the need of the next derivative. In an 
application of group monitoring, Olivia argued the group back to optimizing the first 
derivative. The group members then worked quietly, but were only calculating relative 
extrema, rather than absolute extrema. Upon completion, Jon identified the relative 
maximum, having misread the problem. This began a lengthy debate between Olivia and 
Jon as to whether the answer should be the relative maximum or minimum. (Neither 
realized that they were only finding relative extrema, instead of absolute extrema.) 
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Despite an animated discussion, the group decided on the relative maximum, which was 
not the correct answer. Since the group was not applying an absolute extrema analysis 
and decided on the wrong solution, each group member received only one point out of 
four for part (c).  
Due to spending a long time on part (c), the group did not attempt part (d) and all 
members received zero points out of two. In sum, Olivia received 5 points, Tim received 
4 points, and Jon received 3 points, resulting in a mean group score of 4 out of 9 possible 
points. Due mainly to the group’s issues with part (c), the class, which averaged 4.73 
points, outperformed the group. 
AP Calculus exam preparation performance. Since Olivia missed five AP exam 
preparation sessions and Tim and Jon missed one AP practice session on the same day, 
all group data contain only the six sessions for which the group was intact. Group 
statistics for the 6 problems were as follows: Olivia averaged 4.67 points, Tim averaged 
4.67 points, and Jon averaged 5.00 points. Thus, the group’s overall average score for the 
6 problems was 4.78 points, resulting in a difference between Olivia’s average score and 
her group’s average score of 0.11&  points. Olivia’s overall average performance on the 7 
in-class AP Calculus AB practice problems for which she was present was 4.86 points. 
The overall class average for the 7 problems that Olivia completed was 5.11, resulting in 




Mathematical Achievement and Questionnaire Data 
Martin was classified as a Category I calculus achiever since his AP Calculus AB
grade was 97. He was included in this study for his contribution to the quota sample
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) and the preponderance of high scale categorizations he 
received. For the IMBS, Martin received three average and three high categorizations. 
The high categorizations were for the Belief 1, Belief 3, and Belief 4 scales. Thus, Martin 
self-reported highly availing beliefs that he can solve difficult mathematics problems 
regardless of duration, conceptual understanding is important in mathematical problem 
solving, and word problems are important in mathematics (Kloosterman & Stage, 1992).  
For the MSLQ, Martin was categorized as high for all scales except for 
Motivation: Extrinsic Goal Orientation and Learning Strategies: Help Seeking. These 
high categorizations imply that he self-reported participation in a multitude of self-
regulatory practices and processes. Unlike the previous four participants, Martin had a 
higher Intrinsic Goal Orientation score (7.0) than Extrinsic Goal Orientation score (6.0), 
indicating the tendency to engage in tasks to be challenged or obtain conceptual mastery. 
His high rating on the Motivation: Task Value scale suggests that Martin was interested 
in tasks in this course and found them important and useful. Martin’s remaining high
categorizations were in the Learning Strategies section of the questionnaire and included 
the Critical Thinking, Metacognitive Self-Regulation, and Peer Learning scales. Thus, 
Martin self-reported that he applies prior knowledge to problems and evaluates new 
content, regulates his cognitive and metacognitive processes, and places value on 
providing and receiving contributions from peers. The Metacognitive Self-Regulation 
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scale is the most comprehensive on the MSLQ and includes twelve items that delve into 
planning, monitoring, and regulating (Pintrich et al., 1991). Thus, Martin’s 
categorizations indicated that he may participate in SRL processing to a higher degree 
than his peers. 
Finally, for the PEP, Martin’s Rational, Empirical, and Metaphorical scale scores 
were 123, 120, and 106, respectively. All of his scores were categorized as high; in fact, 
Martin had the highest score in the class for the Rational scale and the next highest score 
for Empirical scale. Overall, he was profiled as predominantly rational, but with the 
proximity of the scores, a more appropriate categorization may be rational/empirical. So, 
Martin self-reported the tendency to apply logic when justifying knowledge claims and 
use analysis and synthesis for cognitive processing. However, observational and 
perceptual inputs may be utilized by Martin for cognitive processing or justification when 
necessary (Royce & Mos, 1980).   
Think-Aloud Sessions 
 Session 1. For the entirety of TA1, Martin worked on the application of 
differentiation problem. He began by spending 32 seconds reading part (a), noting the 
conditions and the goal of the problem. Then, he spent 3 min 53 sec engaged in analysis,
connecting the first derivative to horizontal tangents and establishing relationships 
between the conditions and the goal. Thus, Martin developed an adequate definition of 
the task to aid in developing solution strategies. This analysis portion of his session was 
also indicative of early signs of processing from the forethought phase of SRL, with one 
instance of prior knowledge activation coded, one code for recycling the goal in working 
memory, and one code for an overt plan. 
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 The overt plan coded during the analysis phase applied the quadratic formula to 
solve for x-coordinates of horizontal tangents, and was a foreshadowing of Martin’s strict 
adherence to a procedural approach to mathematical problem solving during TA1. 
Making little progress with the quadratic formula, Martin embarked on a 26 min 55 sec 
exploration, producing relatively fruitless expressions and equations from the conditions 
in various forms of preparation for a system of equations approach to solve for a, b, c,
and d. The exploratory phase opened with Martin planning to set the derivative equal to 
the function, which has little mathematical meaning, especially in this context.  He later
informed me during his MCI that he recognized that both functions were equal to zero 
and thus, could be set equal to one another. Fortunately, Martin exercised performance 
control over his actions throughout the session. Unique to other participants, he applied 
the monitoring technique self-questioning for most of his local and global assessments, 
with five instances coded during this phase. For example, when assessing the validity of 
setting the derivative and function equal, Martin made the following statement:
I know that zero is equal to the original function and it produces one root. But I 
don’t know if one of those roots is also the horizontal tangents. So if I back track, 
what would I be able to solve down to, anyway? If I continued working that out 
assuming that there is a root actually equal to a horizontal tangent, I mean, that’s 
not going to tell you anything. 
Unfortunately, Martin’s monitoring skills proved insufficient to procedurally solve the 
application of differentiation problem.
After making little progress solving the system by hand, Martin spent the 
remainder of this exploration attempting to use the computer algebra system (CAS) 
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capabilities of his calculator to solve for a, b, c, and d. Ideas ranged from simply solving 
the equations as is to storing the expressions for x obtained from the quadratic formula, 
then substituting these values into the cubic and trying to solve. Despite logging six 
instances of local and global assessments of strategy use and goal state, Martin was 
unable to alter his solution path or transition to another strategy more conducive to 
solution development. 
 Finally, Martin moved to part (b) and spent 23 seconds reading the problem, 
noting conditions and identifying goals. Despite only spending 4 min 35 sec on part (b), 
he had already developed an adequate definition of the task and was beginning to work 
with linear functions. However, time was called before he could advance further.
With respect to epistemology, Martin’s behavior was erratic, directly contrasting
his questionnaire results that were highest in the class for all scales. For example, despite 
demonstrating an arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions by understanding the 
infinitude of possible values for a, b, c, and d, he remained fixated on applying 
procedural techniques that generally produce a single solution. Interview data from his 
RRI1 triangulated this finding: 
I was assuming more than one [solution] for sure. But, to be honest, I thought if 
I’d just start working through the math, I mean, I left it as an open blank whether I 
don’t really know how many solutions there will be. So, I decided not even to 
think about that and rather just work out the math and see if I can start making 
conclusions without the various variables I had. 
Later in the interview, after expressing disdain for guess-and-check as a mathematical 
problem-solving method, Martin bluntly described his mindset during TA1: 
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Looking back at my thought process, I think that I was so determined that there 
wasn’t going to be any guess-and-checking to it. There was going to be a straight 
algorithmic way to approach it rather than, oh well, now that I know this and 
know this, let’s try a couple of values here or here or a range of values. I mean, 
maybe looking back now, that would have been a better idea if I were still 
working on that problem. 
As his comments indicate, Martin realized late in the interview that a mixture of 
logically-based mathematical problem-solving techniques may be advantageous 
depending on the context. Despite overt instances of monitoring, Martin’s TA1 would be 
best described as a series of applications of fruitless empirical explorations. 
Session 2. Martin made up for his lack of success in TA1 by displaying a flurry of 
mathematical problem-solving prowess during TA2. With extracurricular demands, 
homework, and only one evening between sessions, he was unable to even look at the 
problem during the interim between sessions. So, Martin requested to have both problems 
on the table simultaneously and work intermittently between the problems. He began 
TA2 by reading part (a) of the application of integration problem for 48 seconds, noting 
conditions and identifying the goal. Then, Martin spent 36 seconds engaged in analysis of 
the problem space, establishing relationships between the conditions and the goal. Based 
on his analysis, Martin developed a plan to find the area, divide it by two, and use the 
upper bound of the integral to find an equation for the vertical line. He spent 6 min 53 sec 
implementing this plan. Martin required only one instance of monitoring during the 
implementation and seemed perfectly comfortable with the technique that he was 
applying. Except for two minor errors that did cost him accuracy, he employed his 
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method flawlessly. Had he spent some time in verification, Martin may have received full 
credit.
 Upon completion of part (a), Martin spent 19 seconds reading part (b) of the 
application of integration problem. From reading, Martin moved to a 4 min 8 sec analysis
episode and made significant progress, finding the area of the bounded region with 
precision. During this phase, he demonstrated excellent problem-solving control by 
catching an error in his original graph. Martin had inadvertently misplaced one of the 
boundaries and was prepared to set up an improper integral, or integral over an 
unbounded region, when he decided to graph the region on his calculator. Upon typing 
the boundaries into the calculator, Martin caught his error and was able to move forward 
with a bounded region.  
Martin failed to read the problem carefully and assumed that part (b) was similar 
to part (a). Thus, he set up an integral with respect to x and attempted to find an equation 
of a vertical line separating the area into two parts, despite the directions requesting a 
horizontal line. This error led to a 7 min 16 sec fruitless exploration ending with an un-
solvable equation since the area of the region increases without bound horizontally as m
approaches zero. The most troublesome aspect of this phase was the lack of self-
monitoring; Martin only monitored his performance two times during the 
implementation, never re-read the problem, and moved through transitional phases with 
no regard to their effect on the goal of the problem. For this reason, his problem-solving 
practices were coded as rational and conceptual for part (a) since he demonstrated 
understanding of the underlying principles of the problem and translated them to 
mathematical output. However, his blind perception that part (b) was the same type of 
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problem resulted in empirical and procedural coding for his problem-solving efforts for 
part (b). 
Stumped by the lack of a solution for part (b) of the application of integration 
problem, Martin spent 19 seconds reading part (b) of the application of differentiation 
problem. Then, he spent 2 min 59 sec engaged in analysis of the conditions of the 
problem, tying the second derivative to concavity and brainstorming ways to make linear 
functions always positive, which is the crux of the problem. 
Realizing that time was not on his side, Martin moved on to part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem without re-reading the instructions. He spent 4 min 
33 sec in productive exploration that resulted in a solution. During this phase, he 
attempted to use the CAS on his calculator one more time, but without success. 
Monitoring kept him from continuing down this erroneous path. Then, he attempted to 
build a cubic function based on conceptual understanding and developed the function           
f (x) = –3x3 + 4x2 +2x + 1, which meets all of the conditions of the problem. Some of the 
logic leading to his solution was flawed, resulting in a lower score for justification.
Satisfied with his result for part (a) of the application of differentiation problem, 
Martin spent 2 min 41 sec in analysis and verification of part (b) of the application of 
differentiation problem. His analysis of the problem space led him to the conclusion that 
a linear function with non-zero, defined slope cannot be positive on its entire domain. 
Upon verification, Martin reported his answer and received full credit for this solution. 
 For his final 4 min 31 sec, Martin engaged in exploration and analysis of part (b) 
of the application of integration problem, since he still had no solution to report. Despite
analyzing his sketches and making one more global assessment of his goal state, Martin 
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failed to note that he was not even answering the correct question. Thus, his session 
ended with him still pondering this final, incomplete problem. 
In terms of epistemological beliefs, Martin’s received an overall categorization of 
rational/empirical for his beliefs in mathematical problem solving. His navigation of the 
problem space included both logically-based problem solving plans and perceptually-
based explorations. Martin’s RRI2 and MCI elicited findings regarding two beliefs. First, 
despite appearing to be comfortable with the arbitrary constants in both problems, Martin 
cited them as a major barrier to problem-solving success during his RRI2: 
Conceptually [the problems] are not easy by any means but I think even harder 
than that is just working with all the variables and all the arbitrary m and I guess 
in this case the arbitrary a, b, c, and d. Really just trying to keep up with it is the 
most difficult.
Earlier in the interview, he made some statements that indicated a possible source of 
these troubles:
Well, originally when I did 1 (a) [application of differentiation problem], 
especially yesterday, I remember thinking, and this is bad thinking on me, but I
remember thinking you wouldn’t give me a question in which there is more than 
one answer. But I think that was more of me thinking of what kind of problem 
you would give me rather than looking at the actual problem itself.   
Probed as to what gave him the impression that the problem may have only one solution, 
Martin stated:
Oh, I don’t know, I just always feel a lot of times in math they try and focus and 
give you a systematic way to do it which would mean there is only one answer. 
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Martin’s expressions indicate, despite a certain level of comfort in the arbitrary nature of 
problem solutions, a unique belief may manifest in students’ mathematical problem-
solving practices based on past experiences in mathematics courses. 
Second, Martin’s final comment above indicated that an overt focus on 
procedural methods of navigating problem spaces may be the culprit for his confusions. 
His RCI comments provided triangulation for such an assertion. When asked whether 
knowing procedures or understanding concepts is more important to problem-solving 
success, he made the following statement:
I would say understanding underlying concepts which would lead you hopefully 
to a certain set of steps; that would be my guess. . . conceptual knowledge, I think, 
leads to the procedural knowledge, or the procedural steps generally to solve the 
problem. 
So, despite emphasizing the conceptual, Martin continued to indicate a desire for 
procedures. When probed as to the sources of his desire to have a more procedural, or 
direct, approach, Martin responded:
Because I felt that if I had just done the guess-and-check thing I wasn’t really 
justifying anything, I really was just kind of guess-and-checking. Where if I had 
shown work for it at least I would have work behind it to explain how I got to that 
solution, which I like better.
So, Martin indicated the need for a procedurally-based, as opposed to a conceptually-
based, justification for his mathematical work. It appears that a disconnect between an 
ideally conceptual belief in mathematical problem-solving and the realized procedural 
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manifestation of problem-solving habits exists in high-achieving, advanced mathematics 
students.   
Think-aloud problem-solving session performance. Martin received nearly full 
credit for both parts of the application of differentiation problem and part (a) of the 
application of integration problem. During the second session, Martin was able to 
adequately solve part (a) of the application of differentiation problem. However, his 
justification was insufficient; thus, based on Schoenfeld’s (1982) grading scheme, he was 
awarded 17 points for part (a) of the application of differentiation problem. Martin’s 
solution with justification for part (b) of the application of differentiation problem was 
perfect. Hence, Martin was awarded the full 20 points for solving part (b) and earned a 
combined score of 37 out of 40 points for the application of differentiation problem. 
For part (a) of the application of integration problem, Martin worked like an 
expert. Very little control was applied and his methods were flawless. Unfortunately, he 
made two careless errors that affected the final solution. Thus, Martin was awarded 18 
out of 20 points for his efforts. Finally, Martin made some progress on part (b) but the 
solution path chosen was procedurally identical to part (a) despite the change in goal 
state. However, his area was accurate and with respect to m. If he had simply noted the 
need for a horizontal line, he may have been able to solve the problem. Thus, Martin was 
awarded a score of 10 out of 20 points for part (b). His total score for the application of 
integration problem was 28 out of 40, resulting in a combined total of 65 out of 80 points 
for both problems. 
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AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
 During the MCI, each participant was asked to comment on the differences in the 
AP Calculus exam preparation session problems and the think-aloud session problems. 
Martin stated that the think-aloud session problems were “more difficult” and that he 
could not “remember any AP problems either in groups or in class that I didn’t really 
understand what I was doing.” Unfortunately, despite noting the difficulty-level 
differences and citing the procedural aspects of the AP exam practice problems, Martin 
provided insufficient detail for providing additional justification for categorizations of the 
tasks based on Stein et al.’s (2000) system. 
 Classroom observation 1. Martin was observed working on question 5 from the 
AP Calculus AB 2005 (Form B) exam with his partners, Roy and Mae (see Appendix E). 
The question required students to work with an implicitly-defined relation and solve four 
problems, (a)–(d). For part (a), students were to show that the derivative of the implicit 
relation was equal to a given expression. The group finished this part so quickly that they 
were working on part (b) when the researcher began the observation. Upon inspecting 
solutions, things must have gone well because all three group members earned the full 
two points. 
For part (b), students had to find all points such that the slope of the curve equals 
one-half. Mae presented an idea to the group, but Martin pointed out a flaw in her plan 
and suggested that the group set the derivative from part (a) equal to one-half and solve 
for one of the variables. Martin and Mae employed this plan but soon realized the 
cumbersome algebra in store for them. At this point, Martin requested feedback from 
Roy, who demonstrated an alternative solution path. All three agreed with the new plan, 
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which was similar to Martin’s plan but with fewer algebraic steps. All three group 
members successfully solved for x, but made an error in solving for y. Thus, each group 
member received one out of the possible two points for part (b). 
 For part (c), students were to show that the curve had no points such that the 
tangent was horizontal. Mae was unable to recall the definition of a horizontal tangent but 
Martin was able to provide a conceptual explanation for her. Then, all group members 
appeared to be working on the problem. Providing an overt example of group monitoring, 
Roy noted that Martin had set the denominator equal to zero instead of the numerator and 
saved him a costly error. Despite the discussions engaged by Martin and Roy, Mae was 
still unable to make any progress with part (c). Eventually, Martin simply explained 
verbatim how to show that the curve can have no horizontal tangents so the group could 
move on. All three group members received the full two points for part (c). 
For part (d), x and y were defined as functions of t, additional information was 
provided, and students were asked to find the derivative of x with respect to t at a given 
point. The entire group was stumped for several minutes and Roy was literally scratching 
his head. None of them saw the connection to related rates. Fortunately, Martin, in an 
expression of critical-thinking genius, developed a plan to differentiate all variables with 
respect to t at the given point. (He had essentially developed the concept of related rates 
without realizing it!) His fellow group members had difficulty following him. Roy 
decided to work independently and this decision cost him as he only earned one point out 
of three. Mae probed Martin, who provided a sufficient explanation for her to earn two 
points out of three. Despite attempting to verify his solution, Martin’s stroke of genius 
only yielded him two points out of three, as he had two arithmetic errors and thus, an 
216
incorrect final solution. In sum, Martin and Mae received 7 points and Roy received 6 
points, resulting in a mean group score of 6.67 out of 9 possible points. The group 
outperformed the class, which averaged 5.85 points. 
Classroom observation 2.  During his second observation, Martin worked on 
question 1 from the AP Calculus AB 2009 exam with his group members (see Appendix 
E). In direct contrast to the first observation, this observation is best described as three 
students working independently on a problem and occasionally discussing their thoughts. 
The question provided a piecewise-linear graph representing the velocity of a student’s 
bicycle as she rides to school and posed four problems, (a)–(d). For part (a), students 
were required to find the acceleration of the bike at a given time with appropriate units of 
measure. Martin and Roy immediately recognized that differentiation was necessary and 
set to work calculating the slope of the linear piece containing the given time. Mae 
walked in a little late and had to catch up with her partners. In the first example of the 
lack of group unity, each group member received one point out of two for part (a) but all 
for different reasons. Martin and Roy indicated incorrect units with differing errors. If 
they had participated in group monitoring, they may have reconciled the issue. Mae had 
correct units, which she did not share with the group but made a calculation error that 
was not monitored. 
For part (b), students were required to interpret the meaning of the integral of the 
absolute value of the velocity function over a give interval and then find the value of the 
integral. Yet again, the group failed to monitor or verify each other’s interpretations and 
this cost Martin, as he excluded the time interval from his answer. Ironically, Mae could 
not recall whether the integral produced total distance or displacement and upon asking 
217
for help, received a good explanation of the conceptual differences in distance and 
displacement from Martin, and earned a point that Martin himself did not receive. For the 
calculation, Martin presented the plan to use geometric formulas to calculate the integral.
Everyone assented and worked quietly calculating the area. Upon completion, Martin 
asked the group if they got 1.8 as an answer, but everyone had obtained different results. 
Upon inspection, Martin and Roy determined that the error involved the scale of the 
graph; the horizontal scaling was one unit, but the vertical scaling was 0.1 units. So, Roy 
and Mae re-calculated their areas. Mae checked her solution with Martin and found that 
she was still slightly inaccurate. She mumbled something under her breath about just 
leaving it. Upon checking her work, it was confirmed that she had not corrected the error. 
So, for part (b), Martin earned one point out of two due to his incomplete interpretation of 
the integral, Roy earned the full two points, and Mae earned one point since she did not 
correct her erroneous calculation of the integral. 
Part (c) required students to determine the time at which the student returned 
home to retrieve her calculus homework and provide a reason for their answer. At time t
= 2, the graph indicated a change in velocity from positive to negative, demonstrating a 
change in direction. The group had no noticeable discussions of this part and simply 
worked quietly. As a result, all group members determined the correct answer but Mae’s 
reasoning was inaccurate. So, Martin and Roy received the full two points and Mae 
received one point for part (c). 
 Part (d) introduced another student riding his bike to school with a specific 
function, rather than a piecewise graphical representation, describing the velocity of the 
bike. Students were required to determine which student lived closer to the school. 
218
Martin presented the plan to compare both students’ displacements, rather than distances, 
which was an accurate conceptualization of the problem. Students then struggled with 
rectifying the change in direction that resulted from the first student’s bike trip. 
Eventually, Martin and Roy figured out a technique to find the first students’ distance and 
were able to complete the problem. Despite receiving help from Martin, Mae was 
unsuccessful in her solution for part (d) and only received one point out of three. Roy 
received the full three points since his integrals were properly set up, calculated, and the 
results interpreted. Martin received two points out of three since he made all the 
calculations appropriately but misinterpreted his results and made the wrong conclusion. 
So, the session ended as it began, with lack of group monitoring resulting in three 
different scores for a group of students supposedly working together. In sum, Martin 
received 6 points, Roy received 8 points, and Mae received 4 points, resulting in a mean 
group score of 6 out of 9 possible points. Due in large part to a lack of group monitoring, 
the class, which averaged 7.33 points, outperformed the group. 
 AP Calculus exam preparation performance. Since Martin and Mae missed the 
same two AP practice sessions, all group and overall class data contain only the ten 
sessions for which the group was intact. Group statistics for the ten problems were as 
follows: Martin averaged 6.10 points, Roy averaged 6.60 points, and Mae averaged 4.50 
points. Thus, the group’s overall average score for the 10 problems was 5.73 points, 
resulting in a difference between Martin’s average score and his group’s average score of 
0.37( . The overall class average for the 10 problems that Martin completed was 4.95, 
resulting in a difference between Martin’s average score and the overall class’ average 
score of 1.15(  points.  
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Cameron’s Narrative
Mathematical Achievement and Questionnaire Data  
 Cameron was the upper-bound maximum variation participant (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) based on his grade of 100 in AP Calculus AB. His grade was the 
highest among students from all sections of AP Calculus AB offered at the school, 
obviously making him a Category I calculus achiever. Cameron also had a very diverse 
array of categorizations from the questionnaires. For the IMBS, Cameron had one low,
three average, and two high categorizations. His low categorization was for the scale 
Belief 5, implying that he self-reported the non-availing belief that mathematical 
knowledge is innate and hard work may not produce mathematical proficiency. His two 
high categorizations were for the Belief 1 and Belief 4 scales, indicating that he self-
reported the availing belief that he could solve difficult mathematical problems regardless 
of duration, and word problems are important to mathematics, respectively (Kloosterman 
& Stage, 1992). 
 For the MSLQ, Cameron was categorized as low for one scale, average for three, 
and high for three. His low categorization was for the scale Learning Strategies: Help 
Seeking, indicating that Cameron self-reported placing little value on seeking help from 
outside sources. His three high categorizations were for Motivation: Intrinsic Goal 
Orientation, Motivation: Task Value, and Learning Strategies: Critical Thinking. 
Congruent with Martin and in opposition to the other participants, Cameron scored higher 
on Intrinsic Goal Orientation (6.5) than Extrinsic Goal Orientation (5.5), indicating the 
tendency to engage in tasks for the purposes of mastering and understanding concepts. 
His other high categorizations, Task Value and Critical Thinking, indicate that Cameron 
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self-reported being interested and seeing importance in tasks for this course, and in 
applying prior knowledge to problems and critically evaluating content presented in this 
course, respectively (Pintrich et al., 1991).
Finally, for the PEP, Cameron’s scores for the Rational, Empirical, and 
Metaphorical scales were 110, 110, and 67, respectively. He was categorized as average
for the Rational and Empirical scales and low for the metaphorical scale. In fact, 
Cameron’s metaphorical score was lowest in the class. Due to obtaining the exact same 
score for both scales, Cameron was categorized as rational/empirical. This categorization 
implies that Cameron self-reported giving equal credence to analysis, synthesis, and logic 
(rational), and observation and perception (empirical) for cognitive processing and 
justifying knowledge claims. The low categorization assigned to the Metaphorical scale 
indicates that Cameron gives little credence to insight, awareness, and symbolism as 
means for cognitive processing and justifying knowledge (Royce & Mos, 1980). 
Think-Aloud Sessions 
 Session 1. During TA1, Cameron spent all of his time working on the application 
of differentiation problem. He began TA1 by reading both parts (a) and (b) for 42 
seconds and then spending 1 min 30 sec engaged in analysis of the conditions and goals 
of part (a) of the problem. During his analysis, Cameron established accurate and 
appropriate relationships between problem conditions and goals by applying the restate 
the problem and setting up equations heuristics, enacting prior knowledge, and recycling 
the goal in working memory. Thus, Cameron developed a definition of the task that 
allowed for establishment of initial goals that would inform the forethought phase of SRL 
processing. From this analysis phase, Cameron shifted to a rather fruitless exploration of 
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the quadratic formula as a means for finding the x-coordinates of the horizontal tangents
that lasted 1 min 18 sec. An earlier global assessment indicated that he doubted the 
usefulness of this idea. The exploration resulted in an expression for x dependent upon 
the variables a, b, and c.
Then Cameron assessed the current state of the problem and established a plan to 
“create values” for a, b, c, and d. This decision made in the forethought phase of SRL 
processing proved to be the most important to his successful navigation through the 
problem space. The ensuing 14 min 2 sec was comprised of an elegantly developed and 
successfully implemented solution and verification for part (a). To use his own words, 
Cameron was “working backwards,” which is a useful heuristic, by “creating arbitrary 
points.” He began this process by assigning an x-coordinate to the single point of 
inflection that he had logically deduced must exist. Since the second derivative still
contained two unknowns, a and b, he arbitrarily assigned a = 1 so he could solve for b.
Then, using a combination of rational logic and empirical substitutions, Cameron used 
the first derivative to find an appropriate value for c and then assigned a value to d that 
lifted the function above the x-axis.
During this implementation, six instances of local assessment of strategy use and 
two instances of global assessment toward goal state were coded and led to transitions 
that were purposeful and productive. It should be noted that, although successful, 
Cameron’s problem-solving path was not seamless; his ability to control erroneous and 
unforeseen results during the performance control phase of SRL was crucial to his 
success. For example, when solving for c, Cameron had established two x-values for his 
horizontal tangents, but substituting the x-values resulted in two different c values. The 
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reason for this rather strange occurrence is that he had correctly set his horizontal 
tangents equidistant from the point of inflection but made a minor arithmetic error when 
solving an equation. Spending only seconds contemplating this issue, Cameron decided 
that the best option would be to accept one of the c-values and continue working the 
problem. Thus, control kept him from spending too much time focusing on issues that 
had no bearing on the overall goal state of the problem. During verification, Cameron 
used his graphing calculator to check that his solution, which was f (x) = x3 – 3x2 – 9x +
28, met the conditions of the problem.  
Satisfied with his solution for part (a), Cameron spent 16 seconds re-reading part 
(b) and then spent 1 min 8 sec engaged in analysis of the second derivative. Then, 
Cameron developed an argument that part (b) was not possible based on the linear 
qualities of the second derivative and verified his result by re-reading his answer. The 
solution and verification of part (b) lasted 3 min 31 sec. No control was needed because 
Cameron conceptually understood the relationship between goals and conditions to the 
point that strategy use was unnecessary.
In terms of epistemological beliefs, Cameron’s navigation through TA1 was 
coded as predominantly rational but with evidence that an empirical belief in 
mathematical problem solving is important as well. This result is supported by 
Cameron’s scores on the Rational and Empirical scales of the PEP. Additional support 
includes his solution strategy for part (a), which was based simultaneously on conceptual 
understanding and arbitrary assignments of values to variables. Additionally, a strict 
adherence to the belief in conceptually solving mathematical problems pervaded the 
session. There was little evidence of prescription or procedure during the plan and 
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implementation phase of part (a). Rather, Cameron’s navigation of the problem space 
consisted of decisions based on conceptual insights and transitions applied in light of 
local and global assessments of his strategy.   
Cameron’s work during TA1 was also indicative of a belief that knowledge is 
interrelated. For example, he was the only participant to consider the second derivative 
and points of inflection while developing a strategy to solve part (a). His consideration of 
the information inherent in the second derivative provided him with another equation to 
work with, a point (of inflection) from which to develop a function, and the Second 
Derivative Test to justify his extrema. Finally, Cameron’s work and RRI1 provided 
evidence of an arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions. Within this specific context, 
this belief dimension is representative of the degree of acceptance that multiple 
representations may exist for the constants contained in both problems. Overt evidence of 
Cameron’s arbitrary belief is represented by the following quotes from his RRI1: “When 
I first read the question I saw all the variables, a, b, c, and d, that left it up for grabs;” and 
“I realized that there were a lot of possibilities here so I could start making arbitrary 
assumptions.” Summarily, Cameron demonstrated an availing belief in mathematical 
problem solving. 
Session 2. Having successfully solved the application of differentiation problem 
during TA1, Cameron spent all of TA2 working on the application of integration 
problem. Cameron began TA2 by spending 52 seconds reading the problem and then 58 
seconds engaged in analysis. The analysis portion of this phase of the session involved 
sketching a graph of the shaded region and establishing relationships between conditions 
and goals. So, as in TA1, Cameron entered the forethought and performance control
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phases of SRL processing with an accurate definition of the task. Following analysis, 
Cameron embarked on a 58-second, productive exploration that resulted in obtaining the 
area of the bounded region for part (a). However, upon global assessment, Cameron 
dismissed this result as unnecessary based on the plan he had in mind.
 Recognizing the conceptual significance of the bounds of an integral in solving 
for area, Cameron determined the following equation to be the most appropriate means 
for solving the problem: 
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 He followed this plan to success over a 5 min 2 sec implementation phase. The execution 
of the plan was so precise that little monitoring was required; hence, little evidence of 
performance control was coded. In fact, only three instances of locally assessing strategy 
use and three instances of globally assessing progress toward goals were coded. In the 
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He then used the CAS capabilities of his calculator to verify his result by setting both 
definite integrals equal to each other and obtaining the word true. 
 Cameron’s work for part (b) began by re-reading the problem for 17 seconds, 
then spending 1 min 20 sec engaged in analysis. During this analysis phase, he sketched 
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the appropriate region and more importantly noted the importance of re-writing h (x) as a 
function of y to facilitate finding an equation for the horizontal line. Then, appropriately 
using the heuristic of recalling a similar problem, he applied his plan for part (a), but 
with respect to y, and developed a solution in 7 min 32 sec. It should be noted that his 
plan would not have been successful had he not re-written h as a function of y.
Additionally, Cameron monitored his actions, logging seven instances of locally 
assessing his strategy and three instances of globally assessing his goal state. The most 
intriguing assessment occurred as Cameron neared the end of implementing his problem-
solving plan. He had been solving by hand but reached an unsolvable equation and used 
the CAS to find the solution. As he did so, he realized that the solution was to be unique 
(i.e., not related to m) and this caused him to consider the plausibility of his solution. 
Once Cameron had a solution, 0.6348108y 6 , he spent his final 3 min 51 sec verifying it
in the same manner as part (a). Up to the end, Cameron was trying to convince himself 
that one unique solution was plausible for part (b).
From an epistemological perspective, multiple findings emerged from Cameron’s 
TA2 and RRI2. To begin, Cameron’s navigation of the problem space was coded as 
completely rational throughout. Every thought and action was logically-based and 
grounded in the integral calculus. Consequently, the problem-solving session was also 
coded as exhibiting a predominantly conceptual belief in mathematical problem-solving 
and the interrelated nature of knowledge. These beliefs were evident when Cameron 
transitioned from using the area in part (a) to set up an integral equation. This action 
demonstrated a deviation from procedure, which would typically lead to a numeric value 
for the area, to a more sophisticated and contextual understanding of conceptual aspects 
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of the conditions and goals of the problem. Cameron confirmed this interpretation during 
his MCI, as demonstrated by the following excerpt of his answer to whether knowing 
procedures or understanding concepts is more important to problem solving: 
In a conceptual understanding, you can not only apply it to any of the cases but 
also apply it to cases that you haven’t been taught a procedure for. You can at 
least give it a try and have a better shot at going into the unknown. And if you’ve 
just known procedures, then you will not be able to take that outside. 
Finally, Cameron’s session also indicated an arbitrary belief regarding problem 
solutions. The most informative evidence of this arbitrary belief was Cameron’s reaction 
to the unique solution obtained for part (b) during TA2: “Am I going to get a value here? 
That’s odd. Uh, well let me keep going and I will ponder that later.” Later in the session 
while verifying his solution, he was still perplexed by the unique solution: “I still think 
it’s weird that I’m getting that number answer for something when not everything is 
defined.” These statements indicated that Cameron understood the effect that the constant 
m typically has on a problem of this nature. Thus, he was not expecting a unique solution 
and upon receiving one, questioned its validity.  
 During his RRI2, Cameron made the following statement: 
And then with 2 (a) and (b), because there was this m, I was expecting a solution 
that would have ms in it. So that it wouldn’t be an exact value; it would be a 
variable answer kind of thing. So with (a) my expectations were met, and then 
with (b) it surprised me that I got a numerical answer as opposed to some 
expression involving m.
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Thus, Cameron seemed to hold a strong belief in the arbitrary nature of the constants and 
their differing roles in the problems analyzed in this study. When probed during his MCI, 
Cameron was unable to identify the source of his arbitrary belief, but he did concur that 
previous mathematics courses did not prepare him adequately for such abstractions by 
stating, “Well, I have actually noticed, now that you’ve mentioned it, but all the previous 
math classes when we have a variable we solve for it and it eventually becomes a number 
and never any arbitrary constants and general solutions.” 
Think-aloud problem-solving session performance. Cameron was the only 
participant to earn the full 80 points for the given problems. Additionally, he successfully 
solved both problems within the time constraints of the sessions, solving the application 
of differentiation problem in 22 min 27 sec and the application of integration problem in 
24 min 19 sec. Despite two minor errors, all four final solutions were accurate and 
adequately and conceptually justified. 
AP Calculus Exam Preparation 
During the MCI, each participant was asked to comment on the differences 
between the in-class, AP Calculus exam preparation session problems and the after-
school, think-aloud session problems. Cameron responded with the following: 
The practice problems we did in class, even thought they were AP questions, were 
just more stuff we had learned, just taking our knowledge and applying it to just a 
little problem; whereas the afternoon sessions were a little more outside the box, 
let’s think a little more. And it has to be the AP questions that they need to focus 
on the knowledge you currently have and test the knowledge we have, as opposed 
to trying to build new knowledge. 
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So, Cameron’s response provides further justification for categorizing the AP Calculus 
exam preparation session problems as “procedures with connections tasks” and the think-
aloud session problems as “doing mathematics tasks” (Stein et al., 2000, p.16). 
Classroom observation 1. Cameron was observed working on question 2 of the 
AP Calculus AB 2003 (Form B) exam with his partners, Jim and Ned (see Appendix E). 
The question provided functions describing the rates heating oil is pumped into and 
removed from a tank. Four problems, (a)–(d), were posed based on the given information. 
For part (a), students had to find the total amount of oil pumped into the tank over a give 
time period. The group simply began working quietly on the problem and once finished 
demonstrated group verification by checking one another’s answers. During verification, 
Jim pointed out to Cameron that he was missing part of the function in his calculation and 
thus, had an incorrect answer. However, no one realized that Ned had only recorded two 
decimal places of accuracy, thus he lost a point. For part (a), Jim and Cameron received 
the full two points and Ned received one point. 
 For part (b), the group determined whether the level of oil was increasing or 
decreasing at a certain time. For this part, Cameron’s group monitoring practices came to 
Jim’s aid. Both began by assuming a derivative was required, but upon re-reading, 
Cameron realized that the functions were already providing rates. After some 
calculations, the group, yet again, took time to verify solutions and the result was that all 
three received the full one point.
As soon as Jim and Cameron read part (c), both students knew that an initial 
condition integral expression was required. As with the first two parts, Ned provided little 
input and simply assented and applied Jim and Cameron’s plan. All worked quietly, until 
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Ned informed the group that he could not input the integral expression into his calculator. 
Jim and Cameron helped him clear up the calculator problems. Then Jim discussed the 
conceptual meaning behind the initial condition and integration performed. Despite this 
showing of group monitoring, Ned did not set up the integral properly. Thus, Jim and 
Cameron received the full three points and Ned received two points for part (c). 
None of the students recalled the necessary conceptual knowledge to solve the 
absolute extrema problem presented in part (d). In fact, Cameron’s journal even indicated 
a plan to apply relative extrema techniques. The group spent a lot of time quietly reading 
and discussing this problem but was never able to get past considering relative extrema. 
For this reason and because time was called, Ned and Cameron received one point and 
Jim received zero points out of three. In sum, Cameron received 7 points, Jim received 6 
points, and Ned received 5 points, resulting in a mean group score of 6 out of 9 possible 
points. The group outperformed the class, which averaged only 4.53 points. 
Classroom observation 2. During his second observation, Cameron worked on 
question 5 from the AP Calculus AB 2007 (Form B) exam (see Appendix E). The 
question posed four problems, (a)–(d), based on a given, non-separable differential 
equation. For part (a), students simply had to sketch a slope field for the differential 
equation. The group worked silently on this part and no one showed signs of 
misunderstanding the concept. However, thanks to group monitoring, Cameron caught an 
error made by Ned while the group was verifying solutions. All three group members 
earned the full two points for part (a). 
 Part (b) required students to find the second derivative and discuss the concavity 
of the solution curves to the differential equation. Yet again, Jim and Cameron 
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formulated a plan for solution and Ned merely assented and followed along. However, 
during implementation, Jim was unable to rectify the dy dx remaining in the expression 
for the second derivative. In another example of group monitoring, Cameron pointed out 
the substitution provided by the given information. At this point, the group got very 
confused, as Jim thought that (b) was finished and moved on to (c) and Ned attempted to 
continue following along. Cameron straightened the group out by reminding them that 
part (b) had a second question. Thus, Cameron’s focus on the definition of the task and 
goal state had a heavy influence on group performance. For part (b), all three group 
members earned the full three points.   
 Since he had moved on earlier, Jim knew that part (c) required the use of the 
Second Derivative Test to determine whether a given solution to the differential equation 
contained a relative extrema value at a given point. Based on this plan, Jim and Cameron 
began working but Ned could not recall how to apply the Second Derivative Test. Thus, 
Cameron explained the concept of the Second Derivative Test and its application to the 
given context. After completing his work, Cameron began work on part (d), but Jim made 
him stop so the group could verify solutions. All three group members earned the full two 
points for part (c).
 The group was truly stumped by part (d), which required them to find values for 
m and b such that y mx b# (  would be a solution for the differential equation. Jim and 
Cameron discussed the problem extensively, with the most important instance of group 
monitoring occurring when Cameron stifled Jim’s desire to solve using separation of 
variables. Ned interrupted the deep discussion to ask which part the group was working 
on, clearly showing that he was unable to follow along. Then, Ned realized that his 
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solution for part (c) was incorrect and Cameron re-explained the concept to him. As the 
researcher stood to leave, Cameron had a revelation and began building an argument for 
using the result from part (b), which provided a solution for zero concavity, or linearity. 
An inspection of his work showed that he had developed a solution. He must have shared 
his solution with the group since all three received the full two points for part (d). In sum, 
all three group members received the full 9 points for this question, obviously resulting in 
a mean group score of 9 points. The group outperformed the class by a large margin, as 
the class averaged only 4.97 points. 
 AP Calculus exam preparation performance. Since Jim missed one AP practice 
session, all group data contains only the eleven sessions that the group was intact. Group 
statistics for the eleven problems were as follows: Cameron averaged 7.64 points, Jim 
averaged 6.91 points, and Ned averaged 5.73 points. Thus, the group’s overall average 
score was 6.76 points, resulting in a difference between Cameron’s average score and his 
group’s average score of 0.88( . Cameron’s overall average performance on the 12 in-
class AP Calculus AB practice problems was 7.50 out of 9 possible points. The overall 
class average for the 12 problems was 4.92, resulting in a difference between Cameron’s 
average score and the overall class’ average of 2.58(  points.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided rich, thick descriptive narratives of the experiences of 
the six participants. In addition, theoretical interpretations were provided via triangulated 
data sources with respect to epistemological beliefs, SRL, and mathematical problem-
solving based on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II: Review of Relevant 
Literature. Each participant engaged in a member-checking interview shortly after the 
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study to review initial findings, augment results, and answer follow-up questions to 
ensure credibility of the findings. Overall, the results suggest the following: 
! SRL processing and mathematical problem-solving prowess are related to 
students’ beliefs in a procedural or conceptual approach to mathematical problem 
solving and additionally a simple or interrelated belief in the simplicity of 
knowledge; 
! SRL processing and mathematical problem-solving prowess are related to 
students’ unique or arbitrary beliefs regarding problem solutions; and 
! SRL processing and mathematical problem-solving prowess are related to 
students’ abilities to appropriately apply both an empirical and rational approach 
to mathematical problem-solving. 
Further qualitative exploration of these assertions were addressed via cross-case analysis




 The purpose of this study was to explore relationships between students’ 
epistemological beliefs and self-regulatory processing in the context of mathematical 
problem solving. To achieve this goal, the researcher applied quota and maximum 
variation sampling to obtain six individual participants from an intact Advanced 
Placement (AP) Calculus BC class (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Then, participants were 
provided opportunities to work mathematical problems both individually and in small 
groups. Data were collected from think-aloud transcriptions, student work samples, 
journal entries, observational field notes, and individual interviews. Finally, the 
researcher provided students with draft narrative accounts of their experiences to review 
for the purposes of member checking.
In the previous chapter, rich, thick descriptions of participants’ experiences during
the eleven-week study presented initial interpretations that emerged from open-coding 
analyses (Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Then, using NVivo Version 8, data 
were analyzed via axial and selective coding to determine patterns, themes, and 
relationships (Bazeley, 2007; Creswell, 2007). Matrices and models were developed to 
provide both final analyses and visualizations of the findings. This chapter provides a 




The previous chapter provided narratives reports of the analysis of each 
participant’s experiences. This chapter will present cross-case analysis that revealed
major themes and patterns which emerged from the data. A broad overview of 
participants’ experiences will be provided. During the think-aloud sessions, virtually all 
students demonstrated some degree of processing in all four phases of the SRL model 
developed in the theoretical framework (see Table 7). Differences and similarities 
between participants and their attributes will be discussed at length below. It should be 
noted that the performance control phase was further subdivided into five subcategories, 
as follows: self-control and self-observation, problem-solving explorations and 
implementations, general and heuristic strategy use, monitoring, and transitions.
Additionally, participants’ capacity to appropriately monitor their progress and transition 
to more purposeful problem-solving plans emerged as a major finding during analysis 
and thus, pervades much of the discussion.  
 Due to the nature of group problem solving, credit for problem interpretations and 
development of problem solving plans during the AP exam preparation sessions was 
often blurred. Thus, coding was done only for the performance control and self-reflection 
phases and only if the participant was actively involved in the action. The 6 individuals 
identified via sampling are referred to as participants; whereas the remaining 24 
individuals in the class are referred to as students. In other words, participants’ actions 
were coded at an individual level for their active participation in monitoring group 
problem solving during the AP exam preparation sessions. Classroom observations and, 
to a lesser degree, participants’ journals provided data from the AP exam preparation 
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sessions. Yet again, all participants demonstrated some level of self-regulatory (or group-
regulatory) activity during their two classroom observations (see Table 8). Further 
discussion of similarities and differences amongst participants and their attributes may be 
found below. 
Table 7
Coding Frequencies  for SRL Processing During Think-Aloud Problem- 
Solving Sessions
Participant DT FO PC SR
Robert 16 30 98 7
Edwina 10 14 8 2
Julia 18 34 64 2
Olivia 6 8 13 0
Martin 15 25 29 4
Cameron 9 33 41 7
Note. DT = definition of the task; FO = forethought; PC = performance 
control; SR = self-reflection 
Categorizations 
Each participant’s performance on the think-aloud problems was quantified using 
Schoenfeld’s (1982) grading scheme. Performance on the AP Calculus exam preparation 
problems was assessed via scoring guidelines developed by College Board. (See Chapter 
IV: Individual Case Results for further details.) Participants were categorized based on 
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their performance during the think-aloud problem solving sessions and the AP Calculus 
exam preparation sessions. Students were placed into categories based on their 
performance from both sessions as indicated by the following intervals: low (M – 1.5SD,
M – 0.5SD), average (M – 0.5SD, M + 0.5SD), and high (M + 0.5SD, M + 1.5SD). For the 
think-aloud sessions, the mean score was M = 47.33 (SD = 22.39), resulting in the 
following respective performance intervals: (13.75, 36.14), (36.14, 58.53), and (58.53, 
80.92). For the AP exam preparation sessions, the mean score was M = 5.40 (SD = 1.23), 
resulting in the following respective performance intervals: (3.56, 4.79), (4.79, 6.02), and 
(6.02, 7.25).  
Table 8
Coding Frequencies for Group Problem-Solving Behaviors During AP Exam 
Preparation 
Participant FR SD OM VS WL FA WQ
Robert 5 2 2 4 2 2 2
Edwina 2 3 0 1 4 7 0
Julia 1 2 1 1 0 0 4
Olivia 1 2 4 2 0 1 3
Martin 1 1 6 2 0 0 3
Cameron 0 1 8 3 0 0 3
Note. FR = feedback request; SD = self-disclosure; OM = other-monitoring; 
VS = verifying solutions; WL = watching and listening; FA = following 
along; WQ = working quietly 
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The performance results for both sessions yielded the same categorization for 
each participant and were relatively consistent with each participant’s original calculus 
achievement categorization obtained for sampling  purposes. Although some ordinal 
variation occurred within the three performance indicators, all six participants’ overall 
categorizations were consistent across all three indicators. Thus, for the purposes of 
cross-case analysis, Robert and Edwina were categorized as low achievers, Julia and 
Olivia as average achievers, and Martin and Cameron as high achievers with respect to 
calculus performance prior to and during the study. 
Throughout the study, participants’ actions and verbalizations suggested 
adherence to particular epistemological beliefs. Based on Muis’s (2008) cautions, 
participants’ epistemological beliefs were not determined based on a single data source. 
Instead, participants’ verbalizations and actions during the four parts of the think-aloud 
session were given overall codes for beliefs that manifested as participants worked. Then 
participants’ interviews were coded for overt references to particular epistemological 
beliefs. Based on these manifested and self-reported beliefs, participants were categorized 
as predominantly adhering to either an availing or non-availing persuasion for each belief
emerging during this study (See Table 9). Lacking a high degree of confidence in 
assigning categorizations based on a close proximity of coding frequencies, participant 
categorizations were assigned only if the difference between the frequencies for a given 
belief exceeded two. For example, Olivia was described as predominantly 
straightforward in terms of simplicity of knowledge since the difference in frequencies 
was three but was described as procedural/conceptual for conceptual mathematical 
problem-solving since the difference in frequencies was only two. When possible, 
238
participants’ categorizations were compared to self-report questionnaire findings to either 
triangulate or call to question the assigned categorization. Such comparisons were 
presented in participants’ narratives (see Chapter IV: Individual Case Results). 
Additionally, participants were probed during member checking to further inform 
categorizations. None of the participants disagreed with the categorizations.  
Only two issues were discussed during member checking regarding findings. To 
maintain confidentiality, participants’ pseudonyms will not be identified during this 
discussion. One participant described in detail the reasoning for exploring a solution 
strategy during the application of differentiation problem. The wording in the original 
draft narrative indicated that the strategy lacked conceptual reasoning. The explanation 
provided by the participant was inserted into the narrative to more accurately depict the 
cognitive reasoning involved in exploring the strategy. Another participant agreed with 
the accuracy of the findings but was displeased with the overall tone of the narrative. This 
participant felt that the wording in the narrative was overly negative. This reaction 
prompted a re-evaluation of the wording for all participants’ narratives. Wherever 
possible, changes were made to eliminate both explicit and implicit negative connotations 
while maintaining accuracy of participants’ experiences. 
Finally, based on the literature, the following belief codes (see Table 9) were 
considered non-availing for their respective beliefs dimension: fixed, straightforward,
procedural, and empirical (Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kloosterman & Stage, 
1992; Muis, 2004, 2008; Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985). The remaining 
codes were considered availing for their respective beliefs dimension. Thus, for the 
purposes of cross-case analysis, Robert, Edwina, and Julia were assigned a novice
239
mathematical problem-solving beliefs (MPB) categorization since they had non-availing 
beliefs for all dimensions. Olivia and Martin were assigned an emerging MPB 
categorization since the majority of their beliefs dimensions were indeterminate. Finally, 
Cameron was the only participant to attain the advanced MPB beliefs categorization 
because he was assigned availing beliefs for all dimensions.
Table 9
Coding Frequencies for Epistemological Beliefs 
Nature of Simplicity of Approaches to
solutions knowledge problem solving 
Participant UN AM ST IN PR CO EM RA
Robert 9* 0 8* 0 11* 1 7* 1
Edwina 6* 0 4* 0 5* 1 4* 0
Julia 10* 2 6* 1 9* 1 7* 1
Olivia 4 2 5* 2 6 5 3 4
Martin 0 3* 4 4 7 5 5 5
Cameron 0 9* 0 7* 0 9* 1 8*
Note. Numbers with asterisks indicate that the participant was 
categorized as predominantly adhering to the corresponding belief. UN
= unique; AM = ambiguous; ST = straightforward; IN = interrelated; 
PR = procedural; CO = conceptual; EM = empirical; RA = rational
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Cross-Case Analysis
Based on individual participant narratives and categorizations, patterns and 
themes emerged from the data. In most cases, overall quantitative tabulations of open 
coding provided insufficient descriptions of actual events and thus, deeper qualitative 
analyses were required to accurately depict the emerging patterns and themes. In fact, 
initial results of summed open codes of SRL processing seemed to indicate a surprising 
result. Robert and Julia, two participants attributed with non-availing MPB, registered the 
most codes for SRL processing in this study (see Table 7). However, as discussed in 
depth below, a more accurate depiction of participants’ experiences was obtained from a 
finer-grained, qualitative interpretation of the data. Using NVivo Version 8 for axial 
coding, selective coding, textual analysis, and matrix development, the nature of patterns 
and themes was revealed (Bazeley, 2007).  
Beliefs Affected Definition of the Task and Forethought
 Only think-aloud session data were analyzed for this section since AP Calculus 
exam preparation sessions provided insufficient evidence for individual participants. 
From a purely quantitative perspective, the results pertaining to the definition of the task
and forethought phases appeared inconclusive (see Table 7). Thus, deeper qualitative 
analyses were conducted to gain a clearer rendition of lived events and reveal findings 
hiding behind the numbers. To begin, participants’ frequencies for the three finer-grained 
codes under the definition of the task node were analyzed and revealed distinct patterns 
(see Table 10). Despite logging the majority of codes for noting conditions and 
identifying goal state, the three novice MPB participants logged fewer instances of 
establishing relationships between conditions and goals than the other three participants. 
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Participants were assigned the establishing relationships code if they made mathematical 
connections between conditions and goals that were conducive to plan development 
(Schoenfeld, 1985). Thus, despite referring to the given information multiple times for 
each part of the two problems, novice participants were relatively unsuccessful at 
establishing an adequate definition of the task upon entering the forethought and 
performance control phases. In contrast, the emerging and advanced MPB participants 
were more successful at establishing relationships and developing a more adequate and 
appropriate definition of the task. This finding is congruent with prior research suggesting 
that epistemological beliefs may be activated during the definition of the task phase and 
subsequently affect planning in the forethought phase (Muis, 2008; Muis & Franco, 
2009). 
A finer-grained analysis of participants’ frequencies of forethought phase codes 
also revealed further insights (see Table 11). Participants’ coding frequencies for prior 
knowledge activation provided evidence, along with prior course completion, of the 
availability of appropriate calculus resources for completing the given problems. 
Participants received the prior knowledge activation code if they activated accurate 
mathematical knowledge that had potential for aiding in the solution of the given 
problem. This code in no way implies that the participant properly utilized the 
knowledge, only that the knowledge was available for use. Edwina appeared to be the 
only notable exception, demonstrating insufficient prior knowledge to complete the 
problems. Although she passed the previous course, Edwina genuinely appeared to lack 
the necessary resources to complete both problems and would have received a very low 
overall think-aloud score had she not consulted an expert during the interim between 
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sessions. Thus, conclusions drawn with respect to Edwina’s data must be tempered with 
the fact that she lacked the appropriate resources to complete the problems. All other 
participants were able to activate the appropriate calculus knowledge but had varying 
success in applying the knowledge. 
Table 10 
Total Frequencies for  Definition of the Task Behaviors 
Participant NC IG ER
Robert 14 6 1
Edwina 8 4 0
Julia 11 4 2
Olivia 3 3 2
Martin 9 5 3
Cameron 4 4 4
Note. NC = noting conditions of the problem; IG =  
identifying goal state; ER = establish relationships between 
conditions and goal 
 According to Zimmerman (2000), an important product of the forethought phase 
is a plan for successfully completing the learning task. With the exception of Olivia, all 
participants verbalized overt plans for developing problem-solving strategies (see Table 
11). Although Olivia’s work indicated significant planning, her verbalizations during the 
think-aloud sessions were vague and skipped from idea to idea with little indication of the 
243
planning involved. This occurred despite providing her with multiple practice think-aloud 
problems (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Since little data from the forethought phase was 
obtained from Olivia, only the five other case participants are included in the following 
discussion. To assess these five participants’ planning acuity, a comprehensive, 
qualitative analysis of participants’ verbalized overt plans was conducted based on their 
beliefs (see Tables 12 and 13). Using NVivo Version 8, participants were placed into sets 
based on their beliefs (i.e., unique or arbitrary, procedural or conceptual, empirical or 
rational) and codes for definition of the task and forethought verbalizations were analyzed 
qualitatively via axial coding (Bazeley, 2007; Creswell, 2007). Patterns and themes 
emerging from the data suggest that availing beliefs are related to more productive 
processing during the definition of the task and forethought phases of SRL.   
Unique Versus Arbitrary
The unique belief regarding problem solutions was negatively related to the 
definition of the task and forethought phases. For example, Julia, categorized as a 
participant holding a unique belief regarding problem solutions, exhibited a major 
misconception concerning m in part (a) of the application of integration problem. She 
believed a unique value needed to be assigned to m and as long as m was any positive 
integer, then an accurate solution could be obtained. Assigning a unique value to m would 
have been consistent with applying Polya’s (1957) solving a simpler problem heuristic 
but solution paths for both parts of the application of integration problem had to be 
involve m. This inaccurate assessment of the task led to a flawed plan being developed in 
the forethought phase, involving serial testing of upper bounds to obtain a solution for her 
special case (see Table 13). Her plan was flawed because the solution of her simpler 
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problem did not lead to a solution path which could be generalized (Schoenfeld, 1985). 
Thus, Julia’s unique belief in the value of m in the problem led to a poor definition of the 
task and subsequently, to an unproductive plan from the forethought phase. The finding 
from this study suggesting a relationship between a unique belief regarding problem 
solutions and academic deficiencies is consistent with prior research (Neber & 
Schommer-Aikins, 2002; Schoenfeld, 1992). Furthermore, Neber and Schommer-Aikins 
suggested that the lack of ambiguity in high school physics courses is particularly 
detrimental to motivation and SRL strategy use in gifted students. These results also lend 
support to Muis’ assertions that beliefs are activated in the definition of the task phase of 
SRL (Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & Franco, 2009).  
Table 11 
Total Frequencies for Forethought Behaviors
Participant OP IP PK RG
Robert 13 3 8 7
Edwina 10 1 1 2
Julia 11 7 8 7
Olivia 0 5 4 0
Martin 14 3 5 3
Cameron 16 6 10 3
Note. OP = overt planning; IP = inferred planning; PK = prior knowledge 
activation; RG = recycle goal in working memory
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In contrast to Julia’s efforts, Martin’s work with m in part (a) of the application of 
integration problem demonstrated that an arbitrary belief regarding problem solutions 
may lead to an appropriate definition of the task. He was fully aware that his solution 
should be in terms of m and thus, developed a plan that incorporated m into the solution 
(see Table 13). His plan led to a solution receiving almost full credit for part (a) but lack 
of attention to detail stymied his solution of part (b).  
Procedural Versus Conceptual and Straightforward Versus Interrelated
 Patterns were uncovered indicating that procedural versus conceptual and 
straightforward versus interrelated beliefs affected the forethought phase. In general, 
participants categorized as availing for both sets of beliefs developed more productive 
plans than their non-availing beliefs counterparts (see Tables 12 and 13). For example, 
Robert’s fixation on finding a unique solution for a, b, c, and d led to his decision to 
apply systems of equations to the application of differentiation problem. Despite 
receiving feedback from monitoring that his plan was not working, Robert continued to 
revert to his procedural technique and cited problem recognition from prior courses as his 
reasoning. This pattern continued during the application of integration problem, for 
which Robert was able to apply the procedure of calculating area but failed to develop a 
conceptual plan to find the necessary bounds. Additionally, once Robert realized that a 
procedure had failed, his planning based on monitoring generally consisted of 
considerations of other fully-intact procedures without regard to conceptual implications, 
which took him farther from the problem goals (see Table 13). Thus, Robert’s planning 
consisted of random procedures inconsistent with the conditions and goals of the 
problem. Findings based on Robert’s experiences lend support to Hofer’s (2004a) 
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Table 12 
Participants’ Verbalizations of Overt Planning During the Application of Differentiation 
Problem 
Participant Overt Planning 
Novice 
Robert Part (a)
- go ahead and solve for x, I would guess 
- solve things in terms of things and substitute that back in  
- going to be setting [derivative] equal to zero 
- try to plug this into my calculator
Part (b)
- take the second derivative of this 
- need to find values for x that are positive
Edwina Part (a)
- take the derivative . . . set it equal to, to something, to zero, and that 
can give me one root 
Part (b)
- maybe I’ll try solving for x. . .put my function into the calculator 
- just try taking the second derivative . . . see what I can get from that 
- I’ll try a sign line
- could plug negative two-thirds back into the original equation and  
see what I get
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Table 12 (continued) 
Participant Overt Planning 
Novice 
Julia Part (a)
- gonna set and find what x is when it’s equal to zero, or when x is
zero 
- set the derivative equation and use it as two functions 
- find what x is at zero
Part (b)
- use the derivative I already have . . . derive that again 
Emerging 
Olivia No overt planning coded. 
Martin Part (a)
- Maybe I could try and use quadratic [formula] 
- I can say those two functions are equal 
- I plug that back into the original function and set equal to zero
- I have everything but a, I think, can I use a calculator?
- if I were to solve for x
- make the first one negative and the rest positive, I can try that
Part (b)
- have to prove that 6ax + 2b is always going to be greater than zero
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Table 12 (continued) 
Participant Overt Planning 
Advanced 
Cameron Part (a)
- have to create a, b, c, and d so that there are three distinct values for 
that 
- that would just simplify everything if I set a equal to one 
- make the point of inflection at point zero 
- I can now find c
- I guess I’ll need points for x
- I’ve got to find the . . . relative minimum 
- need to somehow get two roots out of that . . . let’s just plug it into  
the calculator
- to find out which one was the minimum, I plug in negative one and  
three into the double prime
Part (b)
- have to prove that somehow 
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Table 13 
Participants’ Verbalizations of Overt Planning During the Application of Integration 
Problem 
Participant Overt Planning 
Novice 
Robert Part (a)
- need to probably find the area 
- have to find the line that bounds that 
Part (b)
- have to figure out where the other two intersect 
- have to find the horizontal line that divides it in half
- graph this on my calculator
- do just some, I don’t know, proportions 
Edwina Part (a)
- go ahead and graph this, the lines 
- let’s see what happens when I put in a number besides one 
Part (b)
- draw this graph out as well 
- we will solve for area right now 
- maybe I can estimate the area in my graph
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Table 13 (continued) 
Participant Overt Planning 
Novice 
Julia Part (a)
- going to graph that real fast 
- guess I’ll solve for m
- guess I’ll solve it without finding m . . . plug it into my calculator
- set 0.4323 equal to the integral of h(x) 
Part (b)
- find the horizontal line that divides A exactly in half
Emerging 
Olivia No overt planning coded. 
Martin Part (a)
- I’m going to do two first 
- let’s figure out what 1A is equal to
Part (b)
- let’s graph this
- just plug that into my calculator
- going to have to half that, define where my z is
- what if I try to solve this by hand 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Participant Overt Planning 
Advanced
Cameron Part (a)
- so to integrate that
- the integral from zero to a . . . will equal the integral from a to two
- just have to find a way to solve for a
- in order to justify, I’ll have to plug that entire value back into the  
bound
Part (b)
- have to write h(x) . . . as a function of y 
- just have to . . . the integral now from one-half to a
- going to the solve command 
- plug in that value 
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suggestions that epistemological beliefs are not independent, but rather form an 
interconnected theory of epistemology since Robert’s unique belief regarding problem 
solutions yielded procedural problem-solving planning. 
On the other hand, Cameron’s plans for both problems were based on 
conceptualization of the conditions and focused attention to goals. Thus, upon receiving 
feedback from monitoring, he was able to cycle back to forethought and alter plans to 
meet problem criteria. In contrast, Robert’s procedural plans were not malleable since 
they were based on prescription. In sum, as feedback was taken in, conceptualization led 
to purposeful planning; whereas a procedural approach implied the need for a fully-
established procedure as a new plan. For the mathematical problem-solving suggested by 
Schoenfeld (1985) and implied by NCTM (2000), procedural beliefs would be 
insufficient since students are applying problem-solving to learn, or construct, new 
knowledge. 
Empirical Versus Rational 
 In line with prior studies, differences were noted between problem-solving 
behaviors for participants categorized as empirical or rational (Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 
1985). The results of this study indicate differences in the forethought phase for 
participants with predominantly empirical or rational beliefs. For instance, Edwina, a 
novice MPB participant, read the application of differentiation problem and then recalled 
that roots of the first derivative produce horizontal tangents. Unable to progress from this 
point, Edwina applied a series of empirically-based plans for the remainder of her first 
session. In terms of SRL, Edwina received internal feedback from monitoring that her 
current plan was not working, which she verbalized during the think-aloud. Then, rather 
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than building logically from her current state, Edwina simply jumped into a new plan, 
thus reducing the productivity of planning that occurred from cycling back to the 
forethought phase. The interpretations gleaned from Edwina’s empirical beliefs must be 
tempered with the fact that she did not appear to have the appropriate mathematical 
resources to solve the problems. In fact, during this session she could not recall whether 
the first or second derivative described concavity. Serial testing of mathematically-based 
plans that lacked logical significance to the current problem was prolific amongst all 
participants while empirical beliefs were being manifested. In fact, Julia spent the 
majority of her second session engaged in serial testing of decimal upper bounds for an 
integral expression that did not even provide the desired solution.
 Cameron, the only predominantly rational participant based on actual 
performance, produced plans that were highly productive and based on logical 
connections between conditions and goals. For instance, at one point during part (a) of 
the application of differentiation problem, Cameron’s assessment of the problem space 
revealed that he needed to determine two x-values for the horizontal tangents. Cameron 
developed a logically based plan to place the x-values equidistant from the point of 
inflection that he had determined, which is a property of cubic functions with two 
extrema. This property of cubic functions had never been addressed in class; Cameron’s 
conceptualization of the cubic function allowed him to develop this justification. Thus, he 
was building a justification for his solution as he solved the problem since his work 
provided a logical mapping of the problem space. 
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Beliefs Affected Performance Control
Think-Aloud Problem-Solving Sessions 
General overview. Based solely on the performance control data from Table 7,
findings appear mixed and inconsistent. Thus, deeper qualitative analyses necessitated
grouping codes into sets using NVivo Version 8 for the purposes of axial and selective 
coding (Bazeley, 2007; Creswell, 2007). All beliefs coded as non-availing and availing 
were included in two sets, regardless of the overall MPB categorization of individual 
participants. Thus, availing and non-availing beliefs became the units of analysis. Then, 
monitoring and transitioning activities were further subdivided into advanced and low-
level categories. An example of advanced monitoring is monitoring progress based on 
implementation of a plausible plan; whereas an example of low-level monitoring is 
monitoring strategy use while embarking on a fruitless exploration of the problem space. 
An example of advanced transitions is assessing the appropriateness of the new direction; 
whereas an example of low-level transitions is jumping into a transition without 
considering ramifications. Finally, all deficit-focused self-observations were included as 
a set in NVivo Version 8. The results indicate that a relationship existed between the 
quality of performance control processing and participants’ beliefs (see Table 14). This 
finding provides support for Muis’ hypothesis that epistemological beliefs enacted in 
earlier phases of SRL affect SRL processing in latter phases (Muis, 2007, 2008; Muis & 
Franco, 2009).  
More specifically, manifestations of participants’ beliefs affected their ability to 
control problem-solving performance (see Table 14). Cameron, the only advanced MPB 
participant, accounted for virtually all instances of advanced monitoring and transitions. 
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One may question whether other factors, such as prior performance and accessibility of 
mathematical resources, may provide alternative hypotheses for Cameron’s findings. 
Martin’s results provided a negative case for the prior performance and mathematical 
resource hypotheses. Despite his high achieving categorization and evidence of sufficient 
prior knowledge activation, Martin, an emerging MPB participant, produced mainly low-
level monitoring and transitioning codes. Martin’s activities in the performance control 
phase coupled with his emerging MPB categorization provided a compelling 
counterexample for alternative hypotheses. The researcher fully acknowledges that SRL 
processing is related to multiple factors. The purpose of this study was to examine 
relationships between SRL and a single factor, epistemological beliefs. The results of this 
study indicate that epistemological beliefs are related to SRL processing. Further research 
is warranted to assess the degree to which epistemological beliefs (and other factors) are 
related to students’ regulation of mathematical problem-solving tasks. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Robert and Julia, while they appeared to 
dominate SRL processing in the study, were actually involved in only low-level 
performance control activities and deficit-focused verbalizations. Finally, Edwina and 
Olivia provided the fewest codes for performance control processing in the study. The 
performance control codes noted for Edwina and Olivia were almost exclusively low-
level. Future investigations of these phenomena will require even deeper qualitative 
analyses into specific beliefs dimensions.
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Table 14 
Coding Frequencies for Advanced and Low-level Performance Control 
Behaviors 
Source AM AT DF LM LT
By belief categorization
Availing 34 10 1 6 5
Non-availing 0 6 40 90 39
By participant 
Robert 0 2 23 35 13
Edwina 0 1 12 15 2
Julia 0 2 4 18 18
Olivia 1 1 1 10 2
Martin 2 1 0 17 5
Cameron 31 8 1 1 3
Note. AM = advanced monitoring; AT = advanced transitions; DF =  
deficit- focused verbalizations; LM = low-level monitoring; LT = low- 
level transitions
Unique versus arbitrary. As mentioned above, participants’ unique and arbitrary 
beliefs affected their actions in the definition of the task and forethought phases. Since 
activities in both phases directly affect the performance control phase, participants’ 
unique and arbitrary beliefs regarding problem solutions also affected their strategy use 
and control as they navigated the problem space (Muis, 2007, 2008; Winne & Hadwin, 
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1998; Zimmerman, 2000). For example, Robert, a unique belief participant, became so 
fixated on finding a unique solution for part (a) of the application of differentiation 
problem that he spent his entire first session engaged in a fruitless attempt to solve for a,
b, c, and d via a system of equations. He monitored this plan fairly closely, checking for 
errors and assessing the validity of his substitutions. However, despite doubts and deficit-
focused statements regarding his plan, Robert never transitioned to other strategies. He 
later stated in an interview that he expected a unique solution for a, b, c, and d but did not
know of any other technique to find it. So, his belief that a single, unique solution existed 
negatively impacted his ability to make executive, transitional decisions based on his 
monitoring. Lerch (2004) suggested an alternative explanation to the one presented 
above. She argued that Schoenfeld (1985) disproportionately attributed students’ control 
issues to their lack of success at mathematical problem solving. Lerch suggested that 
Schoenfeld’s mathematical resources category in tandem with students’ beliefs provided 
a more accurate explanation for students’ struggles with mathematical problem solving 
during her case study. However, the findings in this study show that students were able to 
access the appropriate mathematical resources but failed to make controlled executive 
decisions regarding how to apply these resources in the given context.   
 In direct contrast, Cameron, who maintained an arbitrary belief throughout both 
think-aloud sessions, engaged in a well-controlled plan for part (a) of the application of 
differentiation problem. His plan consisted of building a cubic function based 
simultaneously on arbitrary assignments and conceptualizations. His belief that multiple 
solutions existed and that he could develop a solution (rather than the solution) as 
knowledge of the conditions and goals of the task unfolded allowed him to make 
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executive decisions which led to prosperous transitions. Initially, however, Cameron was 
no different from other participants. He was visibly and audibly shocked when first faced 
with the application of differentiation problem, which involved finding a solution for four 
variables with two equations. In his first solution attempt, he applied the quadratic 
formula to the equation formed by setting the first derivative function equal to zero. The 
difference in Cameron’s work within the problem space was his ability to abandon this 
procedural method and seek non-standard techniques of solution, which eventually led to 
the plan outlined above and ultimately to a successful solution. 
Robert and Cameron were on opposite ends of a continuum of beliefs regarding 
the nature of problem solutions. Olivia was closer to the middle of the continuum and 
provided a different set of experiences to examine (see Table 9). For the application of 
differentiation problem, Olivia’s actions and verbalizations indicated both unique and 
arbitrary manifestations of beliefs. For instance, she reacted to part (a) just as Robert and 
tried to apply algebraic systems of equations to find unique values for a, b, c, and d.
Then, for part (b), she seemed completely comfortable with the arbitrary constants and 
developed and executed an argument for the lack of a solution with little effort. Her 
interview responses provided triangulation for these findings. For instance, when probed 
to expound on her actions during session one, her responses indicated a clear 
understanding that a, b, c, and d generated a family of cubic functions but simultaneously 
indicated the expectation of a unique solution for part (a). In sum, her actions and 
verbalizations indicated the belief that an infinite family of cubic functions existed but 
did not carry over to developing an arbitrary member of the family based on the problem 
conditions. Finally, the findings discussed in this section indicate that students’ beliefs 
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regarding the nature of problem solutions affected actions in the performance control
phase while solving mathematical problems.
Procedural versus conceptual and straightforward versus interrelated. Due to 
similarities, discussion regarding manifestations of procedural versus conceptual problem 
solving beliefs and straightforward versus interrelated beliefs in the simplicity of 
knowledge are conducted together. Edwina exhibited non-availing beliefs for both sets of 
beliefs. In both sessions, Edwina’s actions and verbalizations indicated that she was 
expecting a procedural method for solving the problems. Additionally, her problem-
solving strategies always consisted of straightforward applications of one concept at a 
time, never attempting to interrelate topics or find connections. For example, Edwina 
was able to apply all the procedural steps necessary for success on part (b) of the 
application of differentiation problem. She calculated the first and second derivatives of f
and even attempted to apply sign line procedures, indicating that she had sufficient 
mathematical resources for this part of the problem despite her overall lack of resources 
demonstrated in other parts of the study. When her procedural efforts failed, Edwina 
applied a useful heuristic by graphing the second derivative, which produced a line 
passing through the origin. Lacking a conceptual or interrelated mindset, Edwina 
determined the graph to be useless for conclusions about the concavity of the function f.
Thus, her beliefs stifled the development of productive transitions from her assessment of 
the current state of the problem. In other words, she was unable to interrelate the 
properties of linear functions with the conceptual aspects of concavity and the second 
derivative.  
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As mentioned above, Lerch (2004) advocated for lack of mathematical resources 
as the primary source of students’ failures at problem solving. She further argued for a 
“mathematical process model” that would provide “universal procedures” to be 
applicable for a variety of problem-solving situations (p. 34). Thus, her argument for 
students’ success is grounded in specific problem-solving strategies that transcend 
problem types. Based on the findings in this study and especially with regard to Edwina’s 
experiences above, I advocate a more conceptual-beliefs approach to mathematical 
problem-solving that would foster a more controlled navigation of the problem space 
based on conditions and goals, rather than predetermined procedures that may or may not 
be accessible in long term memory.  
Edwina’s procedural mindset carried through the entire problem, as indicated by 
her lamentations at the end of the session of not having seen how to solve the problem 
before it was presented to her. As indicated by Schoenfeld (1985), however, if one has 
seen how to work a mathematical exercise, it is no longer a mathematical problem.
Finally, her inability to develop a procedural method for either problem led to a 
significant number of deficit-focused verbalizations (see Table 14), which may explain 
why she gave up before either session had ended (Zimmerman, 2000).  
Cameron’s work indicated purely conceptual, interrelated beliefs throughout both 
sessions and painted a very different picture than Edwina’s. As mentioned previously, 
Cameron was initially stumped by the situation of having two equations and four 
variables for part (a) of the application of differentiation problem but was able to navigate 
through the problem space due largely to monitoring which led to productive transitions. 
An example of his belief that concepts are interrelated emerged as he considered the 
261
second derivative and applied it to his solution path. Other participants considered the 
second derivative but only Cameron monitored its introduction and transitioned to a plan 
involving a single point of inflection for f and the application of the second derivative 
test. Every other participant who introduced the second derivative expected the extra 
equation to aid in eliminating variables for the purposes of their systems of equations 
procedure. Thus, their assessment, monitoring, and subsequent transitions based on the 
introduction of the second derivative were fruitless. There were no previously learned 
algorithmic procedures for solving part (a) of the application of differentiation problem, 
which provided the novelty necessary for true problem solving (Schoenfeld, 1985). Thus, 
Cameron’s conceptual, interrelated belief system provided the perfect engine for 
controlled performance for this problem.
Martin, whose MPB categorization was indeterminate, provided a unique 
perspective. Despite maintaining an arbitrary belief and indicating that part (a) of the 
application of differentiation problem may have infinite solutions, Martin procedurally
applied system of equations techniques during the majority of his first session, which 
indicated the expectation of obtaining a single solution. Thus, like Robert, his strict 
adherence to a system of equations approach made purposeful transitions impossible, as
he considered all assessments of monitoring from his procedural perspective. However, 
unlike Robert, his logic for applying procedures did not evolve from a fixed belief, rather 
he felt that justifications of mathematical work must come from rigorous, algebraic 
procedures. Thus, his close-minded belief that mathematics problems must be solved 
systematically led to the demise of any productive performance control activities during 
his first think-aloud session (Schoenfeld, 1992).  
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During his second session, Martin demonstrated the dual nature of his beliefs via 
productive work grounded mainly in conceptual, interrelated decision-making, which 
produced the majority of his high-level performance control codes. Despite these 
manifestations of his conceptual and interrelated beliefs, his procedural mindset did 
emerge during the second session and hampered part of his work. Upon obtaining a 
solution with only minor errors for part (a) of the application of integration problem, 
Martin assumed that part (b) was procedurally the same and thus, worked part (b) in 
exactly the same manner as part (a). When he was unable to solve part (b), Martin spent 
all of his efforts in the performance control phase monitoring his procedures for errors 
but never considered to monitor the more global, conceptual aspects of the problem. 
Thus, Martin’s lack of conceptual focus and attention to procedures inhibited his 
transition to a more productive plan and ultimately resulted in an unsuccessful solution 
attempt. 
Rational and empirical problem-solving beliefs. Participants’ rational and 
empirical approaches to problem solving also affected performance control. Julia’s 
actions and verbalizations indicated an empirical belief in problem solving, which was 
consistent with her high score on the Empirical scale of the PEP. Virtually all activities
during her think-aloud sessions were coded as empirical (see Table 9). The most overt 
example of her empirical beliefs occurred as she worked part (a) of the application of 
integration problem during session two. Having found the area of the bounded region 
using a special case for m = 1, she was unable to develop a solution strategy to find an 
equation of the vertical line that divided the area in half. Thus, she began arbitrarily 
substituting values in for the upper bound of her integral in an attempt to find the 
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numerical value that corresponded to half the area. This empirical method of solution 
would eventually lead to a fairly accurate answer but no generalizations conducive for 
finding a solution with respect to m. At any point, she could have monitored her progress 
and rationally determined that her serial testing of values was equivalent to finding an 
unknown value and that a variable could be assigned to the upper bound. However, her 
overt empiricism led her to merely check her serial tests for accuracy, a very low level of 
monitoring, until she had an acceptable value. Thus, Julia’s lack of logical reasoning led 
to low-level monitoring that produced assessments of a flawed plan, rather than 
generating internal feedback to foster advancement toward the goal state. 
Virtually the opposite result occurred for Cameron, who demonstrated rational 
beliefs throughout the sessions. While working on part (a) of the application of 
integration problem, he began by determining the area just as Julia  had, except his area 
was in terms of m. Then, based on a logical assessment of the area with respect to the 
overall goal of the problem, Cameron determined that his area calculation was 
unnecessary and transitioned to an integral equation approach that yielded an accurate 
solution. Despite having far fewer codes for monitoring than Julia during this part of the 
problem, Cameron’s performance control processing was logically-based and productive. 
Cameron’s lower frequency of monitoring may not be surprising, as Zimmerman (2000) 
suggested that students who attain a higher level of self-regulatory skill for a given task 
will require fewer instances of monitoring to obtain successful results. Further discussion 
of self-regulatory skill is provided below. Both Cameron and Julia’s findings are 
supported by previous literature examining rational and empirical beliefs with respect to 
mathematical problem solving (Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989). 
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Despite having the highest Rational scale score in the class on the PEP, Martin’s 
actual performance during the problem-solving sessions indicated even adherence to both 
empiricism and rationalism. This may be explained by his insistence on applying 
procedural techniques as described above. This insistence led him to many illogically-
based decisions, which resulted in a serial testing of procedures. Hence, like Julia, the 
empirical side of Martin’s beliefs led to low-level monitoring that produced a quantity of 
monitoring codes with little quality. However, when Martin applied more rational beliefs 
to his endeavors, mainly during the application of integration problem, his monitoring 
focused more consistently on the goal of the problem and led to more productive 
transitions.  
AP Exam Preparation Sessions 
Overview. Since AP exam preparation sessions involved small group 
collaboration, the unit of analysis became participants’ interactions with their respective 
group members. As discussed above, this section will focus mainly on participants’ 
behaviors in the performance control and self-reflection phases while working in groups. 
Thus, participants’ behaviors were coded with respect to participation, or lack thereof, in 
assessments of both personal and group progress toward developing solutions for the 
problem. With increased focus on applying social constructivist ideologies in 
mathematics classrooms, assessments of students’ abilities to work with others in a group 
setting are becoming more important.  
As indicated by Table 8, all participants engaged in some level of group-
monitoring and group-verification, which are synonymous to performance control and 
self-reflection, respectively. To provide deeper analysis, activities were classified as non-
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participatory, participatory, or highly participatory group-regulation and were grouped 
into sets in NVivo Version 8. Non-participatory group-monitoring activities included 
watching and listening and following along since these codes indicated that the 
participant either stopped working or was merely following a plan without participating 
in its development (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Goos, Galbraith, & Renshaw, 2002). 
Participatory group-monitoring activities included self-disclosure and feedback request
since these codes indicated assessments focused solely on personal progression toward 
problem solutions (Goos, Galbraith, & Renshaw, 2002). Finally, highly participatory
group monitoring included other-monitoring and verifying solutions since these codes 
indicated assessments focused on whole-group attainment of problem goals (Goos, 
Galbraith, & Renshaw, 2002). Participants’ actions for all other group problem-solving 
codes had varying effects (e.g., both positive and negative) on group problem-solving 
productivity and thus, could not be grouped into sets.  
Overall, the results indicated that beliefs do affect group monitoring and 
verification (see Table 15). Robert, Edwina, and Julia, the three novice MPB participants, 
accounted for the lowest mean for highly participatory codes (M = 2.67) and the highest 
mean for non-participatory codes (M = 5.33). Cameron, the only advanced MPB 
participant, had the highest frequency of highly participatory codes with ten codes and 
zero non-participatory codes. Then, Martin and Olivia had mean highly participatory 
codes (M = 6.50) and mean non-participatory codes (M = 0.50) which were between the 
novice and advanced MPB categorizations but skewed toward Cameron’s figures.   
Novice MPB. The three novice participants engaged in group activities differently 
based on multiple factors. Edwina, who demonstrated the least productive group 
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monitoring, followed along with every idea suggested by her group members without 
monitoring the validity of the assertions. She was on the receiving end of all monitoring 
activities with which she was involved based on self-disclosures and feedback requests
verbalized to her other group members. Finally, she rarely engaged in group assessments 
of goal state. Robert was more involved in his group, which actively engaged in verifying 
solutions. However, Robert was prone to shutting down when he got stumped and 
reducing his actions to watching and listening. Robert rarely engaged in other-
monitoring, but was on the receiving end of many instances of group monitoring based 
on self-disclosures and feedback requests. It should be noted that Edwina and Robert 
were both in groups in which another group member emerged as a de facto leader.
Table 15 
Coding Frequencies for Advanced and Low-Level Group Monitoring 
 and Verification Behaviors
Non- Highly 
Participant Participatory Participatory Participatory
Robert 6 7 5
Edwina 8 5 1
Julia 0 3 2
Olivia 1 3 5
Martin 0 2 8
Cameron 0 1 10
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In stark contrast, Julia was in a group that did not have a clearly-defined leader 
and she did not volunteer herself as such. Her group spent much of its time engaged in 
silent work and only occasionally engaged in group monitoring. Julia’s initiations of 
monitoring mainly involved self-monitoring and group verification of solutions. Due to 
her group’s dynamics, Julia registered the fewest group monitoring codes. Thus, little 
more may be discussed concerning her participation in this portion of the study. Overall, 
participants with novice MPB tended to be very passive and assumed a role as followers, 
rather than actively monitoring group performance.
Emerging MPB. Olivia and Martin played a more active role in their groups’ 
performance control. In fact, Martin assumed the role of de facto leader for his group and 
instigated the monitoring of others’ work on six occasions. His participation in the group 
led to productive discussions, monitoring, and transitions based on conceptualizations of 
the problems. As his narrative indicates, Martin’s availing beliefs emerged during this 
portion of the study. He seemed more comfortable with the problem types and was able 
to develop more logically-based, conceptual ideas based on his monitoring of the 
problem space. Recall that participants’ member-checking interviews indicated that the 
AP exam preparation problems more closely resembled procedures with connections than 
the doing mathematics think-aloud problems. Thus, Martin’s increased comfort level may 
be explained by the change in cognitive demand. This finding is congruent with 
Lodewyk, Winne, and Jamieson-Noel’s (2009) suggestions that high achieving students 
do not require self-regulatory processing to complete a well-structured task, which may 
have resulted in Martin having sufficient time and resources to monitor group 
performance during the AP exam preparation problems. Despite suggesting that 
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educators provide a mixture of well- and ill-structured tasks for students, the authors 
warned that a preponderance of well-structured tasks may lead to boredom and apathy 
amongst high-achievers. This may explain the apathetic appearance of Martin’s group 
during their second observation since it was the last of the twelve in-class AP Calculus 
exam preparation sessions.
Olivia was involved in a group with no overt leader, although one of her group 
members dominated much of the group interaction. She was very active in all group 
interactions and was on both the receiving and giving ends of group-monitoring. Just like 
Martin, her more availing beliefs emerged during this portion of the study and provided 
conceptual tools by which she could convert group-monitoring into productive group 
transitions.  
Advanced MPB. Like Martin, Cameron assumed the role of de facto leader for his 
group. Cameron’s availing beliefs were evident in both the AP Calculus exam practice 
sessions and think-aloud problem-solving sessions. He logged the most instances of 
monitoring others of all participants and attempted to provide group members with 
conceptual understanding as well as performance control. Despite providing significant 
feedback, he rarely received feedback since he was able to conceptualize problem 
demands and required little self-monitoring during the sessions. In many cases, Cameron 
single-handedly solved problems and group members merely followed along, content to 
accept his assertions. 
Summary. Participants with availing beliefs displayed more productive group-
monitoring behaviors. This may be explained by a significant decline in self-regulatory 
processing for students with availing beliefs compared to the more ill-structured, doing 
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mathematics think-aloud session problems. All AP exam problems used in this study 
contained multiple parts (see Appendix E). For the first parts of AP exam problems, the 
general pattern of engagement was prior knowledge activation, set-up equations, apply 
procedures, and verify results. Then, the latter parts of the problems required significant 
metacognitive monitoring and critical thinking.
Cameron, whose beliefs and self-regulatory skills remained at an optimal level for 
the duration of the study, was a productive and active monitor for the group. For Olivia 
and Martin, the lower cognitive demand of the AP questions appeared to foster the more 
availing aspects of their beliefs than the higher cognitive demand think-aloud problems. 
With the decrease in abstraction, Olivia and Martin more readily connected problems to 
concepts and engaged in logically-based discussions. Then, with a more manageable 
problem to monitor, Olivia and Martin’s self-regulatory skills could be applied in the 
group setting as needed. Unfortunately, the decrease in cognitive demand was insufficient 
in eliciting availing beliefs and productive regulatory behaviors from Robert, Edwina, 
and Julia. Although some variation existed between their individual results, an overall 
qualitative assessment revealed that all three participants generated limited behaviors 
indicative of collaborative group monitoring. 
 Group dynamics provide an alternative perspective for analyzing participants’ 
group-monitoring behaviors. When asked to comment on the overall group-work 
experience, all participants except Robert made some reference to either disliking group 
work altogether or having problems with one or more group members. Specifically, 
Edwina did not feel comfortable asking a preponderance of questions of her group 
members because she felt that her questions would interrupt their development of a 
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problem solution. Julia was not used to working in groups that do not interact but did not 
feel comfortable taking the leadership role since she was not the highest performer in her 
group. Martin felt that one of his group members could have interacted more. Olivia and 
Cameron stated that they have never enjoyed group work. Additionally, Olivia stated that 
she had never worked well with one of her group members. From a social cognitive 
perspective, participants’ statements merged with their actions provided further evidence 
of the degree of their self-regulatory prowess. Zimmerman (2000), discussing the self-
control aspect of performance control, stated, “Attention focusing is designed to improve 
one’s concentration and screen out other covert processes or external events” (p. 19). 
Thus, at the theoretical level, group dynamics provide self-regulating students further 
opportunities to apply their adaptive skills.
Analysis of Time Allocation During Think-Aloud Sessions 
To further illustrate the differences in overall SRL processing, participants’ 
actions in each phase of Schoenfeld’s (1985) problem-solving framework will be 
analyzed. Participants engaged in definition of the task and forethought phase behaviors 
predominantly during reading and analysis episodes. Performance control phase 
behaviors were distributed throughout analysis, exploration, and implementation 
episodes. The highest frequencies of low-level monitoring occurred during the 
exploration stage. All self-reflection phase behaviors occurred during verification 
episodes.
Differences in time allocation during the think-aloud sessions were noted among 
the three MPB categorizations. Edwina, a novice MPB participant, spent all of her time 
engaged in the reading, analysis, and exploration episodes (see Figure 8). Since most of 
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her time was spent in exploration, she did not engage in advanced monitoring and 
transitions that became the mark of more successful problem-solving endeavors. Findings 
suggest that Edwina’s struggles with self-regulatory behaviors are derived from low-level 
MPB and a lack of necessary mathematical resources.  
Figure 8. Time Line Representations for Edwina’s Think-Aloud Problem-Solving 
Sessions.
Martin was categorized as an emerging MPB participant based on his actions and 
verbalizations during this study. Taken separately, his think-aloud sessions presented two 
completely divergent interpretations of Martin’s problem-solving prowess (see Figure 9). 
Taken as a whole, Martin’s mathematical problem-solving and self-regulatory skills are 
revealed. Based on the expectation of a procedural problem with a unique solution, 
Martin spent the majority of the first session engaged in an exploration of the problem 










Think-Aloud Session 1 Think-Aloud Session 2 
Time (min) 
272











regulatory skill was demonstrated as multiple assessments of monitoring progress went 
unheeded. Thus, Martin entered the second session with the daunting task of needing 
solutions for both tasks. In a flurry of nonlinear-SRL activity, Martin engaged in well-
managed solution paths, heeded monitoring, and transitioned to new plans based on 
conceptual assessments of problem conditions and goals. The only negative aspect of 
Martin’s second session was that lack of verification cost him points that could have 
easily been salvaged.
  
Figure 9. Time Line Representations for Martin’s Think-Aloud Problem-Solving 
Sessions.
 Cameron, the only advanced MPB participant, successfully applied Schoenfeld’s 
(1985) framework during both sessions. Cameron had not been taught the framework 
directly; his problem-solving techniques manifested naturally in the manner visually 
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described by Figure 10. During the first session, he had initial difficulty with part (a) of 
the application of differentiation task (see Appendix F). However, unlike participants 
who held non-availing beliefs, Cameron heeded the internal feedback provided by 
monitoring and applied conceptual, interrelated plans to solve the problem. Cameron’s 
second session was more indicative of an expert solving a problem. However, he still 
relied on self-regulatory processing to guide his efforts. Cameron also differed from the 
other participants in time spent verifying solutions. Self-reflection is a critical phase in the 
SRL process and Cameron was the only participant who regularly applied it. Overall, this 
time analysis provides further evidence of the relationships between epistemological 
beliefs, SRL processing, and mathematical problem solving.  
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Beliefs Related to Heuristic Strategy Use
 During this study, participants applied five heuristic strategies while engaged in 
mathematical problem solving. The heuristics applied were draw a picture, recall a 
similar problem, restate the problem, set up equations, and establish subgoals. All 
participants used heuristic strategies to a certain degree during this study (see Table 16). 
Robert, Julia, Martin, and Cameron registered higher frequencies of codes for heuristics 
than Edwina and Olivia. Thus, deeper analysis was required to determine whether 
relationships existed between epistemological beliefs and heuristic strategy use. 
Using NVivo Version 8, heuristic strategy use was analyzed with respect to 
availing and non-availing beliefs sets (see Table 16). Recall that the availing and non-
availing beliefs sets contained all instances coded for the respective belief regardless of 
participants’ overall MPB categorization. Since participants demonstrated a combination 
of availing and non-availing beliefs during this study (e.g., exhibiting a conceptual 
approach to problem solving while empirically testing conjectures), discrepancies may be 
noted between frequency totals for by belief categorization values and by participant
values in Table 16. Rather surprisingly, frequencies of heuristic strategy use were higher 
for participants demonstrating non-availing beliefs than availing beliefs. 
 Upon deeper qualitative analysis, differences in the application of heuristic 
strategies were noted based on participants’ MPB categorizations. Specifically, Robert 
and Martin, novice and emerging MPB participants respectively, each applied the 
heuristic setting up an equation on seven instances. The majority of these codes were 
registered while Robert and Martin were attempting to apply systems of equations to 
solve for a, b, c, and d in part (a) of the application of differentiation problem (see 
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Appendix F). Neither participant was able to utilize the development of equations to 
solve the given problem. Both participants cited beliefs in unique problem solutions and 
procedural problem-solving approaches as sources of their lack of success but Robert 
also cited the inability to access additional mathematical resources as a barrier to success. 
The relationship between heuristic strategy use and accessibility to mathematical 
resources is consistent with Schoenfeld’s (1985) findings: 
 Often the successful implementation of a heuristic strategy depends heavily on a 
 firm foundation of domain-specific resources. It is unrealistic to expect too much 
of these strategies. (pp. 73–74) 
 Cameron, the only advanced MPB participant, also applied the setting up an 
equation heuristic seven times. The difference in his application of the heuristic was that 
equations were not developed to find a final solution for the think-aloud problems but 
were developed as the problem unfolded and assessments of the current state necessitated 
further conditions. In fact, his equations were generally developed to further his 
application of the establishing subgoals heuristic. The ability to apply multiple heuristics 
while engaged in problem solving is demonstrative of a sophisticated level of functioning 
(Schoenfeld, 1985). During his second think-aloud session, Martin also demonstrated this 
high level of sophistication by incorporating three of his setting up an equation heuristic 
codes into an establishing subgoals heuristic strategy. For both Martin and Cameron, 
applications of multiple heuristic strategies led to productive advancement toward 
problem goals. In sum, participants who held non-availing beliefs applied heuristic 
strategies more frequently but participants who held availing beliefs tended to be more 
productive in their application of heuristic strategies. Access to mathematical resources 
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and adherence to epistemological beliefs appear to be jointly related to the application of 
heuristic strategies.
Table 16 
Coding Frequencies for Heuristic Strategy Use
Source DP RP RS EQ ES
By belief categorization
Availing 6 2 1 12 4
Non-availing 14 4 1 18 4
By participant 
Robert 3 1 0 7 2
Edwina 4 0 0 1 0
Julia 6 3 0 3 2
Olivia 2 0 0 2 0
Martin 2 1 1 7 1
Cameron 3 1 1 7 3
Note. DP = draw a picture; RP = recall a similar problem; RS = restate the
problem; EQ = set up equations; ES = establish subgoals 
  
Beliefs and SRL Related to Overall Performance 
 The results of this study indicated that epistemological beliefs and SRL are 
interrelated. Additionally, participants’ beliefs categorizations were related to their 
overall performance (see Table 17). This finding is congruent with Cano’s (2005) 
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structural equation modeling results, which suggested that students’ performance was 
directly affected by epistemological beliefs. For both AP Calculus exam preparation and 
think-aloud sessions, participants’ performance increased progressively from novice to 
advanced beliefs categorizations. Although certainly not conclusive, findings from this 
study indicate that availing beliefs and quality SRL processing affect students’ 
performance in solving mathematical problems. 
A Disconnect Existed Between Idealized Beliefs and Realized Practice
While analyzing member-checking transcriptions, a discrepancy was discovered 
between novice MPB participants’ responses concerning the importance of a conceptual 
approach to problem solving, other interview responses, and their categorizations from 
behaviors exhibited during this study. Specifically, when Julia was asked directly 
whether conceptual or procedural knowledge was more important to problem solving, she 
stated that conceptual knowledge was more important. However, later in the interview 
when asked about her struggles with the arbitrary constants, Julia lamented a lack of 
procedural means for solving for the constants and further stated that the source of her 
woes originated from always learning procedural steps when studying for exams. 
Similarly, Robert stated that a conceptual approach to problem solving would be more 
appropriate but later stated that his approach to the arbitrary variables was based on 
procedures he applied in previous courses. Finally, Edwina believed that a conceptual 
approach would be more conducive to solving mathematical problems but blamed the 
educational system itself for instilling a procedural, cookie-cutter approach to 
mathematical problem-solving into her. Her previous mathematics teachers had always 
taught her shortcuts and step-by-step means for solving problems until Algebra 2. Not 
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armed with any other skills, she had applied the procedural approach and memorized 
steps for all high school mathematics courses.
Table 17 
Participant Performance By Mathematical 
Problem-Solving Beliefs Categorization
Mean
AP Exam Think- 











Two results may be derived from these interview data. First, the novice beliefs 
participants may be farther from the procedural end of the continuum than reported here. 
Certainly their beliefs continue to manifest in their realized problem solving approaches 
as procedural but acknowledgement that conceptual approaches are more ideal may 
indicate a progression toward a realized conceptual belief. Second, participants’ 
perceptions of their epistemological beliefs did not always coincide with their practice 
due to both personally- and institutionally-based habits of the mind. Edwina’s responses 
imply that mathematics teachers can play a major role in the development of students’ 
beliefs and subsequently, their ability to apply SRL processing to mathematical problem-
solving. 
Conclusion 
Since this study involved advanced mathematics students, all participants were 
motivated to perform and engaged in some form of SRL processing. Thus, participants 
who demonstrated little purposeful control received codes indicative of SRL processing. 
It became apparent that an accurate rendition of events necessitated analysis and 
discussion of the quality of SRL processing. This finding was not a complete surprise, as 
Goos, Galbraith, and Renshaw (2002) encountered a similar issue in their study 
investigating group metacognition. Focusing on quality rather than quantity, the current
study became an investigation into participants’ levels of self-regulatory skills. 
Zimmerman (2000) suggested that an individual’s level of self-regulatory skill is based 
on “social as well as self sources of influence” (p. 29). Hence, educators may have an 
influence on developing students’ self-regulatory mathematical problem-solving skill 
level.
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Upon careful consideration of the findings, Zimmerman’s (2000) levels of self-
regulatory skill may be applied to participants’ behaviors with respect to the skill 
required to solve the problems. Zimmerman identified four levels of self-regulatory skill, 
as follows: (1) observation, (2) emulation, (3) self-control, and (4) self-regulation. Since 
they were able to “ systematically adapt their performance to changing . . . contextual 
conditions” of the problems, Martin and Cameron were identified as demonstrating self-
regulated skill during the study (p. 30). Robert, Julia, and Olivia were identified as 
demonstrating the self-controlled level of skill development since they were able to apply 
self-regulatory processing of their skills “in structured settings outside the presence of 
models” but had difficulty adapting their skills to the problems in the study (p. 30). It 
should be noted that Martin would have been categorized as demonstrating the self-
control level based solely on his first think-aloud. His behaviors during the second think-
aloud session earned him the next level for this study. Finally, Edwina’s behaviors 
demonstrated an emulation level of skill for the problems in the study. She was unable to 
navigate any of the problem spaces alone, lamented the lack of a procedural model to 
follow, and was only successful when an expert explained a problem to her during the 
interim between think-aloud sessions. As will be discussed further in the following 
chapter, educators may have a significant influence over students’ self-regulatory skill 




DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
 The purpose of this multiple-case study was to explore relationships between 
students’ epistemological beliefs and self-regulated learning (SRL) processing while 
engaged in mathematical problem-solving. Digressing from conventional SRL studies 
involving students with academic struggles (e.g., Cleary & Zimmerman, 2004), this study 
focused on advanced students in an effort to inform the gifted education community. The 
specific research questions addressed by this study were: 
1. How are students’ epistemological beliefs related to self-regulatory processing 
practices during engagement in mathematical problem-solving  tasks?
2. What self-regulation strategies do AP Calculus students employ while 
preparing for the AP exam and engaging in problem-solving episodes? 
3. What epistemological beliefs influence students’ choice and use of heuristic 
strategies to solve mathematical problems?
4. How are self-regulated learning strategies and epistemological beliefs related 
to student performance on problem-solving tasks? 
Based on the findings from this study, conclusions are drawn for each research question. 
A discussion of each conclusion ensues and is grounded in the findings of this study and 
the current literature. The discussion follows the order of the research questions and is 
laid out as follows: (1) relationships between SRL and epistemological beliefs, (2) SRL 
processing strategies based on task demand, (3) relationships between epistemological
282
beliefs and heuristic strategies, (4) effects of SRL and epistemological beliefs on 
performance, and (5) disconnect between beliefs and practice. Discussion point (5) was 
not included in the research questions but emerged as a theme from the findings. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study, implications for 
practice and further research, and researcher reflections.
Discussion of Findings
Relationships Between SRL and Epistemological Beliefs
Definition of the Task 
Findings from this study indicate that participants’ unique and arbitrary beliefs 
regarding problem solutions manifested during think-aloud sessions affect their actions in 
the definition of the task phase. When faced with a task involving arbitrary constants or 
variables, students with unique beliefs may struggle with the role of the arbitrary
constants, whereas students with arbitrary beliefs will tend to develop a more appropriate 
definition of the task. The expectation that such problems should have unique solutions 
places a barrier between the student and appropriate understanding of the problem. As 
suggested previously, “students who . . . seek single answers, avoid ambiguity . . . tend to 
experience more difficulty with the ambiguous features of tasks that call for reflective 
judgments, perseverance, and appropriate self-regulated learning” (Lodewyk, 2007, p. 
324). Although Lodewyk has examined some facets of SRL, he has not analyzed 
students’ actions in the definition of the task phase. The finding that unique and arbitrary 




 Based on the results of this study, all three sets of beliefs affect participants’ 
actions in the forethought phase, particularly with respect to problem-solving planning. A 
commonly-recurring theme was the difference in planning based on procedures learned in 
prior courses and planning based on conceptual aspects of the particular problem being 
presented. Participants who developed plans based solely on procedural recall were 
unable to work past a certain point in each problem. Thus, it can be concluded that sole 
reliance on a procedural belief in mathematical problem solving may be insufficient in 
effective processing through the forethought phase while engaged in ill-structured, doing 
mathematics tasks. 
 Schoenfeld (1992) identified students’ expectations of procedural methods for 
solving problems as a non-availing belief. Despite a national focus on mathematical 
problem solving suggested by NCTM (2000) a decade ago, five of the six advanced 
mathematics students in this study expected a procedurally-based task when they 
approached the think-aloud problems and subsequently developed procedural problem-
solving plans. When probed as to the source of their procedural allegiance, participants 
cited experiences in prior mathematics courses as the primary source. Thus, a further 
conclusion to be drawn from this study is that mathematics educators may not effectively 
facilitate problem-solving habits of mind (Schoenfeld, 1985) in students to the degree 
recommended by the NCTM (2000).  
Performance Control 
Participants’ actions in the performance control phase became a major focus of 
this study. The results of this study indicated that all three sets of epistemological beliefs 
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are related to participants’ processing in the performance control phase. The belief that 
problems with arbitrary constants had unique solutions led participants through fruitless 
explorations devoid of purposeful transitions or elicited low-level monitoring of flawed 
plans for procedural accuracy. In contrast, participants who exhibited arbitrary beliefs 
regarding problem solutions in this study tended to make more purposeful transitions as 
problem navigation informed the changing nature of the constants. Since Cameron was 
the only participant in the advanced mathematics course to consistently demonstrate 
arbitrary beliefs, one might conclude that secondary students are not receiving sufficient 
exposure to arbitrary variables and constants or may be developing unique beliefs from 
patterns within the secondary mathematics curriculum itself. 
In this study, performance control was related to participants’ beliefs regarding 
conceptual or procedural approaches to problem solving. Yet again, availing beliefs that 
concepts are interrelated typically led to meaningful transitions based on problem 
assessments; whereas the non-availing, simple belief that procedures are available for all 
problems typically led to dead-ends when the procedures had to be modified to account 
for problem assessments. Edwina’s overt assertion as well as other participants’ 
implications that mathematics teachers use too many cookie-cutter problems led to the 
following conclusion: secondary mathematics educators may be focusing too much time 
and energy developing procedures for mathematical exercises and not enough time and 
energy developing conceptual understanding. In that that the nature of reform 
mathematics and any constructivist-oriented curricula implies that mathematical problem 
solving is one medium for learning (NCTM, 2000), continued focus on procedural 
aspects of problems at the expense of conceptual understanding seems counterproductive 
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to the constructivist-oriented cause. Based on the findings of this study, a further 
conclusion can be that the development of beliefs that foster SRL processing should 
supersede, or at least coincide with, the implementation of constructivist-oriented
mathematics initiatives.  
Finally, the results of this study indicated that students’ rational and empirical
approaches to mathematical problem solving are related to processing during the 
performance control phase. As shown by the example above, participants demonstrating 
the more availing, logic-based rational beliefs tended to yield more productive self-
monitoring than their non-availing, perceptual-based empirical counterparts. The findings 
from this study also indicated that epistemological beliefs are interrelated, as suggested 
by Hofer (2004a). As evidenced in previous chapters, novice MPB participants 
implemented and monitored procedural plans based on the expectation of a unique
solution and upon the failure of the initial plan, began serially testing alternate procedures 
in an empirical fashion. In contrast, Cameron, basing his plans on the possibility of 
ambiguous solutions to the mathematical problems, assessed problem progress at a more 
conceptual level and transitioned logically and rationally as consideration of conditions 
moved toward problem goals. Although not consistent throughout the study, the presence 
of this progression indicates that epistemological beliefs may be interrelated and may also 
explain the preponderance of evidence obtained via axial coding of beliefs and SRL 
processing. Additionally, the myriad empirical codes generated by the advanced 
mathematics students in this study suggest that logic has been omitted or deemphasized 
in secondary mathematics curricula. Prior research has suggested that overt emphasis on 
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surface features of problems and pattern recognition may lead to empirical, as opposed to 
logical and rational, navigation of a problem space (Schoenfeld, 1988, 1989).  
Self-Reflection
Since most participants were unable to finish the problems, it was not possible to 
assess the self-reflection phase of SRL. The few codes that were obtained appeared to 
indicate that participants who held non-availing beliefs assigned ability-focused causal 
attributions to their failures, which promote further negative attitudes toward learning 
(Zimmerman, 2000). Future research is needed to investigate the relationships between 
epistemological beliefs and the self-reflection phase of SRL.
Mathematical Resources 
Findings from this study indicate that mathematical resources and epistemological 
beliefs work in tandem in relation to students’ SRL processing of problem-solving tasks. 
All participants passed the prerequisite course, AP Calculus AB, which dealt with topics 
presented in both the think-aloud and AP Calculus exam preparation problem-solving 
sessions. However, exposure to mathematical content does not imply accessibility 
(Schoenfeld, 1985, 1992). I assert that epistemological beliefs are indirectly related to 
the accessibility of mathematical resources. Edwina had the most notable deficiency in 
accessing appropriate mathematical resources to solve the think-aloud problems. She also 
stated that she had been converting mathematical knowledge to prescriptive procedures 
since entering high school. Thus, my assertion is that certain non-availing beliefs 
exacerbate students’ inability to conceptualize mathematical content, which in turn leads 
to deficiencies in recalling necessary content. Recall that Julia, who seemed more 
comfortable recalling appropriate calculus content for the application of integration 
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problem (see Appendix F), continuously applied procedures that carried her closer to a 
solution. However, she ultimately failed to make conceptual connections and thus, was 
unable to complete the problems. I further assert that developing students’ beliefs in 
conceptual approaches to mathematical problems will lead to improved access to 
mathematical resources. Further research is needed to investigate relationships between 
epistemological beliefs and students’ access to mathematical resources.
A Model for SRL, Epistemological Beliefs, and Mathematical Problem-Solving 
 Based on the findings of this study, the model suggested in the theoretical 
framework should be updated to include relational connections between epistemological 
beliefs and SRL processing (see Figure 11). Based on the findings in this study, 
unidirectional connections were utilized representing the hypothesis that epistemological 
beliefs affect certain phases of SRL. Future research is needed to determine whether 
Muis’ (2007) hypothesized reciprocal relationship between SRL and epistemological 
beliefs may be confirmed for the mathematical problem-solving domain. Prior research 
and literature has indicated that mathematics students enter a problem space with certain 
beliefs (Muis, 2004, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985, 1992). Based on the findings of this 
study, I suggest that these mathematical problem-solving beliefs (MPB) are variant 
attributes that affect SRL processing during problem solution attempts. The term variant 
attributes indicates that each set of beliefs lies on a continuum from availing to non-
availing and student expressions of beliefs may be inconsistent based on a plethora of 
factors, possibly including social and motivational issues (Muis, 2004). 
Additionally, it should be noted that Muis and Franco (2009) have applied 
structural equation modeling to determine relationships between Hofer and Pintrich’s 
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(1997) epistemological beliefs dimensions and college students’ self-reported SRL 
processing and achievement in a college-level educational psychology course. Assuming 
a domain-specific theory of epistemological beliefs, a goal of this study was to produce 
compelling evidence for relationships between possible mathematics-specific 
epistemological beliefs and SRL processes to inform the development of a study 
involving such methods as grounded theory or structural equation modeling (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2004; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006). The findings of this study 
suggest that relationships exist between epistemological beliefs and SRL processing. 
Thus, the researcher recommends that future studies continue this work by employing 
such methods as grounded theory or structural equation modeling.  


























SRL Processing Strategies Based on Task Demand 
In this study, participants who had emerging and availing MPBs required less 
cognitive and metacognitive regulation for the well-structured AP exam preparation 
problems than the ill-structured think-aloud problems. The lower cognitive demand of the 
AP exam preparation tasks allowed the availing MPB participants to engage in more 
productive group-monitoring than their novice MPB counterparts. This finding suggests 
that the inclusion of more ill-structured tasks into curricula promotes self-regulatory 
practices for well-attuned advanced mathematics students. However, for advanced 
students with novice MPB, more scaffolding may be required before a preponderance of 
ill-structured tasks are introduced. In fact, Lodewyk, Winne, and Jamieson-Noel (2009) 
suggested that teachers be cognizant of the cognitive level of tasks since tasks with too 
little cognitive demand promote individual work and tasks with too much cognitive 
demand promote reliance on others and loss of peer-learning opportunities. Hence, 
mathematics teachers should heed the cognitive developmental level of individual 
students and the collective level of groups when designing tasks. Professional 
development will likely be required to achieve this goal as mathematics teachers may 
lack the necessary skills to assess students’ cognitive developmental levels and the 
cognitive levels of tasks.  
Relationships Between Epistemological Beliefs  and Heuristic Strategies
In this study, participants who held non-availing beliefs applied more heuristic 
strategies while solving mathematical problems, but participants who held availing 
beliefs tended to be more productive in their application of heuristic strategies. This 
finding may be explained by considering participants’ prior experiences and the 
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definition of heuristic strategies. First, all participants had passed the previous course, 
AP Calculus AB. This course introduced participants to all of the heuristics which were 
needed in this study. Additionally, successful navigation through assessments in the AP 
Calculus AB course required students to apply heuristics. Second, Schoenfeld (1985) 
defined heuristic strategies as “techniques used by problem solvers when they run into 
difficulty” (p. 74). Participants in this study who held non-availing beliefs ran into 
difficulty more often than participants who held availing beliefs. Thus, it follows that 
participants who held non-availing beliefs would require the use of heuristics at a higher 
frequency than participants who held availing beliefs. Research may be warranted to 
investigate whether this pattern holds for mathematics students who are not on an 
advanced track. 
 Findings regarding the productivity of heuristic strategy use for participants who 
held availing beliefs further suggest that epistemological beliefs and access to 
mathematical resources are both related to SRL processing. The successful adaptation of 
heuristic strategies to mathematical problem-solving tasks is evidence of the performance 
control phase of SRL. The existence of a framework relating beliefs and resources to 
successful heuristic strategy usage may explain the lack of successful implementation of 
heuristics into American mathematics classrooms (Schoenfeld, 1985, 2007). It may be 
that the introduction of heuristic strategy usage into mathematics curricula and teachers’ 
pedagogical practices is more difficult than Schoenfeld (2007) has indicated.  
Effects of SRL and Epistemological Beliefs  on Performance 
The results of this case study indicate that problem solving performance is related 
to participants’ epistemological beliefs and SRL processing. This finding is congruent 
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with other studies that investigated SRL, beliefs, and performance (Cano, 2005; Lerch, 
2004; Lodewyk, 2007; Muis, 2008; Schoenfeld, 1982, 1985). A conclusion that may be 
drawn from this finding is that students with availing mathematical problem-solving 
beliefs (MPB) and, subsequently, either a self-control or self-regulated level of SRL 
mathematical problem-solving skill may be more successful in adapting to constructivist-
oriented mathematics curricula. The ability to make purposeful transitions based on 
logical, conceptual assessments of task progression appears to be an important 
component to successful navigation of mathematical problems, which is one component 
of constructivist-oriented mathematics curricula. As this study has indicated, such beliefs 
and skills may not come naturally to advanced mathematics students and the system itself 
may be promoting non-availing beliefs and then indirectly, reducing self-regulatory skill. 
As will be discussed further below, mathematics educators may potentially play a crucial 
role in students’ development of more availing beliefs and higher levels of self-regulatory 
skill. 
Disconnect Between Beliefs and Practice
 A further finding that emerged from this study is that participants’ verbalized, 
idealized problem-solving beliefs are not always consistent with their problem-solving 
practices. This finding was most prominent among novice MPB participants, who 
professed that conceptual problem-solving beliefs were preferable to procedural beliefs 
during their member-checking interviews, yet adhered to procedural approaches 
throughout the study. Additionally, the novice MPB participants made both explicit and 
implicit statements during interviews indicating procedural beliefs in problem solving.
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 One conclusion from this finding is that mere awareness that an epistemological 
belief is preferable may not imply adherence to that belief. A ramification of this 
conclusion is that students may need more than exposure to availing mathematical 
problem-solving beliefs. The participants in this study were taught in a calculus course 
that emphasized the conceptual over the procedural, yet this exposure was insufficient in 
breaking the cycle of procedural adherence which had been developed in previous 
mathematics courses. Thus, mathematics educators may need to develop alternative 
methods for scaffolding conceptual beliefs in problem-solving through creative and 
research-based pedagogical interventions. 
 An additional conclusion that may be gleaned from this finding is that self-
regulatory problem-solving skill may be more dependent upon the manifestation of 
students’ internally held epistemological beliefs than the external, verbalized expressions 
of their beliefs. This relationship explicates the findings from this study. Applying the 
assumption that each set of beliefs in this study lies on a continuum, we may assume that 
novice MPB participants were near the procedural end of the continuum (Hofer, 2000; 
Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2004; Schommer, 1990). Their idealized beliefs in a 
conceptual approach to mathematical problem-solving emerged when probed during 
interviews but the overwhelming power of ingrained procedurally-based mathematical 
practices may have hampered conceptualization of the problem space and thus, led to 
their lack of control demonstrated during the study. Mathematics educators and 
researchers need to be cognizant that expressed, self-reported availing beliefs should be 
tempered with actual students’ behaviors and alternative means of measuring the 
manifestations of epistemological beliefs may need to be considered.
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 Uncovering a disconnect between students’  beliefs and practice may not be 
surprising to the mathematics education community because studies indicating a 
disconnect between teachers’ beliefs and practice proliferate the body of literature 
(Philipp, 2007; Thompson, 1992). Similar to findings regarding sources of non-availing 
beliefs, research suggests that the source of teachers’ disconnect between beliefs and 
practice is the system itself. Specifically, time constraints, classroom-management issues, 
and political, social, and parental pressures cause teachers to abandon their beliefs about 
mathematics teaching and learning and assume a more constrained, traditional teaching 
role.
Limitations
The design of this study necessitated a small sample size and the establishment of 
specific, closed boundaries, which provided thick, rich descriptive results for the 
purposes of exploration. This design was effective since the study sought a deeper 
understanding of specific phenomena than may be obtained by more general studies of 
larger samples. Thus, the findings reported in this study cannot be generalized beyond the 
bounded case setting presented. Additionally, an unfortunate side effect to the sampling 
strategy was that only one participant, Cameron, was found to display advanced MPB 
throughout the study. Thus, findings involving Cameron’s data must be tempered with 
the fact that no corroborating cases were available. Although Olivia and Martin provided 
some availing beliefs data for the purposes of triangulation, no participants demonstrated 
availing beliefs throughout the entire duration of the study to directly and globally 
compare with Cameron’s achievements.
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An additional limitation to this study was the use of the think-aloud methodology. 
Although successfully applied to studies of epistemological beliefs (Hofer, 2004a; Muis, 
2008) and SRL (Greene & Azevedo, 2009; Muis, 2008), the think-aloud technique does 
not produce a complete depiction of participants’ cognitive processing while engaged in a 
task (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). According to Ericsson and Simon (1993), the Type II 
think-aloud and retrospective report technique that was applied to the study only incurs a 
small effect on problem-solving processes but may not provide a fully consistent or 
complete representation of participants’ cognitive and metacognitive activities. 
Additionally, Olivia struggled with the think-aloud process despite working every 
practice problem available to her. As mentioned in the previous chapter, her 
verbalizations were often vague and somewhat incoherent. She was coaxed during the 
think-loud sessions to keep talking but still was unable to produce a complete cognitive 
report. Consequently, findings became more inferential based on a combination of her 
written work, think-aloud verbalizations, and retrospective reports. 
An argument may be developed asserting that issues of group dynamics limited 
the findings of the study during the AP exam preparation sessions. However, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, issues of group dynamics provided an additional opportunity to 
assess participants’ abilities to regulate their learning environment. Zimmerman (2000) 
cited “attention focusing” as a self-control mechanism that can be invoked during the 
performance control phase to overcome both covert and overt distractions (p. 19). 
Participants who mentioned having problems with group dynamics but whose results 
indicated they had overcome them demonstrated application of attention focusing
processing. However, participants who allowed issues of group dynamics to affect their 
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group-regulatory participation and performance were focusing on deficits in their 
learning process, which Zimmerman claims eventually may lead to adverse effects on 
learning.
 Finally, researcher bias based on personal, underlying assumptions may have 
influenced interpretations of the results in this study. I do not issue an apology for this 
bias but rather embrace it as a necessary mechanism for conducting qualitative research. I 
have intentionally provided an interpretation of the findings of this study based on a 
constructivist approach to learning mathematics grounded in social cognitive theory. 
Additionally, methodological tools (i.e., maximum variation sampling, multiple sources 
of data, member-checking interviews) were employed in order to enhance internal 
validity. Researchers who approach my data from differing philosophical orientations 
may draw different conclusions from the findings. Hence, the findings of this exploratory 
case study should be assessed from the viewpoint that mathematical knowledge may be 
developed by students of their own volition in tandem with peers. In my opinion, this 
viewpoint on learning mathematics necessitated further understanding of students’ 
abilities to self-regulate their learning in authentic mathematical problem-solving settings 
and provided a justification for the study. 
Implications for Practice
 After the NCTM (2000) introduced recommendations for reforming the teaching 
of mathematics, school districts across America altered curricula to adhere to a more 
constructivist, problem-solving-based approach to teaching and learning mathematics. 
Unfortunately, many states have already abandoned constructivist-oriented curricula and 
reverted to traditional, back-to-basics mathematics instruction due to political pressures 
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that seem to ignore the failures of the most recent national back-to-basics movement 
(Schoenfeld, 2007). The results of this exploratory multiple-case study inform problem-
solving-based pedagogy. These insights into problem-solving-based pedagogy may help 
mathematics educators implement constructivist-oriented curricula and shed light on 
future constructivist-oriented movements, which Schoenfeld (2007) predicted will 
eventually return in the typical cyclic fashion of educational reform.  
All participants in this case study were on a highly-advanced mathematics track. 
Specifically, five of the six participants registered for the multivariable calculus course 
offered at the school during their senior year. Edwina was in her senior year while taking 
the course involved in this study and thus, did not have the option of taking the 
multivariable calculus course. The multivariable calculus course is aligned with course 
descriptions from local universities’ third-semester calculus courses. Despite their 
successful navigation through advanced secondary mathematics courses, five of the six 
participants struggled when presented with a novel problem to solve during the think-
aloud sessions. Although not generalizable, this finding provides compelling evidence 
that even successful secondary mathematics students are not learning with conceptual 
understanding. The findings of this study suggest that the development of availing MPB 
in conjunction with self-regulatory processing skills influence successful problem solving 
and thus, influence implementation of constructivist-oriented mathematics curricula.   
Based on the discussion above, recommendations for practicing mathematics 
educators, school administrators, and curriculum developers follow: 
1. Mathematics educators should evaluate students’ MPB early in the course. Such 
assessment may be done by self-report instrument or qualitative probing. 
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Educators should assess qualitatively since instrument completion consumes 
valuable class time and findings from self-report instruments may be unreliable 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2007; Winne & Perry, 
2000). Qualitative assessments may be made via individual conversations with 
students as they complete class work and assessments of student work. 
Curriculum developers and school administrators should consider providing 
mathematics teachers appropriate training regarding epistemological beliefs so 
that assessments may be developed and implemented appropriately. 
2. Based on student evaluations of beliefs, mathematics educators should incorporate 
the development of availing MPB into their pedagogy. Specifically, mathematics 
educators should align learning goals, instructional habits, and authentic 
assessments with the availing beliefs discussed in this study. Cano (2005) 
suggested that merely informing students of availing beliefs is insufficient; rather, 
pedagogy should be in constant and consistent agreement with espoused beliefs. 
To facilitate sustainability of any implemented initiatives, assessment of the 
effectiveness of developing students’ beliefs may be distributed to teachers via 
collaborative communities of professional learning and growth (Hargreaves & 
Fink, 2006; Harris, 2006; Katzenmeyer & Moller, 2001).  
3. Despite the findings of this study, mathematics educators should not assume that 
developing availing MPB in students will naturally lead to the development of 
self-regulatory skill in mathematical problem solving (Zimmerman, 2000). 
Zimmerman suggested that self-regulatory skill development depends on 
significant social influences during the observation and emulation levels.
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However, social influences should taper off as student behaviors indicate 
attainment of the self-control and self-regulation levels. Thus, it is recommended
that mathematics educators incorporate self-regulatory skill development into 
their pedagogy and differentiate pedagogical decision making (e.g., teacher-based 
assistance, group assignments, cognitive level of tasks) based on assessments of 
individual students’ self-regulatory prowess. Initially, school administrators 
should provide sufficient professional development to teachers based on their 
level of understanding of SRL. Then, assessments of the implementation of 
initiatives may be monitored via professional learning communities. 
4. Finally, Perels, Gürtler, and Schmitz (2005) suggested that combining formal 
SRL training with formal problem-solving skill training for students may provide 
the optimal means for developing students’ mastery of both skills. It is further 
recommended that students’ MPB be added to any such developmental program. 
Based on the findings of this study and Perels, Gürtler, and Schmitz’s study, it is 
recommended that school systems adopting, or currently implementing, 
constructivist-oriented curricula use the combined resources of mathematics 
teachers and curriculum developers to infuse a combination of SRL, MPB, and 
problem-solving skills training into secondary mathematics courses. This addition 
would not add to the curriculum but serve as a way to introduce process standards 
to complement the curriculum and provide an alternative engine for pedagogical 
practice to the current, more direct approach that is once again prevailing in many 
secondary mathematics classrooms (Schoenfeld, 2007).  
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Implications for Future Research
Based on the results of this study, recommendations are made for future research. 
This multiple-case study explored the relationships between epistemological beliefs and 
SRL processing during mathematical problem-solving in an effort to inform possible 
extensions on research along this vein (Schoenfeld, 1985; Muis, 2008). Upon deep 
reflection of the results and conclusions derived from this study, the following 
recommendations for future research are provided:
1. The majority of findings in this study converged on the performance control phase 
of SRL. Future research should investigate deeper the effects of epistemological 
beliefs on the definition of the task, forethought, and self-reflection phases of SRL
during mathematical problem solving. 
2. Similar to the suggestion above, further research should investigate the effects of 
source of knowledge and justification of knowing on SRL processing during 
mathematical problem-solving, as little data emerged from the current study to 
inform these sets of beliefs. Qualitative or mixed methods approaches seem most 
appropriate to this task as we still know little about how beliefs affect self-
regulatory skill in problem-solving and self-report instruments continue to 
demonstrate insufficient reliability.
3. Since this study investigated advanced mathematics students, it is recommend that 
future researchers replicate or adapt this study to investigate mathematics students 
at other levels of achievement. To better inform productive change in the 
development of mathematics education initiatives, input is needed as to which 
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results from this study converge and which results diverge with respect to other 
populations of mathematics students.  
4. To address issues of researcher bias and additional limitations inherent in the 
design of this study, a call for research on larger populations is suggested to 
assess the transferability and generalizability of findings to other populations of 
advanced mathematics students. Similar studies may also be merited on other 
populations once qualitative studies, as advised above, are conducted. I suggest 
that two types of studies may sufficiently address such a request: (a) grounded 
theory study on a larger population to determine if similar findings emerge, and 
(b) mixed methods study with a large population combining a case study similar 
to the current study with a subset of the sample and structural equation modeling 
for the entire sample. 
My final call for research is presented in prose form as it is nearer to my heart and 
based on a deeper level of meditation and reflection on the findings of this study. I call 
for a new generation of researchers, a generation that conducts studies in the trenches. I 
call for research to emerge from those who sit side-by-side with the participants daily 
and know them better than anyone else. It is time to truly merge theory and practice and 
who better suited to do so than the practitioners! Why do my findings echo those of other 
researchers preceding me by three decades? Are the engines of change in education truly 
that rusty or are we (teachers) failing to provide the necessary propulsion? It is our 
classroom. It is our hour. It is our semester. Are we willing to construct the knowledge 
necessary to implement positive change in the mathematics classroom or are we merely
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hypocrites who cannot practice what we preach? It is time to merge theory with practice 
and the responsibility is on us. 
Researcher Reflections
As I reflect on this dissertation research journey, I do so with solemnity and awe. 
I have attempted through this study to provide an accurate and revealing glimpse into the 
lived experiences of select advanced secondary mathematics students as they solved 
problems. The qualitative research paradigm has, in my opinion, provided an appropriate 
medium for analyzing this phenomenon. My students have voluntarily spoken for 
themselves and I have attempted to capture the essence of their voices, both the overt and 
the covert. I am hopeful that each participant took away from his or her personal 
experiences further insights into his or her role as a learner and crafter of mathematical 
knowledge.  
 In conducting this research and reporting my findings, my goal was to provide the 
larger research community with a clear depiction of the relationships that exist amongst 
the three converging constructs studied: self-regulated learning, epistemological beliefs, 
and mathematical problem solving. I feel confident that this study will place another 
brick in the wall that represents mathematics-education research and hope that future 
researchers, possibly even teacher researchers, are able to continue building onto my 
portion of the wall. I am a firm believer that mathematics education needs to continue on 
the reform path explicated by NCTM (2000) and that the constructivist philosophy needs 
to be infused into more curricula and pedagogy. I have conducted research that informs 
pedagogical and institutional changes necessary for the furtherance of the mathematics 
education reform. In doing so, I have gained significant insights into the needs of my own 
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students that will inform and enhance my practice as a secondary mathematics teacher. 
Locally, I plan to place added focus on students’ beliefs as I assess progress and promote 
availing beliefs practices amongst my students. Globally, I plan to share my findings via 
communities of learning at my school and larger forums, such as conferences and 
convocations. I also intend to continue providing research from the trenches and provide 
an outlet for student voices in the hopes that someone is listening.
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Participant Consent Form
My signature below indicates that I have read the information provided and have decided to participate in 
the study titled Epistemological Beliefs and Self-Regulated Learning: A Case Study of AP Calculus Test 
Preparation and Advanced Problem Solving to be conducted at school between the dates of January 5, 
2010 and March 31, 2010.  I understand that the signature of the principal and classroom teacher 
indicates they have agreed to allow student participation in this research project.   
 
I understand the purpose of the research project will be to determine why and how mathematical beliefs 
affect self-regulation of problem-solving tasks and that I will participate in the following manner:  
 
1. All students will complete AP Calculus exam practice problems in a journal. 
2. If your are one of six students chosen for the case study, two additional problem solving sessions of 
one-hour duration will be completed after school. 
3. For confirmation of data, your may be asked to participate in an interview after school of approximately 
30-minute duration. 
 
Potential benefits of the study are: increased performance on AP exam, increased performance in the 
course, increased performance in mathematical problem solving, development of self-regulatory skills, 
and development of problem-solving strategies. 
 
I agree to the following conditions with the understanding that I can withdraw from the study at any time 
should I choose to discontinue participation.   
 
! The identity of participants will be protected. No student names will appear in any of the data 
collected or in the final report of the findings. Additionally, all data will be destroyed within five 
years of the completion of the study. 
 
! Information gathered during the course of the project will become part of the data analysis and 
may contribute to published research reports and presentations.  
 
! There are no foreseeable inconveniences or risks involved in participating in the study.  
 
! Participation in the study is voluntary and will not affect either student grades or placement 
decisions. Students who do not participate in the study will continue to participate in classroom 
activities and receive the same AP exam practice as their peers, but no data will be collected as a 
result of their work. If I decide to withdraw permission after the study begins, I will notify the 
school of my decision.  
 
If further information is needed regarding the research study, I can contact James Clinton Stockton at 




     Participant      Date 
 
Signature____________________________________________________________________________ 
     Principal      Date 
 
Signature____________________________________________________________________________ 
     Classroom Teacher/Researcher    Date  
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Parental Consent Form 
My signature below indicates that I have read the information provided and have decided to allow my 
child to participate in the study titled Epistemological Beliefs and Self-Regulated Learning: A Case Study of 
AP Calculus Test Preparation and Advanced Problem Solving to be conducted at my child’s school 
between the dates of January 5, 2010 and March 31, 2010.  I understand that the signature of the 
principal and classroom teacher indicates they have agreed to allow student participation in this research 
project.   
 
I understand the purpose of the research project will be to determine why and how mathematical beliefs 
affect self-regulation of problem-solving tasks and that my child will participate in the following manner:  
 
1. All students will complete AP Calculus exam practice problems in a journal. 
2. If your child is one of six students chosen for the case study, two additional problem solving sessions of 
one-hour duration will be completed after school. 
3. For confirmation of data, your child may be asked to participate in an interview after school of 
approximately 30-minute duration. 
 
Potential benefits of the study are: increased performance on AP exam, increased performance in the 
course, increased performance in mathematical problem solving, development of self-regulatory skills, 
and development of problem-solving strategies. 
 
I agree to the following conditions with the understanding that I can withdraw my child from the study at 
any time should I choose to discontinue participation.   
 
! The identity of participants will be protected. No student names will appear in any of the data 
collected or in the final report of the findings. Additionally, all data will be destroyed within five 
years of the completion of the study. 
 
! Information gathered during the course of the project will become part of the data analysis and 
may contribute to published research reports and presentations.  
 
! There are no foreseeable inconveniences or risks involved to my child participating in the study.  
 
! Participation in the study is voluntary and will not affect either student grades or placement 
decisions. Students who do not participate in the study will continue to participate in classroom 
activities and receive the same AP exam practice as their peers, but no data will be collected as a 
result of their work. If I decide to withdraw permission after the study begins, I will notify the 
school of my decision.  
 
If further information is needed regarding the research study, I can contact James Clinton Stockton at 




     Parent      Date 
 
Signature____________________________________________________________________________ 
     Principal      Date 
 
Signature____________________________________________________________________________  




Indiana Mathematics Beliefs Scale (IMBS; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992) 
1. Memorizing steps is not that useful for learning to solve word problems. 
2. Learning computational skills is more important than learning to solve word 
 problems. 
3. There are word problems that just can’t be solved by following a predetermined 
sequence of steps.
4. If I can’t do a math problem in a few minutes, I probably can’t do it at all.  
5. Computational skills are of little value if you can’t use them to solve word 
 problems. 
6. Mathematics will not be important to me in my life’s work. 
7. Most word problems can be solved by using the correct step-by-step procedure.
8. I find I can do hard math problems if I just hang in there. 
9. By trying hard, one can become smarter in math. 
10. A person who can’t solve word problems really can’t do math. 
11. Working can improve one’s ability in mathematics. 
12. I study mathematics because I know how useful it is. 
13. Ability in math increases when one studies hard. 
14. It’s not important to understand why a mathematical procedure works as long as it 
gives a correct answer.
15. Math classes should not emphasize word problems. 
16. Studying mathematics is a waste of time.
17. Word problems can be solved without remembering formulas. 
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18. A person who doesn’t understand why an answer to a math problem is correct 
hasn’t really solved the problem.
19. Any word problem can be solved if you know the right steps to follow. 
20. I’m not very good at solving math problems that take a while to figure out. 
21. It doesn’t really matter if you understand a math problem if you can get the right 
answer.
22. Hard work can increase one’s ability to do math. 
23. Learning to do word problems is mostly a matter of memorizing the right steps to 
 follow. 
24. In addition to getting a right answer in mathematics, it is important to understand 
why the answer is correct.  
25. I can get smarter in math if I try.
26. Getting a right answer in math is more important than understanding why the 
answer works.
27. Math problems that take a long time don’t bother me. 
28. Knowing mathematics will help me earn a living.
29. Word problems are not a very important part of mathematics. 
30. Time used to investigate why a solution to a math problem works is time well 
 spent. 
31. I can get smarter in math by trying hard. 
32. If I can’t solve a math problem quickly, I quit trying. 
33. Mathematics is of no relevance to my life.
34. Computational skills are useless if you can’t apply them to real life situations.
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35. I feel I can do math problems that take a long time to complete.
36. Mathematics is a worthwhile and necessary subject.
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College Board Approval to Use AP Questions 
For the purposes of confidentiality, personal information has been omitted. 
09/30/09 
Name : James Stockton
Email:  james.stockton@cobbk12.org 
RE:  2000 - 2009 Calculus AB and BC free response questions 
Dear James Stockton: 
Thank you for your request to reproduce the aforementioned AP Material for the 
purposes indicated below:  
Title of Your Work:  Self-regulation, epistemology, problem solving, gifted students    
Author: James C. Stockton, AP Calculus AB/BC teacher 





Permission to use the aforementioned Items is granted and is contingent upon the 
following: 
1)Permission is granted on a one-time, non-exclusive, and non-transferable basis.
2)Please include the following credit line, exactly as written below, in each instance 
where the Items appear: 
Source: Copyright Â© 2009. The College Board.  Reproduced with permission.  
http://apcentral.collegeboard.com.
Please refer to the above contract number in any further correspondence.  
Thank you, 
Kelly Fitzsimmons
Assistant Director, AP Policy and Publications
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Email Approval to Use the Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales
For the purposes of confidentiality, personal information has been omitted. 
Clint,
The only restriction on use of the Indiana Scales involves selling them for profit and I 
can’t imagine that’s your aim — you are quite welcome to use them and to include them 
in your appendices.  You do not need to get permission for the Fennema-Sherman 
Usefulness scale.  Good luck with your dissertation. 
Peter Kloosterman 
Professor of Mathematics Education 
School of Education 3274  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, IN 47405  
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Email Approval the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire 
For the purposes of confidentiality, personal information has been omitted. 
I mail out the MSLQ for a fee of $20.  Make your check payable to the 
University of Michigan.  With this payment, you are allowed to use 
the MSLQ  for your needs  but making sure you give the authors 
credit.   You can copy the MSLQ for your needs and also put it on a  
password protected website for your people but do not distribute it  
outside of your group. 
Also, I am willing to send it out before I receive your 
check so you can get it as soon as possible. Please send me back
your complete address and I will use that as my label.  ...Marie 
___________________________________________
Marie-Anne Bien, Secretary 
The University of Michigan 
Combined Program in Education & Psychology (CPEP)
610 East University, 1413 School of Education 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1259 
___________________________________________
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Email Approval to Use the Psycho-Epistemic Profile
For the purposes of confidentiality, personal information has been omitted. 
From  Dr. Leo Mos
To  James Clinton Stockton 
Date   Monday, September 28 
Subject  Re: Request to purchase and use PEP
Hi Clint, I will forward a copy of the PEP if you send me your address. I haven't worked 
with the PEP since the late-60s and certainly have not kept up with the literature. The 
Manual (to which I have copyright) also contains the questionnaire, use it as you deem 
fit. Best wishes on the doctoral research. Leo 
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Figure 12. Distribution of Scores for the Indiana Mathematics Belief Scales (IMBS): 
























































































Figure 17. Distribution of Scores for the IMBS: Belief 6 Scale (N = 30). 
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Figure 18. Distribution of Scores for the Motivated Strategies for Learning (MSLQ): 
Intrinsic Goal Orientation Scale (N = 30). 


























































































































Figure 25. Distribution of Scores for the Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP): Rational 


































Figure 27. Distribution of Scores for the PEP: Metaphorical Scale (N = 30).
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Appendix E: Advanced Placement (AP) Exam Preparation 
Instrumentation and Protocols
* Source: Copyright © 2010. The College Board.  Reproduced with permission.  
http://apcentral.collegeboard.com.
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AP Exam Preparation Journal Entry Format 
 
Student: As you work, record your thinking, planning, and 
Date: strategy use on this side. Be very detailed and 
AP Question Year and Number: record ALL actions involved in solution 
development.






Classroom Observation Protocol 
 
Students:   
Date and Time:
AP Question Year and Number:
Sketch of group with relative positioning:   
    
    
    
    
    
Descriptive Notes: Reflective Notes:
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Appendix F: Think-Aloud Session Instrumentation and Protocols 
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Application of Differentiation Problem-Solving Task 
Suppose $ % 3 2 , 0f x ax bx cx d a# ( ( ( ' , represents a family of cubic functions. 
a) If possible, find a, b, c, and d such that f has exactly two horizontal   
 tangents and exactly one root. Justify your solution. 
b) If possible, find a, b, c, and d such that f is concave up on $ %,&7 7 . Justify 
 your solution. 
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Application of Integration Problem-Solving Task 
Let $ % mxh x e&# , where m is a nonzero, positive integer.  
a) Suppose the area, 1A , bounded by h and the lines 0y # , 0x # , and 2x # . Find 
the equation of the vertical line that divides 1A  exactly in half. Justify your 
solution. 
b) Suppose the area, 2A , bounded by h and the lines 1 2y #  and 0x # . Find the 
equation of the horizontal line that divides 2A  exactly in half. Justify your 
solution. 
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Think-Aloud Problem-Solving Session #1 Protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) 
In this experiment I am interested in what you think about when you are working on a 
calculus problem. To explore this, I am going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you work 
on given problems. What I mean by think aloud is that I want you to tell me 
EVERYTHING you are thinking from the time you first see the problem until you give 
me an answer. I would like you talk aloud CONSTANTLY from the time I present each 
problem until you have given your final answer. I don’t want you to try to plan out what 
you say or try to explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if you are alone in the 
room speaking to yourself. It is most important that you keep talking. If you are silent for 
any long period of time I will ask you to talk. Do you understand what I want you to do? 
PRACTICE PROBLEM # 1
Good, now we will begin with a practice problem. Please solve the following problem 
and think aloud as you do so. 
Give student Practice Problem #1. Student will work the problem and think aloud.
If the student is silent for 10 – 15 seconds, prompt them to “KEEP TALKING.”
Good, now I want to see how much you can remember about what you were thinking 
from the time you read the problem until you gave the answer. I am interested in what 
you actually can REMEMBER rather than what you think you must have thought. If 
possible I would like you to tell about your memories in the sequence in which they 
occurred while working on the problem. Please tell me if you are uncertain about any of 
your memories. I don’t want you to work on solving the problem again, just report what 
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you can remember thinking about when solving the problem. Now tell me what you can 
remember. 
Student will respond.
PRACTICE PROBLEM # 2
Good. Now I will give you one more practice problem before we proceed to the problems 
I will be analyzing. I want you to do the same thing for this problem. I want you to think 
aloud as before as you think about the problem, and after you have answered it I will ask 
you to report all that you can remember about your thinking. Any questions? Here is your 
next problem. 
Give student Practice Problem #2. Student will work the problem and think aloud. 
If the student is silent for 10 – 15 seconds, prompt them to “KEEP TALKING.” 
Now tell me all that you can remember about your thinking.  
Student will respond.
PROBLEMS FOR THE STUDY
Good, now I have two problems that I will be analyzing for the study. You will receive 
an application of differentiation problem first. If you complete it, you may receive an 
application of integration problem if time allows. You will think aloud as you work on 
the problem(s) for thirty minutes. 
Give student the Application of Differentiation problem. Student will work the 
problem and think aloud. If the student is silent for 10 – 15 seconds, prompt them to 
“KEEP TALKING.” If student finishes the problem with sufficient time remaining, 
give them the Application of Integration problem.
Now tell me all that you can remember about your thinking.  
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Student will respond. I will provide cognitive feedback for the purposes of SRL 
processing.
Thank you very much for participating. When you return for your second session, you 
will continue working on the current problem. The second session will be similar to this 
one in terms of structure. You may think about the problem during the interval between 
sessions if you wish. 
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Think-Aloud Problem-Solving Session #2 Protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) 
In this experiment I am interested in what you think about when you are working on a 
calculus problem. To explore this, I am going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you work 
on given problems. What I mean by think aloud is that I want you to tell me 
EVERYTHING you are thinking from the time you first see the problem until you give 
me an answer. I would like you talk aloud CONSTANTLY from the time I present each 
problem until you have given your final answer. I don’t want you to try to plan out what 
you say or try to explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if you are alone in the 
room speaking to yourself. It is most important that you keep talking. If you are silent for 
any long period of time I will ask you to talk. Do you understand what I want you to do? 
Good, do you need a practice problem for this session?  
PRACTICE PROBLEM # 3 (IF NEEDED)
If yes:  Please solve the following problem and think aloud as you do so. 
Give student Practice Problem #3. Student will work the problem and think aloud.
If the student is silent for 10 – 15 seconds, prompt them to “KEEP TALKING.” 
Good, now I want to see how much you can remember about what you were thinking 
from the time you read the problem until you gave the answer. I am interested in what 
you actually can REMEMBER rather than what you think you must have thought. If 
possible I would like you to tell about your memories in the sequence in which they 
occurred while working on the problem. Please tell me if you are uncertain about any of 
your memories. I don’t want you to work on solving the problem again, just report what 
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you can remember thinking about when solving the problem. Now tell me what you can 
remember.  
Student will respond.
Good. Now, do you need another practice problem?  
PRACTICE PROBLEM # 4 (IF NEEDED)
If yes:  I want you to do the same thing for this problem. I want you to think aloud as 
before as you think about the problem, and after you have answered it I will ask you to 
report all that you can remember about your thinking. Any questions? Here is your next 
problem. 
Give student Practice Problem #4. Student will work the problem and think aloud. 
If the student is silent for 10 – 15 seconds, prompt them to “KEEP TALKING.”
Now tell me all that you can remember about your thinking.  
Student will respond.
PROBLEMS FOR THE STUDY
Good, now let’s return to the problems that I will be analyzing for the study. You will 
think aloud as you work on the problems for thirty minutes. 
Give student appropriate problem solving task. Student will work the problem and 
think aloud. If the student is silent for 10 – 15 seconds, prompt them to “KEEP 
TALKING.” If student finishes the Application of Differentiation problem with 
sufficient time remaining, give them the Application of Integration problem.
Good, now I want to see how much you can remember about what you were thinking 
from the time you read the problem until you gave the answer. I am interested in what 
you actually can REMEMBER rather than what you think you must have thought. If 
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possible I would like you to tell about your memories in the sequence in which they 
occurred while working on the problem. Please tell me if you are uncertain about any of 
your memories. I don’t want you to work on solving the problem again, just report what 
you can remember thinking about when solving the problem. Now tell me what you can 
remember. 
Student will respond. Thank you very much for participating. 
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Appendix G: Follow-Up Interview Protocol




“The purpose of this interview is to provide you an opportunity to review my initial 
findings and ensure that my final report will be an accurate representation of your 
experiences.”
Questions: 
1. Please review the following document which summarizes the results of your 
participation in this research project.
Notes:
2. Do you concur with the findings of the study in relation to your participation? 
Notes:
3. Is there a better way these findings could clarify or better describe your 
participation in this study? If so, how? 
Notes:
4. Do you think the results of this study could be used to improve students’ abilities 
to solve mathematical problems? If so, how? 
Notes:
“Thank you very much for your participation in this study.” 
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Appendix H: Code Book
PHASES OF SRL (Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000) 
** Roman numerated items indicate macro-level nodes. Bulleted items indicate 
micro-level codes with suggestions of even more specific, finer-grained codes for 
specific student behaviors. **
I. Definition of Task
! Reading and re-reading the problem (RP) (Schoenfeld, 1985) – noting 
conditions of the problem (NC), identifying goal state (IG), assessment of content 
knowledge based on task (CK) 
! External Feedback (Nicol & Macfarlane-Dick, 2006; Winne & Hadwin, 1995) 
– reaction to peer feedback (PF), reaction to teacher feedback (TF)
! Analysis of the Problem (AP) (Schoenfeld, 1985) – establish relationship(s) 
between conditions and goal (ER)
II. Forethought
! General Planning (GP) (Greene & Azevedo, 2009; Pintrich, 2000) – overt 
evidence of mastery-approach goal orientation (MGAP), overt evidence of 
mastery-avoidance goal orientation (MGAV),overt evidence of performance-
approach goal orientation (PGAP), overt evidence of performance-avoidance goal 
orientation (MGAV), prior knowledge activation (PK), recycle goal in working 
memory (RG)
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! Problem-Solving Planning (PSP) (Schoenfeld, 1985) – assessment of plan (AP), 
inferred planning (IP), overt planning (OP)
III. Performance Control
! Self-control (SC) (Zimmerman, 2000) – self-instruction (SI), imagery (IM), 
attention focusing (AF), task strategies (TS)
! Self-Observation (SO) (Zimmerman, 2000) – evidence of internal feedback 
(IF), performance-focused self-observations (PF), deficit-focused self-observation 
(DF)
! Regulating Motivation (RM) (Garcia & Pintrich, 1994) – self-handicapping 
(SH), defensive pessimism (DP), self-affirmation (SA), attributional style (AT), 
self-consequating (SC), environmental control (EC), interest enhancement (IE), 
performance self-talk (PST), mastery self-talk (MST)
! Exploration of problem space (EXP) (Schoenfeld, 1985) – continuing on “wild 
goose chase” (WGC), monitoring progress (MP), purposeful exploration (PU) 
! Implementation of Problem-Solving Plan (IMP) (Schoenfeld, 1985) – global 
assessment of implementation (GA), local assessment of implementation (LA)
! Strategy Use (SU) (Greene & Azevedo, 2009) – accessing memory (AM), re-
reading problem (RP), inferences (IN), hypothesizing (HY), knowledge 
elaboration (KE) 
! Heuristic Strategies (HS) (Polya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1985) – draw a picture 
(DP), recall a similar problem (RSP), solve a simpler/similar problem (SP),
subgoals (decomposing and recombining) (DR), introduce appropriate notation 
(NO), restate the problem (RP), set up equations (EQ)
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! Monitoring (MO) (Greene & Azevedo, 2009) – judgment of learning (JL), 
feeling of knowing (FK), self-questioning (SQ), monitor progress toward goals 
(MG), monitor use of strategies (MS)
! Problem-Solving Transitions Based on New Information (TR) (Schoenfeld, 
1985) – assessment of current solution state (AC), attempt to salvage work (SW), 
assessment of appropriateness of new direction (AD), assessment of short- or 
long-term effects of new direction (ED), “jumping in” to new direction (JI) 
! Task Difficulty and Demands (TD) (Greene & Azevedo, 2009) – time and 
effort planning (TE), assessment of task difficulty (TD), expectation of adequacy 
of information (AI)
IV. Self-reflection
! Self-evaluation (SE) (Zimmerman, 2000) – mastery criteria (MC), current 
functioning (CF), past performance (PP), normative criteria (NC)
! Causal Attributions (CA) (Zimmerman, 2000) – ability-focused (AF), strategy-
focused (SF)
! Verification of Solution (VS) (Schoenfeld, 1985) – review of solution (RS), 
testing of solution (TS), assessment of confidence in solution (AC)
! Assessment of Future Use of Methods (FM) (Polya, 1957) – global assessment 
of methods used (GA), discovery of new or better solution for current problem 
(NBS), expression of usefulness of result for future work (UF)
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GROUP REGULATION (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Goos, Galbraith, & 
Renshaw, 2002) 
** When solving problems in groups, Schoenfeld’s problem-solving framework, as 
coded above, will suffice for the majority of student behaviors. However, this section 
of the codebook provides codes for group-problem-solving specific behaviors. **
! Group-specific problem-solving behaviors (GPS) – watching and listening 
(WL) 
! Group problem-solving monitoring (GMO) – self-disclosure (SD), feedback 
request (FR), other-monitoring (OM)
! Group problem-solving verification (GPV) – testing solutions (TS) 
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DIMENSIONS OF GENERAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS (Hofer, 2000; 
Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis & Franco, 2009) 
** Roman numerated items indicate macro-level nodes. Bulleted items indicate 
micro-level codes with operational definitions to help identify specific instances of 
students expressing each belief. It should be noted that a dimensionality stance on 
beliefs implies a continuum exists for each dimension. Thus, individuals will express 
differing degrees of beliefs for each dimension, often exhibiting contradictions, and 
typically context-dependent.**
I. Certainty of Knowledge (CE)
! Overt evidence of fixed belief (FI) – def.: knowledge cannot be doubted, 
everyone will develop the same conclusions  
! Overt evidence of fluid belief (FL)– def.: knowledge is not certain, knowledge 
evolves as more info is gathered
II. Simplicity of Knowledge (SI)
! Overt evidence of straightforward belief (ST)– def.: knowledge is one fact after 
another and unrelated
! Overt evidence of interrelated belief (IN) – def.: conceptual meanings are 
complex, relative to others, and contextually dependent 
III. Source of Knowledge (SO)
! Overt evidence of external belief (EX) – def.: knowledge is handed down from 
authority; authority should not be questioned 
! Overt evidence of internal belief (IN) – def.: knowledge constructed by 
interactions, logic, and/or evidence; experts should be questioned 
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IV. Justification of Knowledge (JU)
! Overt evidence of authoritative belief (AU) – def.: knowledge claims are 
accepted if authorities come to consensus
! Overt evidence of personal belief (PE) – def.: knowledge claims are accepted 
based on experience-based logic and/or evidence 
V. Attainability of Truth (ATT)
! Overt evidence in belief of attainability of truth (AT) – def.: every question or 
problem has a solution 
! Overt evidence of belief in non-attainability of truth (NA) – def.: some 
questions and problems have no solution, but should still be explored 
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DIMENSIONS OF MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM-SOLVING BELIEFS
(Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; Muis, 2008; Royce & Mos, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1985) 
** Roman numerated items indicate macro-level nodes. Bulleted items indicate 
micro-level codes with operational definitions to help identify specific instances of 
students expressing each belief. It should be noted that a dimensionality stance on 
beliefs implies a continuum exists for each dimension. Thus, individuals will express 
differing degrees of beliefs for each dimension, often exhibiting contradictions, and 
typically context-dependent.**
I. Empirical/rational problem solving (ER)
! Overt evidence of rational belief (RA) – def.: knowledge is derived and justified 
via reason and logic; use of mathematical argumentation, derived proofs, 
theorems, or facts to solve/justify problems
! Overt evidence of empirical belief (EM) – def.: knowledge is derived and 
justified via direct observation; use of trial-and-error, serial testing of hypotheses, 
perceptual information to solve/justify problems 
II. Problem-solving duration (DU) 
! Overt evidence of duration-conscious belief (DC) – def.: if problems cannot be 
solved quickly, they probably cannot be solved at all 
! Overt evidence of duration-oblivious belief (DO) – def.: some problems take a 
long time to solve, but should still be worked to completion 
III. Procedural/conceptual problem solving (PC)
! Overt evidence of procedural belief (PR) – def.: problems can be solved if the 
right steps are applied
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! Overt evidence of conceptual belief (CO) – def.: problems can be solved by 
understanding the underlying principles; conceptual understanding is important 
even when procedural means are applied
IV. Effort/innate attainment of ability (EI)
! Overt evidence of effort belief (EF) – def.: mathematical ability is attainable via 
effort and hard work 
! Overt evidence of innate belief (IN) – def.: mathematical ability is inherent, 
mathematical geniuses are “born with it”
V. Importance of problem solving (IPS)
! Overt evidence of the degree of importance assigned to problem solving
versus computational skills
VI. Usefulness of mathematics (UM)
! Overt evidence of the degree of belief that mathematics is useful to one’s 
endeavors 
